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Abstract 
There is a distinct communication gap between software engineering and 
cybersecurity communities when it comes to addressing reoccurring 
security problems, known as vulnerabilities. Many vulnerabilities are 
caused by software errors that occur due to developers’ common mistakes. 
Insecure software development practices are common due to a variety of 
factors, which include inefficiencies within existing knowledge transfer 
mechanisms based on vulnerability databases (VDBs) and pattern-based 
approaches, software developers perceiving security as an afterthought, 
and lack of consideration of security as part of the Software Development 
Lifecycle (SDLC). The resulting communication gap also prevents 
developers and security experts from successfully sharing essential 
security knowledge. 
This thesis identifies the major issues in the transfer of vulnerability 
knowledge (vulnerability databases (VDBs)) using the existing pattern-
based approaches, which prohibits developers from finding causes of 
vulnerabilities (errors) and mitigating them; Experts of both domains 
struggle to understand each other’s security perspectives due to lack of 
understanding and sharing of common terms, languages and procedures. 
To address these issues, a hybrid pattern-based approach, 
Vulnerability Anti-pattern (VAPs), has been developed consisting of two 
types that encapsulates knowledge of existing vulnerabilities to bridge the 
communication gap between security experts and software developers. A 
catalogue of VAPs based on the most commonly occurring vulnerabilities 
has been created that assists software developers in developing an 
awareness of how malicious hackers can exploit errors in software. 
The evaluation was performed through a series of experimental 
studies to measure the effectiveness of VAP in order to raise awareness 
of poor security practices that lead to vulnerabilities. Whilst the results 
indicate the improvement of developers’ awareness of vulnerabilities and 
encouraging them to create secure software systems.   
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Definitions and Acronyms 
Term Definition  
Anti-Pattern An anti-pattern describes a “general form, the primary 
causes which led to the general form; symptoms 
describing how to recognise the general form; the 
consequences of the general form; and a refactored 
solution describing how to change the Anti-Pattern into 
a healthier situation”(Brown et al. 1998). 
Exploit/ 
Misuse   
A “technique to breach the security of a network or 
information system in violation of a security policy” 
(Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) 
2003). 
Vulnerability  A “weakness in a system, application, or network that is 
subject to exploitation or misuse” (Kissel 2013).  
Software 
Fault 
Pattern 
The Software Fault Patterns (SFP) are a clustering of 
CWEs into related weakness categories. Each cluster is 
“factored into formally defined attributes, with sites 
(footholds), conditions, properties, sources, sinks, etc. 
This work overcomes the problem of combinations of 
attributes in CWE” (Mansourov 2011). 
Penetration 
Tester 
A tester who is “used to test the external perimeter 
security of a network or facility to find vulnerabilities that 
an attacker could exploit” (CERT 2015). 
 
 
VDB Vulnerability Database 
VAP Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
SP Security Pattern 
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures  
CAPEC Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification 
SDLC Software Deployment Lifecycle 
SFP Software Fault Pattern 
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1 Introduction 
There is a distinct communication gap between the software engineering and 
cybersecurity communities when it comes to addressing the class of reoccurring 
security problems known as vulnerabilities. Software errors made by software 
developers cause many vulnerabilities. Insecure software development practices are 
common due to a variety of factors, which include inefficiencies within existing 
knowledge transfer mechanisms based on vulnerability databases (VDBs) such as 
CAPEC and CWE, software developers perceiving security as an afterthought, and a 
lack of consideration of security as part of the Software Development Lifecycle 
(SDLC). The resulting communication gap also prevents developers and security 
experts from successfully sharing essential security knowledge. The cybersecurity 
community makes their expert knowledge available in various forms including 
vulnerability databases and security-related pattern catalogues such as Security 
Patterns, Anti-Patterns, and Software Fault Patterns. However, these existing sources 
are not effective at providing software developers with an understanding of how 
malicious hackers can exploit vulnerabilities in the software systems they create. This 
is due to the complex structure of existing vulnerability knowledge sources coupled 
with a lack of understanding of how to use them during the SDLC (Van and McGraw 
2005, McGraw 2012, Yun-hua and Pei 2010).  
For example, Jafari and Rasoolzadegan (2016) work on securing Gang of Four 
(GoF) design patterns; however, it raised the concerns related to adding overhead 
against increased security. Dougherty et al (2009) extension of work lacks the 
information related to potential vulnerabilities and solutions and of how to tackle them. 
This suggests that improved use of existing security-related patterns embedded with 
vulnerability knowledge can help to improve the security of software. As developers 
are familiar with pattern-based approaches, the use of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns 
(VAPs) to transfer vulnerability knowledge to developers in a usable way is proposed. 
1.1 Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
The Vulnerability Anti-Pattern is a hybrid solution, which encapsulates knowledge of 
vulnerabilities from VDBs and presents this knowledge to developers so that they can 
understand how poor coding software practices can be exploited. This increased 
understanding and awareness of malicious hackers’ techniques will contribute to the 
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development of more secure software and aid developers’ understanding of the 
prevention of software vulnerabilities.  
 The primary contribution of this thesis is twofold:  
1)  A new pattern-based approach – the Vulnerability Anti-Pattern –that 
encapsulates knowledge of existing vulnerabilities to bridge the communication 
gap between security experts and software developers. 
2)  The use of a Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs) catalogue to provide 
information about the most commonly occurring vulnerabilities that software 
developers can use to learn how malicious hackers can exploit errors in code. 
1.2 Difference between the VAP and Existing Security Related Pattern-
Based Approaches  
The Vulnerability Anti-Pattern template is based on that proposed in Brown et al 
(1998). However, existing anti-patterns are not intended to capture relationships 
between poor practices and vulnerabilities, and do not provide mechanisms for 
capturing cybersecurity domain knowledge.  
We argue that existing pattern-based techniques – security patterns (Steel and 
Nagappan 2006), software fault patterns (Mansourov 2011) and attack patterns 
(MITRE Corporation 2014) – are ineffective at capturing and transferring necessary 
knowledge of vulnerabilities. Anand, Ryoo, and Kazman (2014) and Hafiz (2011) 
report that security patterns are harder for developers to use than conventional design 
patterns. Dimitrov (2016) finds that the structure and semantics of software fault 
patterns (SFPS) do not adequately capture all classes of vulnerabilities, and do not 
align well with existing formal notations used by software engineers. In addition, NIST 
reports that SFPs, as used in the CWE database, do not appropriately describe the 
causes or consequences of related vulnerabilities (Black 2017). Faily, Parkin and Lyle 
(2014) evaluated the use of both security patterns and attack patterns within the 
software development process and found problems with the identification of specific 
vulnerabilities in the system, and the complex interactions between security and attack 
patterns; they report that there is “a dearth of work” evaluating the use of attack 
patterns by software engineers. The intended audience for security patterns is security 
experts rather than developers (Bunke 2015; Fernandez-Buglioni 2013), and the need 
for usable and accessible knowledge about vulnerabilities is highlighted by (Van and 
McGraw 2005, Fahl et al. 2013, Acar et al. 2016). 
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As Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs) are intended to capture recurring errors 
that lead to vulnerabilities, we extended the template to include knowledge extracted 
from vulnerability databases to make it understandable to software developers. As an 
example of VAP, the “Use of Potentially Dangerous Function”: 
Anti-Pattern describes the use of functions within a software system that are likely to 
result in exploitable behaviour when a safer alternative is available. An instance of this 
anti-pattern is the use of C’s strcpy function, which provides no inherent safeguards 
against incorrect source or target buffer sizes, frequently resulting in faults such as 
buffer-overflow vulnerabilities (Howard and Lipner 2011). Vulnerabilities resulting from 
improper use of strcpy are so common – as evidenced in the CVE database (MITRE 
Corporation 2016) – that some standards prohibit its use entirely (OWASP 2015).  
The “Use of Potentially Dangerous Function” is proposed as a corresponding 
solution, such as safe library functions strcpy. This VAP captures security expert 
knowledge extracted from these sources in a form that is understandable for software 
developers. 
1.3 Background 
Information technology (IT) infrastructures have evolved over the last two decades 
and are now integrated into virtually every aspect of our lives. The software is a 
component of the IT systems that form a large part of the present day. For example, 
the UK is considered one of the world’s leading digital societies (U.K National Crime 
Agency 2017). This digital transformation of society, however, somehow creates a 
new set of dependencies such as e-banking, social networking and e-commerce. The 
massive expansion of the Internet beyond traditional computers and mobile phones 
fashions a new electronic medium of digital networks, which is called “Cyberspace”, 
used to store, modify and communicate information (Blackwell and Zhu 2014b). This 
also includes other information systems that support businesses, infrastructures and 
services such as power grids, air traffic control systems, satellites, medical 
technologies and industrial plants.   
The term “cybersecurity” has been coined to refer to the protection of assets 
that are directly or indirectly connected to the Internet (CERT 2015). There will always 
be attempts to exploit weaknesses to launch cyber-attacks. This threat cannot be 
eliminated completely, but the risk can be significantly reduced to a level that allows 
users to continue to prosper, and benefit from the potential opportunities that digital 
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technology brings (Mansourov and Campara 2010). In terms of economic investment 
to maintain cyberspace security, the recent National Cyber Security Strategy 2017-
2021 (National Cyber Security Centre 2016)  estimated that the UK Government 
invests £1.9 billion in cybersecurity (U.K National Crime Agency 2017). In a 
comparatively recent article (CERT 2015), both cybersecurity experts and software 
engineers noted that people’s critical dependency on the Internet had changed so 
radically since the field’s inception. This has created a mind shift in the way we define 
as its early definition is limited to (i) computer security, and (ii) internet security. 
However, the modern definition of cybersecurity further includes process, controls and 
technologies that are designed to protect systems, networks and data from cyber-
attacks (Craigen, Diakun-Thibault and Purse 2014). 
Recently, there has been renewed interest in pattern-oriented research 
methods whose primary focus is to study a subject domain such as Cyberspace by 
identifying the potential relationship between different types of cyber-patterns. Uses 
the term “Cyber-patterns” to refer to unifying design patterns with security and attack 
related patterns in cyberspace. There is little consensus about what cyberspace 
actually means; however, Morningstar and Farmer (2003) have observed that 
cyberspace is defined more by the social interactions involved rather than its technical 
implementation. 
Either way, software systems and the Internet are intertwined with each other 
in cyberspace where users interact for social, information and creative purposes. As 
software systems are continuously growing in size, complexity and connectivity, the 
growing risks are related to their malicious use (McGraw 2006). For malicious 
attackers, the attack surface1 has been increasing by 70% over the last decade, which 
contributes to the misuse of software systems and the exploitation of vulnerabilities 
(Choo 2011). 
Programmers can make mistakes during the development process, which could 
generate or lead to software vulnerabilities. A software vulnerability is a flaw or defect 
in the software system that can be exploited by an attacker in order to obtain some 
privileges in the system. It means the vulnerabilities offer possible entry points to the 
system. Despite the knowledge about vulnerabilities nowadays, there is still a growing 
tendency in the number of reported vulnerabilities, and this is the reason why software 
                                            
1 The total sum of the vulnerabilities in a given computing device or network that are accessible to a hacker. 
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security has become an important field of research. The presence of vulnerabilities in 
software makes it necessary to have techniques that can help and assist developers 
in understanding and mitigating errors during the development of the software.  
In this chapter, the research problem upon which this thesis is based is 
introduced, i.e. why the development of mistakes or errors that lead to vulnerabilities 
are posing a significant challenge for developers in the creation of secure software. 
The research aims to address the existing communication gap between software 
engineers and cybersecurity experts when it comes to addressing reoccurring security 
problems. The research proposed questions that contribute to bridging the knowledge 
gap between both communities. Based on these questions, the main claim made by 
this thesis is to justify the research approach which is derived via the Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern (VAP). This chapter concludes by presenting an overview of the dissertation 
in Section 1.4, followed by its detailed structure in Section 1.9 and publications arise 
from thesis work in Section 1.10. 
The key objectives of the chapter are: 
• Provide an overview of the thesis in section 1.4.  
• Describe the thesis statement and arising research questions in sections 1.5, 
1.6, 1.7 and 1.8. 
• Present the dissertation structure and published work in sections 1.9 and 1.10. 
1.4 Thesis Motivation (Story Line) 
Security is a challenging task for software developers. The development process of 
most software systems prioritises efficiency, cost and user convenience, deadlines, 
but does not always have security designed in from the start. Thus, while users’ 
expectations for technology innovation continue to increase, the quality of software 
security and security often falls short. The unfortunate reality, however, is that software 
developers struggle against these recurring and consistent software errors (commonly 
known as vulnerabilities), e.g. buffer overflows and integer overflows are exploited by 
hackers on a daily basis (OWASP 2015). The Software can be made vulnerable 
through a variety of factors ranging from complex requirements specifications, 
accidental introduction of software errors, and the adoption of poor software 
engineering practices. Malicious hackers may have the capabilities and motivations to 
take advantage of these simple mistakes, which may be unknown to the developer 
who inadvertently introduced them. Furthermore, a lack of understanding of what 
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vulnerabilities are and how they can be exploited may be the reason for developers to 
continue making the same errors repeatedly during the development process. 
The frequency of recurrence of recently discovered vulnerabilities in CVE 
(MITRE Corporation 2015a) shows that malicious hackers know a lot more about 
attacking systems than the developers who created them, indicating that the 
effectiveness of attackers can be traced back to their extensive knowledge sharing as 
discussed further in literature review chapter. In comparison, security experts and 
software developers fail to show similar efficiency in their knowledge sharing 
(Mouratidis, Giorgini and Manson 2003, Yun-hua and Pei 2010, McGraw 2012). 
Although the problem of frequently recurring software vulnerabilities is very well 
known, no standard solution has been universally adopted (Mansourov and Campara 
2010). Furthermore, according to the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) “in 2016, 
cybercrime cost the UK economy £29.1 billion and is growing at an alarming rate” (Levi 
et al. 2016). As a corollary, users would also like software systems to be as secure as 
they are usable. However, this presents a challenging task for software developers 
due to an augmented complex network of people and software systems against 
vulnerabilities. 
The question is: “Why do developers repeatedly make security mistakes?” 
In general, software developers do not thoroughly understand the security 
issues and their main focus is usually delivering features and functionalities, rather 
than making sure that software is secure (Howard 2004). Moreover, in the software 
engineering community, the common trend is to tackle security during the late stages 
of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). Ironically, this is estimated to be 30 
times more expensive than considering security in the early stages of the SDLC 
(Howard 2004). The problem arises when considering how to bridge the distinct 
communication gap between software engineering and cybersecurity experts as part 
of a resilient system development process. Software engineers (Shiralkarand 2009)  
recommend that security should be implemented from the early stages of development 
and should be considered as important as other functional requirements. In the same 
manner, cybersecurity experts suggest the early use of security domain knowledge 
during software development.  There are, however, many reasons why this might not 
occur in practices:  
• Developers face limitations with regards to time and finances (Hans 2010). 
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• There is a lack of knowledge sharing between both experts (developers and 
security) (Yun-hua and Pei 2010, McGraw 2012). 
• Developers present no threat. However, to build secure software systems, 
there is a need to provide developers with usable and understandable security 
knowledge (Green and Smith 2016, Acar et al. 2016, Witschey et al. 2015). 
Evidence from previous studies reflects that there is a knowledge gap between 
developers and security experts, which requires special attention in order to deal with 
vulnerabilities (Ghani et al. 2013, Xie, Lipford, and Chu 2011, Fahl et al. 2013, Acar et 
al. 2016).  Due to this communication gap, the understanding of how common errors 
in software development result in exploitable vulnerabilities in software systems is 
limited (Morgan 2016). For example, in 2016, 10626 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
vulnerability exploitations were confirmed by CVE (MITRE Corporation 2015a) and 
considered one of the most prevalent web application security threat (Wichers 2017). 
Despite XSS prevalence and severe consequences, generally, XSS mitigation only 
requires a simple input validation during development. This has revealed that XSS is 
one of the most common types of vulnerability in web applications, yet many 
developers remain unaware of it and unable to identify instances due to their lack of 
understanding of existing complicated cybersecurity knowledge.  
This thesis argues that an easily understood (usable) representation of recurring 
exploitable development errors can help developers’ awareness of how malicious 
hackers exploit these errors. Thus, it would be fruitful to study failures, identify the 
recurring poor software practices and suggest solutions to these problems. This 
concept is known as a negative pattern or an anti-pattern.  This study proposes a new 
pattern-based approach based upon the improved use of: “the Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern” that encapsulates knowledge of existing vulnerabilities as a solution to bridge 
the gap between cybersecurity experts and software developers. A catalogue of 
Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs), based on the most commonly occurring 
vulnerabilities, is developed that software developers can use to learn how malicious 
hackers exploit errors and address these during SDLC. 
1.5 Rationale for Research 
Despite the software engineering community’s endeavours, and the cybersecurity 
community’s best efforts, the number of serious software exploitations is increasing: 
According to IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index report (2017) tracked 10,197 
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software vulnerabilities in 2016 (Alvarez et al. 2017). Generally, developers are not 
trained on how to leverage existing vulnerability database sources in order to learn 
how to avoid development errors that potentially cause vulnerabilities. Insecure 
software development practices are common due to a variety of factors, which include 
(i) inefficiencies within existing knowledge transfer mechanisms based on vulnerability 
databases (VDBs) and pattern-based approaches, (ii) software developers perceiving 
security as an afterthought, and (iii) lack of consideration of security as part of the 
Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). This information gap between software 
developers and cybersecurity experts has directly led to widespread software 
vulnerabilities. The frequency of recurrence of commonly discovered vulnerabilities in 
databases, such as CVE, confirms that software developers make the same errors 
repeatedly during the development process. Consequently, it would be fruitful to study 
failures, identify recurring poor software practices and find solutions for these 
problems (Busch, Koch and Wirsing 2014, McGraw 2004, Howard and Lipner 2009). 
In addition to investigating how cybersecurity knowledge sources could be used to 
bridge the understanding gap of security information for software developers.  
1.6 Thesis Statement  
The essential argument made in this thesis is that using a pattern-based approach to 
the documentation and communication of knowledge about recurring security 
mistakes (and their amelioration) made during the process of software development 
can lead to the production of more secure software. The need for such an approach 
is based on the observation that ‘vulnerability knowledge’ is not currently transferred 
effectively between the disparate cybersecurity and software development 
communities. Whilst existing pattern-based approaches have been shown to improve 
developers’ understanding of vulnerabilities, it is further hypothesised that constraints 
in the design/style of patterns used have limited the effectiveness of knowledge 
transfer in current approaches. 
 
This thesis statement will be defended through work which seeks to answer the 
following research questions. 
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1.7 Research Questions (RQ) 
The work described in this thesis is thus based on proving the research question: “Can 
a pattern-based approach (Vulnerability Anti-Pattern) be effective in bridging the 
security knowledge gap between software developers and security experts in order to 
help developers in the creation of secure software systems?”  
This research question can be broken down into the following questions: 
• RQ1: Do software developers have an effective understanding of errors that 
lead to the creation of vulnerabilities, coupled with an awareness of how 
malicious hackers can exploit these errors? 
• RQ2: Why are current attempts, in the form of patterns and catalogues of 
vulnerabilities, not successful in communicating security knowledge to software 
developers? 
• RQ3: Do developers know how to mitigate these recurrent errors during the 
Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)? 
This work is original in that no previous study has used the Anti-Patterns construct to 
capture vulnerabilities to educate developers against common vulnerabilities to 
facilitate the creation of secure software.  
1.8 Research Hypotheses (RH) 
This research posits the following hypotheses: 
• RH1: Software developers cannot radically recognise recurring software 
vulnerabilities during the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). 
• RH2: Current attempts, in the form of patterns and catalogues of vulnerabilities, 
are generally not successful in communicating security knowledge to software 
developers. 
• RH3: Anti-Patterns can provide sufficient awareness and understanding of 
vulnerabilities in order to enable developers to create more secure software. 
1.9 Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation is broken down into the subsequent nine chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 
situate the dissertation and present the existing pattern-based approaches used to 
derive Vulnerability Anti-pattern (VAP). Chapters 4, and 5 present the overview of VAP 
design and create a catalogue of VAPs, which is validated by the pilot and industrial 
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studies described in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. Finally, Chapters 9, and 10 discuss the 
results and review the thesis. 
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2. Literature Review  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the on temporary state-of-affairs in the design of 
secure software development practices. This is achieved by describing the changing 
trends in cybersecurity that increase the importance of secure software development. 
Existing pattern-based approaches proposed by the cybersecurity and software 
engineering communities are evaluated to alleviate the severity of security problems 
during software development. Given the dissertation’s focus an in-depth study of 
several pattern-based software engineering & cybersecurity approaches are 
considered from a security perspective. The analysed pattern-based approaches are 
security patterns, attack patterns, software fault patterns, and anti-patterns. The 
literature review has emphasised the fact that these existing efforts from both 
communities are not effective in terms of providing essential awareness about 
software development errors that create knowledge gaps. The chapter concludes with 
a brief evaluation of why security is a growing problem for developers due to existing 
knowledge gaps between software engineers and cybersecurity experts. 
 
3. Criticism of Existing Pattern-Based Approaches and the 
Derivation of a New Approach: Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) 
Chapter 3 describes the proposed methodology used to validate and achieve research 
propositions. It critiques the existing pattern-based approaches taken by the 
cybersecurity and software engineering communities, before presenting the derived 
research method employed. At the end of this chapter, the derivation of Vulnerability 
Anti-Pattern (VAP) process is proposed as improved use of the anti-pattern approach. 
VAP contributes to raising the awareness of developers about common vulnerabilities 
that is necessary for the development of secure software. 
 
4. Vulnerability Anti-Patterns: A Timeless Way to Capture Poor 
Software Practices (Vulnerabilities) 
Chapter 4 presents a proposed hybrid solution “Vulnerability Anti-Pattern”, which 
encapsulates vulnerability knowledge from vulnerability databases (VDBs) and 
presents this knowledge to developers so that they can understand how malicious 
hackers can exploit poor software practices. This chapter provides the VAP definition 
and conceptual design. A justification is presented on how VAPs can help fill the 
knowledge gap between communities – software engineering and cybersecurity – by 
encapsulating knowledge of commonly occurring vulnerabilities. This is followed by 
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the solution presented by this research; merging cybersecurity knowledge into anti-
patterns to generate a new pattern-based approach in the form of VAPs. Two types of 
VAPs are proposed; formal and informal, in terms of how the vulnerabilities are 
addressed. Collectively, this pattern-based approach helps developers to understand 
and become aware of malicious hackers’ techniques and contributes to the 
development of more secure software. This chapter justifies the related concepts such 
as a vulnerability, an anti-pattern and their relationship. This chapter ends with a 
conclusion to describe both the proposed templates of VAPs: formal and informal. 
 
5. Creating a Catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs) 
Chapter 5 presents the catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs) including 12 
vulnerabilities chosen from the OWASP list of “Top 25 Most Dangerous Software 
Errors”. This chapter presents the clustering approaches to develop a catalogue of 
VAPs. The chapter concludes by describing both catalogues of VAPs: formal and 
informal. 
 
6. Pilot Study -I (PS-I) 
Chapter 6 is the part of the evaluation process, which describes the quantitative 
analysis of pilot study-I (without intervention) and its results. This chapter elucidates 
the pilot-study-I, including detail of participants and statistical analysis of data. The 
chapter concludes with statistically significant outcomes of the study. 
 
7. Pilot Study -II (PS-II) 
As a part of the evaluation process, chapter 7 describes the quantitative analysis of 
pilot-study-II and its results. This chapter explains the experiment design, its 
participants and analysis of the statistical results. The chapter concludes with 
significant outcomes of the pilot-study-II.   
 
8. Industrial Study 
As a part of the evaluation process, chapter 8 presents a case study, which 
investigates the contributions of the thesis.  The industrial study based on qualitative 
analysis investigates the use of VAPs by professional software developers that belong 
to the UK-based leading software development company. In the end, this chapter 
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concludes the qualitative analysis results to presents the effectiveness of VAPs in 
order to raise awareness of vulnerabilities. 
 
9. Discussion 
Chapter 9 is the last chapter of the evaluation process, which discusses the conclusive 
results of the series of experimental studies: pilot study-I, pilot-study-II and industrial 
study.  
 
10. Conclusion & Future Work 
Chapter 10 presents the findings gleaned from developing and applying Vulnerability 
Anti-Patterns, which details the contributions made by VAPs to increase developers’ 
awareness about vulnerabilities, before critically analysing the thesis in more detail. 
This critical analysis involves summarising the case made by the thesis, reviewing 
whether the research questions posed in Section 1.5 have been properly answered, 
reflecting on the issues identified while conducting this research, and stating how the 
research contributions in this dissertation answer the research questions and thus 
validate the overall hypothesis. In the end, this chapter concludes with proposing 
future work, extending the contributions made. 
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Figure 1 Dissertation roadmap 
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1.10 Publications Arising from Thesis Work 
Table 1 describes the elements of this dissertation which have been published as 
posters or in conference proceeding and journals. 
 
Publications Related 
Chapters 
Nafees, T. et al. 2016. Bridging the Void between Software 
Engineers and Security Experts. In: Proceedings of the 
womENcourage 2016 - 3rd ACM-W Europe, Linz, Austria. 12-
13 September 2016. ACM,pp.24-25. 
https://womencourage.acm.org/archive/2016/poster_abstracts
/womENcourage_2016_paper_24.pdf  
2 
Nafees, T. et al. 2017. Idea-caution before exploitation: The 
use of cybersecurity domain knowledge to educate software 
engineers against software vulnerabilities. In: Proceedings of 
International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software 
and Systems 2017. Springer, pp.133-142. 
2,3 
Nafees, T. et al. 2017. A Vulnerability Anti-Patterns: Essential 
Education for Software Developers. PCWiCS-2017: The Truth 
About Cyber Security in 7 Words!, Edinburgh, UK, 10th May 
2017. 
http://thecyberacademy.org/pcwics-2017/. 
3,4 
Nafees, T. et al. 2017. Vulnerability anti-patterns: A timeless 
way to capture poor software practices (vulnerabilities). In: 
Proceedings of the 24th Conference on Pattern Languages of 
Programs 2017. The Hillside Group, pp.23-47. 
5 
 
Table 1 Published work from thesis  
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2 Literature Review  
This chapter introduces, some general concepts related to cybersecurity. It is essential 
to understand, as a part of this research, the extent and characteristics of 
cybersecurity, while explaining core cybersecurity terminologies from two different 
perspectives- software developers and cybersecurity experts. In addition, it reviews 
the literature to answer some critical questions such as: why do we care about 
security; who is responsible for maintaining security in cyberspace?  
Both software engineering and cybersecurity communities share the concept of 
security in cyberspace; the research evaluates how existing work on vulnerabilities (in 
the form of vulnerability databases) might be cogent to aid developers to deal with 
poor software development practices. This chapter provides an overview of efforts 
made by the software engineering and cybersecurity communities to address security 
concerns during the software development phases/stages. In particular, potential 
pattern-based approaches are reviewed, while considering existing issues which arise 
when transferring security knowledge from cybersecurity community to software 
engineers when it comes to addressing vulnerabilities in order to create of secure 
software systems. The discussed core concepts in this chapter will be used in the rest 
of the dissertation. 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite significant advances in the state of the art of computer systems in recent 
years, security of information is lacking, and resources in cyberspace are more 
vulnerable than ever before. Each major technological advance in software systems 
raises new security vulnerabilities and threats that require new security solutions. 
Problems regarding the security of software systems are emerging faster than the rate 
of the derivation of their solutions. From software developers’ points of view, 
cybersecurity experts developed methodologies that are often too general and hard to 
understand to implement during software development lifecycle (Kis 2002, Busch, 
Koch and Wirsing 2014). Software engineering methodologies, on the other hand, lack 
support to implement security specifications particularly to see errors that cause 
vulnerabilities (Poller et al. 2017, Xiao, Witschey and Murphy-Hill 2014). Security is 
considered to protect assets from various threats posed by vulnerabilities inherent in 
the system. In general, developers lack the particular “security mindset” in order to find 
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vulnerabilities (Conti and Caroland 2011, Severance 2016). As a result, a distinct 
communication gap between software engineers and cybersecurity experts exist 
regarding security (Van and McGraw 2005, McGraw 2012). It is imperative that both 
communities work together. Questions arising from this are “Why do software 
developers struggle with persistent software errors?” and “What are the knowledge 
gaps that exist between software engineers and cybersecurity experts?”   
There is no simple answer to these questions, although the most obvious issues 
are the lack of commonly shared understanding and poor communication between 
software developers and security experts. In other words, these domains struggle to 
understand each other’s perspectives and do not share common terms, languages, 
and procedures, which prevents them from finding causes of vulnerabilities (errors) 
and explaining them (Fahl et al. 2013). No single security measure or mechanism can 
provide a completely secure system. In fact, there is a fundamental tension inherent 
in today’s systems between functionality (i.e. an essential property of any working 
system) and security (i.e. also critical in many cases) (Hans 2010, Busch, Koch and 
Wirsing 2014).  Therefore, a plan is required to create a balance between systems’ 
core functionalities and the level of protection required for developing a secure system. 
We might not be able to change how software systems work in cyberspace, but the 
transfer of knowledge from cybersecurity community can help in avoiding the typical 
threats and deploy acceptable security practices (Weir, Rashid and Noble 2017, 
Nafees et al. 2017).  
The start of the chapter presents a history of cybersecurity, which began with 
computer security and information security early definitions/concepts and how these 
both merge into cybersecurity. This follows to introduce cybersecurity fundamentals, 
which are explored from software developers’ and cybersecurity experts’ point of view. 
This provides an overview of why cybersecurity experts and software developers are 
different. Following this, cyber-patterns and their relationship within cyberspace are 
explained. The scope of research was to focus on Cybersecurity and software 
engineering efforts to deal with software security while using pattern-based 
approaches. This chapter examined the existing literature related to security from two 
communities: 
• Software engineering community efforts to build security through improved 
use of software development processes, improving runtime environment and 
safer programming libraries, and a pattern-based approach (security pattern). 
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• Cybersecurity community efforts to capture security practice in the form of a 
catalogue of vulnerabilities and to use pattern-based approaches such as 
software fault patterns, attack patterns and anti-patterns. 
At the end of the chapter, the shortcomings of previous communities’ attempts are 
analysed. The chapter’s contents are: 
• Section 2.1.1 provides the problem background  
• Section 2.2 provides an overview of cybersecurity.  
• Section 2.3 presents cybersecurity key terminologies from two different 
perspectives, i.e. software developers’ and cybersecurity experts’.  
• Section 2.4 introduces interdisciplinary security related concerts of both 
communities.  
• Sections 2.8 to 2.9 explore the reasons why security is a problem in 
cyberspace.  
• Section 2.10 examines the causes for the distinct knowledge gap between 
software developers and security experts. 
• Section 2.11 discusses the shortcomings of previous pattern-based 
approaches of both communities, i.e. software engineering and cybersecurity.  
• This chapter concludes with a discussion of knowledge pulling and pushing 
from cybersecurity to software engineering in Sections 2.12 to 2.15. 
2.1.1 Background  
Programmers make mistakes. Much research effort has concentrated on addressing 
this problem (Todorov 2015). Of particular concern are those coding flaws that lead to 
security vulnerabilities. The deliberate misuse of such a vulnerability is termed as 
exploitation, resulting in information leaks, and reducing the value or usefulness of the 
system (Leveson 2004). Generally, software developers do not consider the security 
as their focus is on delivering features, rather than on ensuring the security of the 
software code, so it is often considered as something to be implemented during later 
stages of development. However, the cost of fixing bugs post software release is 
estimated to be 30 times pre-release cost (Cabinet Office 2011). Testing has a poor 
relation to security. It is unusual for the software developer to use testing approaches 
for finding vulnerabilities; this issue has not received the research attention it requires 
(Bekrar et al. 2011). One implication of this is that security concerns should be 
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embedded into the software development lifecycle (including the early phases) 
(Jorgensen 2013). In reality, however, software developers struggle against recurring 
and consistent software flaws (i.e. buffer overflows, and integer overflows), which are 
exploited by malicious hackers. Nonetheless, a large body of knowledge about 
software vulnerabilities exists within the cybersecurity community, in particular, 
amongst penetration testers and ethical hackers. The term ‘Ethical Hacker’ (EH) will 
be used as a shorthand to denote this community. Currently, ethical hackers put much 
effort into classifying discovered vulnerabilities and developing taxonomies of these 
vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities are then catalogued in publicly available 
vulnerability databases (VDBs) (Aslam, Krsul and Spafford 1996). Software 
developers have worked to embed security within the software development lifecycle 
(SDLC) (Howard and Lipner 2006) in order to reduce deployment errors. The 
mechanism of knowledge transfers between the vulnerability databases (VDBs), 
developers’ perceptions of security issues and the security development lifecycle 
(SDLC) is complex, which creates a distinct communication gap between ethical 
hackers and software engineers (Busch, Koch and Wirsing 2014). The application of 
(knowledge) communication directs software developers to repeat persistent prevalent 
vulnerabilities and gives rise to software flaws exploitation. Various attempts to 
capture and formalise the knowledge transfer in a manner appropriate to software 
engineers have been made, including Misuse Patterns (Fernandez, Yoshioka and 
Washizaki 2010), Software Fault Patterns (SFP) (Mansourov 2011), and Security 
Patterns (SP). The need for a better understanding of this mechanism and our 
proposed solution is the subject of this research. 
2.2 Overview of Cybersecurity  
Cybersecurity is a field that is continuously evolving, perhaps even more than the IT 
industry itself (Von and Van 2013). As cybersecurity is undergoing many dramatic 
changes, it is not easy to explain cybersecurity in a definitive way. In fact, the definition 
of Cyber or Security are both under debate and the meaning of cybersecurity has 
evolved over time. For the purpose of this chapter, we will frame the definition in the 
context of the internet or computer systems’ evolutionary history. Thus far, this 
evolutionary process spans the last five decades. Such evaluation allows us to explore 
aspects of cybersecurity as explained in Section 2.2.1 and succeeding Section 2.2.3 
to define the notion of cybersecurity. 
 20 
2.2.1 Evolutionary History of Cybersecurity  
2.2.1.1 Era of Computer Security  
In its origins (Flamm 1988), computer security was focussed on keeping the glass 
houses in which computer processing units were positioned to protect from vandalism, 
along with ensuring constant cooling and electricity. There was a limited number of 
people who used and accessed computer systems (Amoroso 1994, Garfinkel, 
Spafford and Schwartz 2003). After the revolutionary change in the early 1950’s, the 
internet was designed for researchers to share information easily. In that era, internet 
as the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) protocols were 
introduced by the Department of Defence’s Advanced Research Project Agency 
(ARPA), whose intention was to promote the use of a supercomputer among 
researchers and share classified information (Abbate 2000). During these years, the 
primary aim of the internet was to provide openness and flexibility with unrestricted 
access to information on the network for collaborative research. As a result, the first 
problems related to information security emerged because of this ongoing design 
decision unrestricted information sharing. The term information security is loosely 
defined as the protection of information from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction (Fal’ 2010), which are explained further in 
Section 2.2.1.4. Some examples of that time (1980’s) security incidents, which raised 
information security concerns, are described by (Levy 2001) in his book “Hackers: 
Heroes of the Computer Revolution”. Security incidents took place due to unrestricted 
information sharing over the internet in that era had brought the researchers’ attention 
towards future information security-related issues with a realisation to do work about 
it. 
2.2.1.2 Era of Computer Security or Information Security 
As a result of the information sharing and its related security issues, researchers 
introduced the term Information Security, which at first was used synonymously with 
Computer Security (Cherdantseva and Hilton 2013). Regarding the concept of 
substituting Computer Security with Information Security, so far there has been little 
agreement on definitions proposed by Russell and Cherdantseva (Russell and 
Gangemi 1991, Cherdantseva and Hilton 2013) and (Van and McGraw 2005). These 
definitions have revealed the relationship between these disciplines - computer 
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security and information security. There was a general consensus between both 
disciplines’ researchers that the term Information Security could be used in an 
exchange for Computer Security. However, according to (Van and McGraw 2005) the 
definition  of Computer Security has often been regarded as a branch of Information 
Security, which carefully considers the confidentiality and integrity of classified 
information, while (Russell and Gangemi 1991) proposed definition embraces all 
possible aspects of Information Security into basic definition of Computer Security 
such as confidentially, integrity, and availability; therefore, the popular conception of 
Computer Security is often called Information Security. 
During the1960’s, which is known as an era of Information Security, secrecy 
and confidentially was the primary security concern across networks and shared 
computers. By that, security is a matter of protecting the information itself. 
The first accounts of malicious hacking and vulnerability exploitation references 
are: the malicious hacking action published in 1963 in Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT’s) Tech newspaper (Raymond 2017, Lightsein 2008). The 
vulnerability exploitation was performed by William D. Mathews from MIT 
in CTSS running on an IBM 7094 (Csanadi 2015, McMillan 2012). The publicity 
resulting from the misuse was held to have played a key educational role for users. 
In the late 1960’s, the networked computer concept was introduced in the form 
of server and client systems, which enabled the sharing of resources and information, 
both within a computer and over a network. According to Amoroso (1994), and 
Garfinkel, Spafford and Schwartz (2003), additional security problems became the 
primary concern for security researchers and practitioners. 
Progress was, however, being made (Cheswick, Bellovin and Rubin 2003) to 
define Computer Security in more detail, so these arising issues could be addressed 
properly. Consequently, Information Security was integrated into computers system 
security. Authors such as, (Garfinkel, Spafford and Schwartz 2003) propose a more 
operational definition of Computer Security when suggesting that “a computer is 
secure if you depend on it and its software to behave as you expect”, and this concept 
is often called “trust”. In conclusion, however, these informal definitions include natural 
disasters and faulty software as security concerns. Secure software development and 
testing concerns in the regard of computer and information security was often 
overlooked by researchers (McGraw 1999). 
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2.2.1.3 Digital Era of Cybersecurity 
In the early 1980’s, the FBI investigated a breach of security at National CSS, as 
reported in the New York Times (McLellan 1981). This period recognised hackers as 
being an asset in the computer industry. According to (Walton 2006), the United 
Kingdom’s first Computer Misuse Act was written after a hacking attack on Prince 
Philip’s Prestel mailbox (Calcutt 1999). Such events brought to researchers’ attention 
that the correct operation of software can also become a security problem when it is 
operated in a manner which it was not intended to be used.  
By 1988, the Internet was an essential tool for communications, but it began to 
create concerns about privacy and security in the digital world. The term digital world 
here means the virtual space for inter-connected digital devices and media, which is 
further discussed in Section 2.7.2. 
Eisenberg and Gries (1989) described the first computer worm that affected 
many computers, created by Robert Morris. It was a landmark incident in that it was 
the first widespread instance of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack and since then this 
class of vulnerability has been persistently publicised like a buffer overflow 
vulnerability. Up to that time, developers view that software errors (Kidwell 1998) such 
as buffer overruns were a potential problem, but not many people realized what the 
consequences of those errors could be.  
The buffer overflow was one of several exploits used by the Morris worm 
(Orman 2003) to propagate itself over the Internet. Due to the infancy of the internet 
at the time, the impact was less than it would be today. However, it laid the groundwork 
for the kinds of security issues that have seem observable since the Morris Worm. 
This catastrophic incident ultimately forced security practitioners and researchers to 
include software security as an integral part of information security in cyberspace. 
Since software errors have the potential to be exploited as vulnerabilities, software 
security received increased interest among researchers and practitioners (Vacca 
2009). In response to the Morris worm incident, the CERTs (Computer Emergency 
Response Teams) were created in 1988 (Pesante 2002) the first organization of its 
kind in which researchers coordinate responses to computer security incidents in order 
to find and publish software bugs that impact software and internet security. The team 
works with business and government to improve the security of software systems. To 
deal with obvious and growing dangers of cyber-attacks, a large number of software 
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exploits emphasised to researchers that bolting security onto an existing system is not 
a good strategy (McGraw 2012). McGraw argues that software security significantly 
improved but these efforts are not enough, as he explained in his study in the section 
on “Bugs per square inch trending down”: Despite the improvement in architecture risk 
analysis, code review technology and penetration testing techniques, the sheer 
volume of code product is immense, requiring persistent effort to build secure 
software. Therefore, McGraw argues the need for training for software development 
teams to provide knowledge of attacks. He also mentions that exploitation knowledge 
should be cycled back into the development organization and for developers, thus 
security practitioners should explicitly track both threat models and attack patterns. 
Security is not a simple feature because it requires advanced planning and 
careful design that includes some emergent properties such as fault tolerance, and 
error handling. As the internet has greatly increased the connectivity and extensibility 
of computer systems, and complexity of modern software systems, it is necessary to 
secure the cyberspace (computers and networks) and its contextual use (information). 
The question needing to be asked is how developers can implement/adopt the security 
concerns from the start of software systems development to ensure the use of good 
software assurance practices. However, improvement required to include software 
security as an integral part of computer security or information security in order to 
educate developers about up-to-date software assurance practices. In some way, 
progress is being made while changing the opinion to security and trying to emerge 
software security as an integral part of information security (Von and Van 2013). Since 
the start of the decade, a number of studies have revealed a relationship between 
information security and cybersecurity that confirmed the association between them 
in order to protect information (Cherdantseva and Hilton 2013, Von and Van 2013, 
Alexander and Panguluri 2017). 
2.2.1.4 Interrelation between Cybersecurity and Information Security  
Following the brief historical evaluation of cybersecurity, this Section will explain how 
cybersecurity and information security correlate to each other. 
According to ISO/IEC 27000:2009, Information security may be defined to preserve 
three cores of security, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
(Fal’ 2010). 
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According to International Telecommunication Union (Craigen, Diakun-Thibault 
and Purse 2014), cybersecurity may be defined as “the collection of tools, policies, 
security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, 
actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies”, which can be used to 
protect the cyber environment and both organizational and user assets.  
These definitions indicate that cybersecurity and information security are closely 
interrelated and are, indeed, integrated in order to cover significant aspects of security 
within cyberspace. 
2.2.2 Narrowing the Definition of Computer Security  
Before the problem of data (information) security became widely publicised in the 
media, the idea of computer security mostly focused on the physical machine. 
Traditionally, computer facilities have been physically protected for three reasons 
(Stallings et al. 2012): 
• To prevent theft of, or damage to, the hardware 
• To prevent theft of, or damage to, the information  
• To prevent disruption of service 
To date, however, increased reliance on the Internet, has radically changed 
Computer Security concerns towards protecting information from unauthorized 
disclosure, or information secrecy. According to Garfinkel and Spafford’s (2003) 
definition, Computer Security, which was introduced in Section 2.2.1.2, was meant to 
maintain a “Trust”, which may be defined as a functional component of a system in 
order to protect and preserve data. Maintaining trust is not an only concern within 
cyberspace. Referring to ISO/IEC 27000:2009, there are other factors, which need to 
be considered against sophisticated cyber-attacks. For example, preventing a system 
from unauthorised access or unauthorised use on the network. These concerns have 
an association with the core of the concept of Information Security such as 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Thus far, however, with pervasive remote 
terminal access now in the form of communication, and networking, the idea of 
Computer Security has been dramatically changed. 
According to the NIST handbook’s Computer Security definition (Guttman and 
Roback 1995), it may be defined as the protection afforded to automation systems in 
order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability and 
confidentiality of information system resources (includes hardware, firmware, 
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information/data and telecommunication). From the following NIST definition, which 
enclosed both Information Security and Computer Security aspects in much more 
detail, in addition to the security cores such as confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(CIA) (Landwehr 1981, Russell and Gangemi 1991) that are discussed further in 
Section 2.3.2.5, it is suggested that both Computer Security and Information Security 
are intertwined in order to maintain security in cyberspace. 
It can be concluded from NIST Computer Security definition that cyberspace 
includes security of information/data, network, and internet, which is in line with 
cyberspace definition introduced in (Blackwell and Zhu 2014b) in Section 2.7.2. After 
examining the last five-decades of literature in this regard to explore the possible 
alternative definitions of cybersecurity, the direction of academic thought on the 
subject of cybersecurity evokes a sense of revolt and revolution, since the security 
concept was transformed, from computer security to information security, with modern 
cyberspace ideology. In order to establish a working definition of cybersecurity, the 
following section presents some proposed formal definitions. 
2.2.3 Defining Cybersecurity 
In recent decades, cybersecurity has become increasingly challenging, and, in order 
to comprehend this phenomenon, it is first necessary to clarify the notion of 
cybersecurity. Different definitions have been proposed, and these have been 
contrasted with the concepts of cyberspace, information security, and computer 
security (CNSS, 2003; Butler, 2013; CERT, 2015). Table 2 reflects three different 
definitions that provide an overview of how cybersecurity and its concept has changed 
over time. 
 
CNSS (2003) Butler (2013) CERT (2015) 
Cyberspace Cyberspace  
Information security  
Computer security 
Cyberspace  
Information security 
Computer security 
Table 2 Cybersecurity core definitions in different eras.  
As illustrated in Table 2, the most up-to-date definition of cybersecurity 
comprises three cores: cyberspace, information security and computer security. As 
shown in Table 2, the definition of cybersecurity evolved over time. Such as, there is 
consensus to include cyberspace in the definition of cybersecurity, which is 
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fundamentally considered as a primary core. For example, CNSS (2003) stated, 
Cybersecurity may be defined as the ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace 
from cyber-attacks. 
CNSS (2003) and Butler & CERT, (2013; 2015) proposed definitions show a 
modest association between information security and cybersecurity, including the 
cyberspace. 
An advanced definition of cybersecurity is provided by Kaspersky Lab (Butler 
2013), describing the practice of defending computers and servers, mobile devices, 
electronic systems, networks and data from malicious attacks. The term is broader 
ranging and applies to everything from computer security to disaster recovery and 
end-user education. To compare the above definitions with Garfinkel and Spafford’s 
(2003) definition, the interesting fact is that computer security is a subset of 
cybersecurity, because it focuses on protecting computers, networks, programs, and 
data from unintended or unauthorized access, change, or destruction.  
The most comprehensive definition, so far is provided by the CERT 
Coordination (2015), which defines cybersecurity as “the full range of threat reduction, 
vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, 
resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operation, 
information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence 
missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and 
communication infrastructure”. 
This definition is relatively similar to those of CERT (2015) and Butler (2013) 
who defined cybersecurity as “the information and communications systems and 
services composed of all hardware and software that process, store, and 
communicate information, or any combination of all of these elements: Processing 
includes the creation, access, modification, and destruction of information. Storage 
includes paper, magnetic, electronic, and all other media types. Communications 
include sharing and distribution of information” (Kissel 2013). 
Essentially, this reflects that cybersecurity may be loosely defined as computer 
and network security within the context of cyberspace. With this concept in mind, the 
term cyber infrastructure has resonated, which requires further explanation in order to 
articulate a useful concept. Thus, according to NIST provided definition about cyber 
infrastructure stated that (CNSS 2003): An electronic information and communications 
systems and services and the information contained therein (CERT 2015, NIST 2011). 
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There is a consensus in these definitions on having a common security interest 
in order to define the scope of cybersecurity including computer security and 
information security, which provides researchers with a means to taking a proactive 
approach to secure computer systems in cyberspace. 
2.2.4 Formal Definition of Cybersecurity  
The most acceptable definition of cybersecurity stated that, Cybersecurity may be 
defined as “the strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations 
in cyberspace, and encompass the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability 
reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and 
recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information 
assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they 
relate to the security and stability of the global information and communications 
infrastructure” (Amoroso 1994, Board 1993, Instruction 2003).  
2.3 Fundamentals of Cybersecurity  
The study of cybersecurity in this text begins with a description of essential 
cybersecurity-related vocabulary items and core concepts not inclusive, which can 
broadly be divided into two sub-categories. 
1) Software Developers: in the category of developers we include software 
engineers, programmers, analysts, and testers. 
2) Cybersecurity Experts: in the category of cybersecurity experts we include 
penetration testers and ethical hackers. 
2.3.1 Core Software Engineering Terminologies  
This section describes basic definitions for terms related to software developers, which 
will be used in this text. Additionally, definitions appear in subsequent chapters to aid 
in concept understanding. Many of the definitions used in this text are based on the 
terms described in the IEEE Standard Collection for Software Anomalies (Board 1993, 
Brehmer and Carl 1993, C/S2ESC - Software & Systems Engineering Standards 
Committee 2010). The standards collection includes the IEEE Standard Glossary of 
Software Engineering Terminology, which is a dictionary devoted to describing 
software engineering vocabulary (Radatz, Geraci and Katki 1990). It contains working 
definitions of terms that are in use in both the academic and industrial worlds. All 
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definitions described in this text have been directly adapted from the IEEE Standard 
Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology, which follows IEEE Standard 610.12-
190 (IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee 1990). 
2.3.1.1 Defect/ Fault/ Error/ Failure/ Problem 
• Defect: An imperfection or deficiency in a work product where that work product 
does not meet its requirements or specification and needs to be either repaired 
or replaced. 
o Example: it includes for example, omission and imperfections found 
during early life cycle phase (Brehmer and Carl 1993, Board 1993, 
C/S2ESC - Software & Systems Engineering Standards Committee 
2010). 
• Fault: a manifestation of an error in software. Faults contained in the software 
are sufficiently mature for detection by test or operation. An incorrect step, 
process, or data definition.  
o Example: For example, an incorrect instruction in the computer 
program. 
• Error: A human action that produces an incorrect result. The difference 
between a computed, observed, or measured value and condition and the true, 
specified or theoretically correct value or condition.  
o Example: For example, a difference of 30 metres between a computed 
result and the correct result. 
• Failure: is divided into two main definitions:1) Termination of the ability of a 
product to perform a required function or its inability to perform within previously 
specified limits; 2) an event in which a system or system component does not 
perform a required function within specified limits. Note: A failure may be 
produced when a fault is encountered. An incorrect result.  
o Example: For example, a computed result of 12 when the correct result 
is 10. 
• Mistake: A human action that produces an incorrect result.  
o Example: For example, an incorrect action on the part of a programmer 
or operator. 
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• Problem: Difficulty or uncertainty experienced by one or more persons, 
resulting from an unsatisfactory encounter with a system in use. A negative 
situation to overcome. 
o Example: for example, a login system grant access to unauthorized 
users. 
2.3.1.2 Basic Terminologies Association and Intersection   
1. Bug: Fault/ Defect 
A bug may be more precisely defined as a fault or defects. As shown in Figure 2, these 
terminologies are interlinked and generally interdependent on each other. Use of the 
latter terms related to Bug trivializes that fault has a direct impact on software quality. 
Use of the term “defect” is also associated with software artefacts such as 
requirements and design documents. Defects occurring in these artefacts are also 
caused by errors and are usually detected in the review process (Burnstein 2006). A 
bug is another name of an error. Software developers usually name it an error; 
however, testers call it a bug. 
2. Usability 
According to (Nielsen 1994), usability has multiple components and traditionally may 
be defined as the ease with which a user can learn to operate, prepare inputs for, and 
interpret outputs of a system or component. The associated attributes of usability are: 
• Learnability: easy to learn 
• Efficiency: efficient to use 
• Memorability: easy to remember  
• Errors: Few and non-catastrophic error 
• Satisfaction: pleasant to use 
2.3.2 Core Cybersecurity Terminologies 
This section describes basic cybersecurity related definitions and terminologies. An 
additional definition is given in subsequent chapters to aid in concept understanding. 
Many of the definitions used in this text are directly adapted from Common Cyber 
Security Language (CERT 2015), and Glossary of Key Information Security Terms 
(Kissel 2013), which follows IEC 27000:2009 standard. It contains working definitions 
of terms that are in use in both the academic and industrial worlds.  
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2.3.2.1 Vulnerability  
The literal meaning of “vulnerability” is the state of being open to injury. From a 
computing viewpoint, it may be defined as design or implementation or code errors in 
information systems or software applications, which may result in compromise of the 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of information stored upon or transmitted over 
the affected system (Symantec Corporation 2008). For example, consider Robert’s 
vulnerability definition (Newman 2009) “a characteristic of a computer system or 
network that makes it possible for the threat to occur is called vulnerability”. A 
presence of vulnerability within the software systems provides an opportunity for 
problems and disasters to occur. Bishop (2003) argues it as opening doors of a system 
to enable entry to the disallowed state because of a security mechanism failure. 
2.3.2.2 Software Vulnerabilities 
From a cybersecurity point of view, a vulnerability is a weakness (a form of software 
error) which allows an attacker to reduce a system’s assurance.  
Generally, a vulnerability is the intersection of three features: 
1) A system may have a flaw or bug. 
2) An attacker may get access to the flaw or bug. 
3) An attacker may have the capability to exploit the flaw or bug. 
A vulnerability is a subset of a bug. A bug is any defect in a product and different 
terms are used during the software development process such as a mistake, anomaly, 
fault, failure, error, exception that discussed in Section 2.3.1. The potential reason to 
deal with security is to identify the bug before it is exploited by an attacker and is 
labelled as a vulnerability. Software vulnerabilities share common properties and 
similar characteristics in general aspects such as location, cause, impact and severity 
(Chen, Zhang and Chen 2009). Consequently, the process of capturing patterns of 
vulnerabilities may be effective in order to group and implement standard rules of 
classification on the enormous population of vulnerabilities. 
2.3.2.3 Violations 
A violation is a sub-part of vulnerability as shown in Figure 2. It is a malicious or 
inadvertent action that has the potential to impair the security properties of assets. 
Violation is sub-divided into four major categories and each category is related to the 
major class of vulnerability (Schumacher et al. 2013). 
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Figure 2 Broader view: class level distribution of software weaknesses  
• Unauthorized Disclosure: any information that is considered a part of the asset 
of the organization, which is inappropriately released. There are multiple ways of 
leakage 1) Exposure: an organization employee leaving a sensitive document on 
the table at a coffee shop, 2) interception: unauthorized access of data from outside 
the organization, 3) inference: indirect access by reasoning and 4) intrusion: 
bypassing the security protection. The purpose is: 
o Deception: it includes falsification, repudiation and spoofing. All cases that 
lead to false information about the organization are part of the deception. 
o Disruption: It contains injury or damage to the working interior of the 
organization. The main sub-parts of disruption are incapacitation, 
corruption, and obstruction. 
o Usurpation: It causes misappropriation theft and misuse of the physical or 
logical resources of the organization. 
2.3.2.4 Attack/ Countermeasure/ Threat/ Incident 
• Attack: An attempt to gain unauthorized access to system services, resources, or 
information, or an attempt to compromise system integrity. 
o Example: for example, a malicious attacker exploits the web-system with 
SQL injection.   
Bug
Vulnerability
Violation
Unauthorized 
Disclosure
•Deception
•Disruption
•Usurpation
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• Countermeasure: Actions, devices, procedures, or techniques that meet or 
oppose (i.e., counter) a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or 
preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting 
it so that corrective action can be taken. 
o Example: for example, the developer carefully used the potentially 
dangerous function calls strcpy_s as a safe replacement during coding to 
reduce the chance of exploitation. 
• Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 
organizational operation (including mission. Functions, images, or reputation), 
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an 
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification 
of information, and/or denial of services.  
o Example: for example, credential information is protected with email 
verification to avoid the threat of misuse. 
• Incident: A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, 
acceptable use policies, or standard security practices. 
o Example: for example, agent compromised the organization’s confidential 
information via any malicious act or suspicious event. 
2.3.2.5 CIA 
CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are three core concepts of cybersecurity. 
These terminologies are commonly used within the industry but may take on a more 
particular meaning in the context of cybersecurity. All CIA definitions are sourced from 
NIST Glossary of key information Security Terms (Kissel 2013). 
• Confidentiality: may be defined as a 3rd party preserving information assets, 
which are personal to those authorized by the asset owner. 
• Integrity: may be defined as ‘unaltered information assets’, which has not been 
modified or destroyed in an unauthorized manner. 
• Availability: may be defined as an ability of a system to provide reliable and 
timely access to information assets by authorized individuals.  
The key impact factors relating to users’ information are Authentication, Authorization, 
and Nonrepudiation (Longstaff et al. 1997). 
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1. Authorization VS CIA 
• The process of verification of rights to perform any task is called authorization. 
Loss of Confidentiality: when information is read or copied by someone not 
authorized to do so, the result is known as loss of confidentiality. For example, 
for some types of information, confidentiality is a very important attribute such 
as research data, insurance records, and medical records. 
• Loss of Integrity: information can be corrupted when it is available on an 
insecure network. When information is modified in unexpected ways, the result 
is known as a loss of integrity. This means that unauthorized changes are made 
to information, whether by human error or intentional tampering. 
• Loss of Availability:  information can be erased or become inaccessible, 
resulting in loss of availability. This means that people who are authorized to 
get information cannot get what they need. 
2. Authentication VS CIA 
The process of verifying the identity of the user or proof of identity is called 
authentication. 
• Loss of Confidentiality: Authentication is verification that users are who they 
claim to be. When secure information is authorized to the unauthorised user 
such as false identity (identity theft), the result is known as loss of 
confidentiality.   
• Loss of Integrity:  When unauthenticated users gain access and modified the 
information. Such as electronic funds transfer, and air traffic control systems. 
• Loss of Availability: Availability is often the most important attribute in service-
oriented business such as airline schedules. When an authorized user cannot 
get access to specific services this is generally known as Denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks.  
3. Non-Repudiation VS CIA 
The process of assurance that the sender of information is provided with proof of 
delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s intent, so neither can 
later deny having processed the information. 
• Loss of Confidentiality:  When information is not protected against an 
individual falsely denying having performed a particular action. 
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• Loss of Integrity: Having no capability to determine where a given individual 
took a particular action such as creating information, sending a message, and 
receiving a message. 
• Loss of Availability: When an authorized user has no capability to approve 
information because of specific services being unavailable.  
2.4 Interdisciplinary Concepts and Approaches 
Software security practices are receiving increased interest among researchers and 
practitioners. The increased interest is a result of an increase in reported security-
related vulnerabilities and incidents of security breaches (Daud 2010). This section 
describes the relationship between the inter-disciplinary field of cybersecurity and 
software engineering focused on software security. 
2.4.1 Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) and Software Vulnerabilities 
The Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) is generally considered as an idealised 
model of the process involved in building software. It is often described as a complex 
process and can be more challenging for the software developer because of its 
inherent problem that is referred to as complexity includes the program complexity and 
the design complexity (Conte, Dunsmore and Shen 1986). Failures, faults, and errors 
can be introduced and slipped into at any stage of SDLC (Beizer 1990, Beizer 2003). 
Programmers make mistakes. McConnell stated in his book that “Experience suggests 
that there are 15-50 errors per 1000 lines of delivered code” (McConnell 1993). As the 
number of lines of code in a software system increases it always results in increased 
bugs and this is evidenced from developers’ common developing practices during 
SDLC (Murdico 2007). In the complex and large software application, even 1 error per 
1000 lines of code may constitute a large security risk.  
For example, each new version of Microsoft Windows carries the baggage of 
its past errors. As Windows has grown, the technical challenge has become 
increasingly daunting. Several thousand engineers have laboured to build and test 
Windows Vista, a sprawling, complex software construction project with 50 million 
lines of code, more than 40% larger than Windows XP (Lohr and Markoff 2006). This 
means that if the software developers of Windows Vista only made one error per 1000 
lines of code, then Vista had 50,000 errors. Exploitation of any one of these errors, 
bugs and security violations by the attackers is a potential cause of vulnerability in the 
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software system. Furthermore, these vulnerabilities can also cause other issues such 
as the loss of information and reduce the value or usefulness of the system (Krsul 
1998, Leveson 2004, Cohen 1999).  
A vulnerability can be considered to be a type of a bug as described in Section 
2.3.1.2. To protect software systems from being exploited or misused by malicious 
attackers is one of the potential reasons to identify the bug before it is exploited by an 
attacker and is labelled as a vulnerability. According to (Schumacher et al. 2013) each 
category of vulnerability is interlinked with the major class of the bug as shown in 
Figure 2. 
The one critical element shared by vulnerabilities is common initiation patterns 
and similar characteristics such as location, cause, impact and severity (Chen, Zhang 
and Chen 2009). Normally, vulnerabilities are deliberately introduced or mistakenly 
slip through the supply chain during the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). 
They come about in delivered software systems due to acquisition processes and by 
following the poor software development practices. Poor precautions and lack of 
measurements easily allow vulnerabilities to pass through other levels during the 
SDLC. It means, the higher the level of software development, the higher the severity 
and harm impact of these missed vulnerabilities. 
2.5 Empirical Strategies in Software Engineering 
Empirical strategies in software engineering are defined “to set up formal experiments, 
study real projects in industry, i.e. performing a case study, and perform surveys 
through, for example, interviews” (Wohlin et al. 2012 p.120). 
According to Sommerville (2010), experimentation is useful in software 
engineering practices for the provision of understanding in order to identify the 
relationship between different factors, and variables. Over the last two decades, 
software engineering research and practices widely have used empirical studies to 
validate techniques or analyse the results (Anastas 1999). 
In order to evaluate practices and tools related to software engineering, 
empirical studies are essential. For example, to verify and analyse engineering tools 
and practices as they solve real problems with real practitioners. Therefore, empirical 
studies based on experimentation are necessary (Sjøberg et al. 2008). 
The introduction of empirical strategies in the area of software engineering 
serves as the basis of the process for experimentation. The fundamental steps in the 
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process can be utilised for different types of empirical studies. However, the emphasis 
is on providing help and guidelines to perform experiments in software engineering. 
Moreover, ‘true’ experiments with full randomisation, are challenging to perform. In 
software engineering, there are different types of experimentation depending on the 
factors and variables of the study. For example, quasi-experiments are frequently 
used in software engineering. Quasi-experiments are defined as “an experiment in 
which it, for example, has not been possible to assign participants in the experiments 
to groups randomly” (Wohlin et al. 2012 p.12). Quasi-experiments are important, and 
they can gauge valuable outcomes for research based on intervention. There are three 
different types of strategies based on the purpose of evaluation, whether it be tools, 
techniques or methods, and based on the conditions of the experimental evaluation. 
1) Survey 
2) Case study 
3) Experiment 
The empirical strategies are neither competing nor completely orthogonal. They 
offer a convenient outcome; however, some studies might be observed as 
combinations of more than one empirical strategy. 
1) Survey 
According to Fink (2003 p.36): “a survey is often an investigation performed in 
retrospect, when, for example, a tool or technique, has already been in use.” The key 
purpose of gathering quantitative or qualitative data are questionnaires or interviews. 
The survey results are used to derive explanatory and descriptive inferences.  
2) Case study 
According to Runeson et al (2012 p.114): a case study is “an empirical enquiry that 
draws on multiple sources of evidence to investigate one instance (or a small number 
of instances) of a contemporary software engineering phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundary between phenomenon and context cannot be 
clearly specified.” Case studies are utilised to understand research assignments, 
activities or projects. Data is accumulated for a specified purpose during the study. 
Statistical analysis can be performed on the collected data. Normally, case studies are 
intended to track a particular attribute or to determine a link between different types of 
attributes. Case studies are considered lower in the level of control, in comparison to 
experiments.  
3) Experiment 
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Experiment (or controlled experiment) in software engineering is “an empirical enquiry 
that manipulates one factor or variable of the studied setting.” During experimentation, 
different treatments are tested on different subjects. However, other variables are kept 
constant, while measuring the outcome of the independent variables and their effects. 
There is a difference in human-oriented and technology-oriented experiments. 
Human-oriented experiments are defined as “humans apply different treatments to 
objects, while in technology-oriented experiments, different technical treatments are 
applied to different objects” (Wohlin et al.  2012 p.76). The main goal is to manipulate 
multiple variables at fixed levels. The manipulation effect is measured, and statistical 
analysis can be carried out based on this. Generally, quasi-experiments are used, 
when it is difficult to apply treatments on subjects randomly.  
A Quasi-Experiment is “an empirical enquiry similar to an experiment, where 
the assignment of treatments to subjects cannot be based on randomisation but 
emerges from the characteristics of the subjects or objects themselves” (Wohlin et al. 
2012 p.11). During experimental studies, statistical methods for inferences are 
performed to show the statistical significance in order to measure which one method 
is better in comparison with the other (Robson 2002, Sjøberg et al. 2008, Wohlin et al. 
2012).  
During an experiment, different conditions are applied to differentiate between two 
conditions, such as an experimental situation and control situation (Wohlin et al. 2012). 
2.5.1 Experimental Study based on Intervention 
The guidelines state that the process should start from a clear question, in which the 
population, intervention, difference, outcome, and contextual background have been 
made explicit (Dittrich, 2002). In an intervention based experimental study, the 
following aspects need to be taken into account: 
I. The population in which the evidence is collected, i.e. which group of people, 
programs or businesses are of interest? 
II. The intervention applied in the empirical study, i.e. which technology, tool or 
procedure is under study?  
III. A comparison is made of the interventions, i.e. how is the control treatment 
defined? In particular, the ‘placebo’ intervention is critical, as “not using the 
intervention” is mostly not a valid option in software engineering.  
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The outcomes of the experiment should be not only be statistically significant but 
also significant from a practical point of view. For example, it is probably not interesting 
that an outcome is 10% better in some respect if it is also twice as time-consuming.  
The context of the study must be defined, which is an extended view of the 
population, including whether it is conducted in academia or industry, the industry 
segment, and the incentives given to the subjects (Höst, Wohlin and Thelin 2005; 
Petersen and Wohlin 2009). The experimental designs must also be defined. Weir, 
Rashid and Noble (2017) have explored eight types of intervention to support secure 
software development, such as incentivisation workshop, threat modelling, component 
choice, developers training, static analysis, penetration testing, code review and 
continuous reminder. According to (Such et al. 2016) intervention effectiveness can 
depend on two aspects: financial cost and team discipline. Financial cost will mostly 
depend on the cooperate environment. However, team discipline may see reviews of 
codes to be a matter of development related to security. However, some of the 
research found that the probability of taking security initiatives during development 
processes is quite low (Poller et al. 2017).  
2.6 Empirical Evaluations of Anti-patterns  
Patterns are an approach to abstracting and capturing, for reuse, knowledge about 
what made a system or paradigm successful. Anti-patterns are derived from design 
patterns, which capture good practice in software development. Brown (Brown et al., 
1998) introduced the idea of anti-patterns as a way of codifying existing bad practice 
in the software industry; In contrast to a pattern, an anti-pattern “describes a commonly 
occurring solution to a problem that generates, decidedly, negative consequences”. 
Anti-Patterns are useful to provide a specific piece of negative advice, as suggested 
by (Griffiths and Pemberton, 2005).  Unfortunately, the efficacy of anti-pattern has yet 
to be proven. It may be due to a lack of empirical evidence of the practical 
implementation of anti-patterns. Experimentation is difficult in software engineering 
(Juristo and Moreno 2013). One problem is the fact that empirical analysis has to be 
realistic for transfer to industry applications (Sjøberg et al. 2003). However, 
professionals are expensive, the setting has to be as close as possible to an industry 
setting, and the tasks must be chosen realistically (Fittkau 2011). It is difficult to answer 
a question for the use of anti-patterns to transfer knowledge and when it should be 
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used. However, the software engineering industry is aware of anti-patterns and 
commonly use them in their practices (Juristo and Moreno 2013). 
There is some empirical evidence on the use of anti-patterns in teaching human 
computer interaction (Kotzé, Renaud and Van Biljon  2008). According to Van Biljon 
et al (2004), they may be counterproductive teaching tools and a suboptimal 
knowledge transfer strategy.  
According to Cockburn et al (2005) anti-pattern captures poor software 
development practices with an explanation of why such practices are common and 
how they lead to a bad solution. The rationale of anti-patterns is to identify recurring 
flaws/errors and help other people to avoid making the same errors. 
The use of anti-patterns for knowledge transfer during software development is not 
well-known, but there is a growing trend in order to state instructions in negative ways. 
However, it is argued by (Koenig 1995; Long 2001) that knowledge transfer through 
anti-patterns might be useful to provide an adequate understanding of the problem. In 
this situation, it is essential that the anti-patterns are not regarded as blueprints for the 
problem, preferably that they guide to a refactored solution (Julisch 2013). 
The empirical studies carried out by Kotzé et al (2006) and Kotzé, Renaud and 
Van Biljon (2008) have conducted some initial investigations into human computer 
interaction context. Results suggest that anti-patterns are studied in order to avoid 
pitfalls; however, they can actually create pitfalls in knowledge transfer, if not applied 
appropriately (Kotzé, Renaud and Van Biljon 2008). However, in the cybersecurity 
context, awareness of negative practices is exposed through teaching (Conti and 
Caroland 2011). This means that in order to judge whether a specific solution can be 
successful, it is necessary to describe the context as completely and as accurately as 
possible (Juristo and Moreno 2013; Petersen and Wohlin 2009). For example, Shull, 
Seaman and Zelkowltz (2006) and Höst, Wohlin and Thelin (2005) have provided solid 
results in the use of empirical analysis to improves defect detection techniques, such 
as the use of anti-patterns to detect the vulnerabilities during software development. 
The empirical analysis should be used as evidence to prove or disprove the viability 
of anti-patterns in transferring vulnerability knowledge to software developers. 
2.6.1 Use of Anti-Patterns as Intervention 
Empirical studies, in software engineering, are carried out to validate the effectiveness 
of a tool or technique. They are hard to conduct, but are necessary for evaluation of 
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their practical implementation, in different circumstances. Examples of empirical 
strategies in software engineering include surveys, case studies and experiments. 
Interventions are applied in empirical studies to collect evidence of its effectiveness 
and validate application in a specific context. In software engineering, intervention-
based experiments have been carried out to measure the effectiveness of newly 
designed techniques or technologies. It can be concluded that the implementation of 
interventions during experimental study depends on the context, such as the segment 
of industry and incentives for the subject. There are different types of interventions can 
support secure software development. However, there are some financial and time 
related constraints. Anti-patterns are useful to describe poor development practices, 
but it is difficult to answer a question for the use of anti-patterns to transfer knowledge 
.i.e. When it should be used and how it can be used. The software engineering industry 
is aware of the anti-pattern technique but does not commonly use them in their 
practices. Therefore, quasi-experiments can be used as evidence to prove or disprove 
the efficacy of anti-patterns, in terms of their ability to convey vulnerability knowledge 
to software developers. 
2.7 Cyber-Patterns 
2.7.1 The Notion of Cyber-Patterns 
Cyberspace is a territory in which humans interact with technologies, processes, data 
and networks. To make cyberspace secure, patterns have been used to understand, 
predict and fix security issues in the cyberspace (Jang-Jaccard and Nepal 2014). The 
inspiration comes from the use of existing design patterns for cybersecurity (Blackwell 
and Zhu 2014a). Patterns are commonly used in software engineering to find reusable 
solutions for commonly occurring problems (Walker et al  2014). 
However, cyber-patterns remain a poorly-defined term; thus it is challenging to 
provide a definition. However, any pattern related to security is considered part of 
cyber-patterns such as, for example, security patterns and attack patterns. 
Fundamentally, “cyber-pattern” has been proposed to aid researchers in order to 
capture and find solutions in cyberspace (Blackwell and Zhu 2014b). Thus, it is 
suggested that patterns would prompt new conceptual and research methodologies 
for the benefit of cyberspace studies. 
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In the field of software engineering, a pattern may be defined as a reusable 
template, which represents a discernible regularity of the design (Gamma et al. 2008). 
Primarily, software pattern theory is borrowed from Alexander (1977), who described 
the philosophy of architectural design patterns. This concept takes into account the 
ability of software engineers to evolve software development processes and to deduce 
software patterns such as requirement analysis patterns, process patterns, and testing 
patterns. It is believed that cyber-patterns are more abstract whereas other sciences 
propose patterns such as in the field of mathematics patterns are definite and always 
provide definite results. Further, cyber-patterns cannot predict precise results or 
answers, although output may be observable only by analysis (Blackwell and Zhu 
2014a). Generally, cyber-patterns present a “descriptive view” rather than a 
“perspective view”. Cyberspace contains a set of validated patterns, in which each of 
them describes and predicts one subset of the phenomena. To conclude, cyber-
patterns within cyberspace formulate a scientific foundation in order to categorise, 
classify and organise cyber-patterns through assigning a common language. This is 
explained further in Section 2.12.2. Vulnerability related cyber-patterns literature was 
analysed to identify the reasons why existing cyber-patterns are ineffective in 
providing useful knowledge of vulnerabilities.  
 
• Design Pattern (DP): presents a template to build software in an ideal situation 
(Gamma et al. 2008). The pros and cons of DP to provide vulnerability 
knowledge are: 
 
 
 
• Security Pattern (SP): describes a security mechanism against potential 
threats (Brenner 2007). The pros and cons of SP to provide vulnerability 
knowledge are: 
 
Pros
•Standard format
•Easily Understandable to developers
•Agreed by Software engineering 
community 
Cons
•No association with VBDs
•Lack the security knowledge
•Insufficient awareness of exploitation 
circumstances
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• Software Fault Pattern (SFP): indicates the faulty computation of the 
vulnerability (Mansourov 2011). The pros and cons of SFP to provide 
vulnerability knowledge are: 
 
 
 
 
• Attack Pattern (AP): presents a template to describe attacks against software 
error (Blackwell and Zhu 2014b p.115). The pros and cons of AP to provide 
vulnerability knowledge are: 
 
 
 
• Anti-pattern: explains a negative mechanism of poor software development 
common practices (Julisch 2013). The pros and cons of Anti-Pattern to provide 
vulnerability knowledge are: 
Pros
•Sufficient security knowledge 
•Understandable description about the 
threats to point out the vulnerability
Cons
•Lack of standard format
•Difficult to understand and implement
•No association with VDBs
•Inconclusive debates by software 
engineering community
Pros
•Strong association with VDBs and 
cybersecurity community 
•Full explanation of vulnerability (faulty 
computation)
Cons
•Absence of configuration and 
standardization
•Difficult to understand and implement
•Complicated structure 
•poor communication with software 
developers’ community 
Pros
•Strong association with VDBs and 
cybersecurity community 
•Complete explanation of attack 
•In depth study of exploitation 
techniques 
Cons
•Difficult to understand and implement
•Complicated structure 
•poor communication with software 
developers’ community
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Pros
•Refactor solution for any recurring 
problems
•easily understandable form to assist in 
software development 
Cons
•Lack basic structure and format of the 
implementation
•No association with VDBs and cyber 
security community 
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2.7.2 Cyberspace  
The term cyberspace originated in the early 1980s and since then this 
notional and augmented environment has been expanding dramatically. 
There is no agreed definition of what constitutes cyberspace. The earliest 
definition of cyberspace is “an infinite artificial world where humans 
navigate in information-based space and as the ultimate computer-human 
interface” may be defined as cyberspace (Benedikt 1991). Fundamentally, 
this reflects a virtual internet-based space for users, in which they interact 
for social, information and creative purposes.  
Heim (1991) provides a comprehensive definition that has 
demonstrated the identified abilities that might be subsumed under the 
term “Cyberspace”: “is more than a breakthrough in electronic media or in 
computer interface design, is a metaphysical laboratory, is a tool for 
examining users’ sense of reality with its virtual environments and 
simulated worlds”. 
Morningstar and Farmer (2003) argue that cyberspace is defined 
more by the social interactions involved than its technical implementation. 
However, in recent years, research in cyberspace has grown and evolved 
significantly (Blackwell and Zhu 2014b). Therefore, the researchers assign 
a conventional meaning to the term “cyberspace”, which generally refers 
to the internet and its diverse range of information systems environment for 
users (Maymí et al. 2018, Li et al. 2017). More importantly, this 
environment offers various services for its millions of participants, so they 
can influence and interact with each other world-wide. These interactions 
include online distance learning facilities for students across the world, use 
of social media such as Facebook and Twitter, use of online banking and 
e-commerce such as eBay and Amazon. Undoubtedly, this has had a 
considerable impact on human daily life and has become an essential 
aspect of modern society. Nevertheless, cyberspace is highly complex and 
therefore presents challenges in many aspects such as privacy and 
security.  
 45 
 
According to Lee (2008), security is a growing concern in the 
cyberspace, due to its inherent complexity. Furthermore, developers face 
difficulties in enforcing security in this virtual-domain (Wright 2015, Ilyin 
2015). As cyberspace strongly suggests an enlarged virtual world of 
complex infrastructure which has a complicated relationship with the real 
world. Consequently, this poses grave challenges to researchers, who are 
involved in management, protection and further development of this space. 
2.8 Why Care About Security in Cyberspace? 
It is hard to find a facet of modern life that does not involve the internet or 
use of cyberspace, at least at some level. The virtual environment on the 
internet where computer systems virtually interact is known as cyberspace. 
Such as online purchases, debit cards, and automatic bill pay are standard 
parts of modern life.  
Since cyberspace is an open communal area for a wide range of 
millions of users, it requires judicial, supervisory and legislative bodies to 
maintain checks and balances in this complicated space (Lee 2008). As 
cyberspace becomes ever more pervasive in daily life tasks, including: e-
commerce, e-socialization, e-banking and e-government, the risk of 
cybercrime is a growing concern. For example, WannaCry Cyber-Attack2. 
For this reason, many countries have declared their information technology 
space (cyberspace) as part of their national critical infrastructure. 
Additionally, these countries have been establishing their own cyber 
defence authorities. Well-known examples are a National Cyber-Crime 
Unit (NCCU) (U.K National Crime Agency 2017) and a U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS 2017). Despite having these monitoring 
authorities, unauthorized access, confidential information disclosure and 
various other forms of cybercrime have been increasing at an alarming rate 
(Symantec Corporation 2016). The consequences of a successful cyber-
attack cover a broad range of possibilities. For example, a minor loss of 
time in recovering from the problem, a decrease in productivity, a 
significant loss of money or staff-hours; However, a major loss of credibility 
                                            
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCry_ransomware_attack 
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or market opportunity, a business no longer able to compete, legal liability, 
and loss of life (Wright 2015). 
2.9 Why is Security a Problem in Cyberspace? 
As of 2016, the internet connected an estimated 6.4 billion IoTs (Internet-
of-Things) worldwide, including children toys, kitchen appliances, and 
pacemakers. As the internet is comprised of loosely connected multiple 
networks, it fundamentally provides multiple channels for connecting a 
worldwide collection of devices in cyberspace without regards to national 
or geographic boundaries or time of the day. As the number of activities of 
individuals, organizations, and nations being conducted in cyberspace is 
increasing, the security of those activities is an emerging risk. Since a 
decade ago, the United States of America has perceived these risks and 
applied the national strategy for securing cyberspace. As mentioned in 
previous Section 2.7.2, cyberspace is an augmented virtual space, which 
often poses challenges of security for software developers and 
cybersecurity experts. Nonetheless, without having an understanding of 
cybersecurity, attempts to protect people in cyberspace is a difficult task. 
Some reasons are mentioned below: 
2.9.1 Security is Fundamentally Complex 
Since the inception of the internet in 1969, it was designed to provide 
openness and flexibility, and not intended to be secure. Although such an 
approach was appropriate at that time, it is not one that lends itself to 
today’s commercial, private, and official use. In the intervening years, 
usage patterns of the internet have radically changed, leading to 
acknowledge increased attention of cybersecurity (Walker et al. 2014). The 
literature described in Section 2.2.1 highlights several issues related to the 
complexity of cybersecurity.  
1. Complex Relationship or Interconnection between Systems 
and People 
According to (CERT 2015) cyberspace has competed to a complex 
interconnection between systems and people, due to complex 
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interconnection; it creates barriers for software engineers in implementing 
and maintaining cybersecurity. This complex relationship has drawn 
researchers’ attention towards the fine associations between cyberspace, 
and the internet with its diverse culture.  
Essentially, as argued in the cyberspace definition that real people 
and systems augmentation has an ability to directly influence and affect 
each other. 
Despite efforts by security practitioners and researchers to secure 
systems, security has traditionally been a battle of wits: cybersecurity 
experts try to find vulnerabilities; developers attempt to fix these 
vulnerabilities (patches). However, malicious hackers successfully manage 
to exploit the flaws of systems. In fact, the main reasons why software 
developers cannot be confident in establishing fully secure systems are: 
cyberspace scale, and its complexity of software systems along with its 
complicated relations with the real world. Arguably, these complexities 
have imposed challenges to software developers and industry experts in 
developing, protecting, and operating software systems securely in 
cyberspace. 
2. Usability is an Impediment for Security 
A common perception of users about dealing with security is that it is a 
nuisance (Morgan, 2016). Generally, software developers perceive 
security as a painful act (Poller et al. 2017); cybersecurity experts 
acknowledge that evaluation of security is an as an act of finding software 
weaknesses rather than assisting developers in fixing them. Common 
users generally consider security to be the responsibility of someone else 
such as software developers or cybersecurity experts. These biases are 
debatable and raise a question about usability (as defined in Section 
2.3.1.2) with reference to its relationship with security. Amoroso (1994) 
argues that determining attacker intent and balancing usability are 
concerns which present as troublesome impediments to increased 
security.   
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3. Technology is Oversold  
The most common perceptions in regard to achieving cybersecurity are 
that: it is irrelevant to real-world problems and can never be accomplished 
in practice, so any effort is doomed to failure (Arshad et al. 2012). 
To achieve cybersecurity, there are general perceptions of bias 
were overlaid that consider cybersecurity is irrelevant to real world 
problems and it can never be accomplished in practice, so any effort is 
doomed to failure. The main reasons for these misconceptions are: 
• High Level of Expectation 
In general, Users expect more from technology than what it does in reality. 
For example, cloud computing is considered one of the leading 
developments in modern computing. The illusion of unlimited resource 
availability improves the ability of an organization to meet the requirement 
of a wider user-base. As with any other emerging paradigm, security 
underpins widespread adoption of Cloud computing. This has been 
highlighted by the surveys conducted by IDC Exchange where security 
features as the most challenging aspect in the move towards the adoption 
of Cloud computing (Arshad et al. 2012) 
• Misuse of the Technology 
Cloud computing, mobile computing, and the internet of things (IoTs) are 
ever more dynamic in their use of cyberspace. There is no longer a 
boundary between the virtual and real world, which raises concerns related 
to provide and maintain the security of cyberspace. Generally, this 
digitalization has led to an urgent need to set boundaries between systems 
and human of these computing paradigms in order to use security in real-
world contexts, since this diversity has been causing security flaws that 
demand an integrated security strategy to control vulnerabilities.  
4. Security is an Afterthought 
There are millions of software systems around the world connected through 
the Internet, and many organizations have maintained their own web-
space, including university departments, government agencies, 
corporations, schools, and religions. Furthermore, many individuals have 
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personal websites or have some sort of reliance on cyberspace, be it 
through the use of online banking, e-shopping, information 
gathering/sharing, and entertainment. However, along with the 
convenience and easy access to information come new risks. Among them 
are the threats as defined in Section 2.3.2.4 that valuable information will 
be lost, corrupted, stolen, or misused and that computer systems may be 
vulnerable and corrupted (see Section 2.3.2.3). If the information is saved 
electronically and is available on the network, it is more vulnerable than if 
the same information is printed on paper and locked in a file cabinet.  
One of the explanations for this lack of protection that developers 
tend to regard security as an add-on feature (Mouratidis, Giorgini and 
Manson 2003, McGraw 1999, McGraw 2012). For them, security is an 
afterthought at best, and is often neglected. It is reasonably accurate to say 
that developers do not consider security as critical as other system 
requirements (McGraw 2006). Furthermore, security, if considered at all, 
generally comes at the bottom of the list of system requirements. 
2.10 Who is Responsible for Security in Cyberspace? 
As cyberspace is considered a communal place, so the responsibility to 
make it secure is dependent on a number of professionals. For example, 
software engineers who are called software developers and; software 
defenders who are cybersecurity experts. This section explores the efforts 
from both communities -software engineering and cybersecurity- to 
implement and restore the security of software systems 
2.10.1 Software Developers: Building Security into the Software 
Development Process 
This is an exciting time to be a software developer. Software systems are 
becoming more challenging to build (Daud 2010). As software systems are 
playing an increasingly important role in society, it is necessary to build 
secure software. There have been numerous attempts to address security 
concerns as a part of the software development processes. Earlier 
attempts were targeted at the implementation phase of the Software 
Development Lifecycle (SDLC) and include those based upon improving 
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libraries, implementation languages, and language processors. These are 
typified by the work of (Bourque and Fairley 2014, Sutter and Alexandrescu 
2004, Shiralkarand 2009). Approaches based on static and dynamic code 
analysis have been proposed by providing different guidelines, such as the 
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL), and banned functions 
(Howard and Lipner 2011). Recently, the software engineering community 
has been emphasising early exclusion of vulnerabilities by considering 
security issues at all phases of the SDLC. Typifying such approaches, the 
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL), Security Patterns (SP) 
and OWASP CLASP development life cycle is considered below. 
2.10.1.1 Improving Runtime Environments and Safer 
Programming Libraries 
When personal computers were introduced in the late 1970s, operating 
systems (OS) were assumed to be used by a single user. As connecting to 
internet increased cybersecurity threats, it became evident that discovery 
and disclosure of software vulnerabilities would be a continuing feature of 
Cyberspace. The software engineering community took multiple steps in 
order to deal with new security challenges. 
As reflected in the literature (Howard and Lipner 2009), many 
security breaches occur due to insecure runtime environments. For 
example, discoveries of vulnerabilities in Netscape and Internet Explorer 
received wide publicity (Allen et al. 2001). SQL server 2000 initially 
released in 1999 was issued with 16 vulnerabilities (Howard and Lipner 
2009). Given the criticality of securing operation systems, there are many 
papers that study the distribution of bugs and vulnerabilities due to the 
adoption of inadequate software practices (Garcia et al. 2014, Miller et al. 
1995). 
As explained earlier, security threats in cyberspace have changed 
over time. It is argued that from operating systems in vulnerability data 
sourced from the NIST (NIST 2011) that software system architects accept 
could that systems will contain some faults taking a ’less is more’ attitude 
when cyber-attacks occur. However, patches for fixing vulnerabilities are 
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generally superficial solutions and often do not get at the core of the 
software problems (Morgan 2016). 
Developers who are continuously challenged in order to build more 
secure software also trying to improve programming languages by steps 
such as introducing new more secure runtime libraries, as summarised in 
Table 3. As a result, developers can more easily avoid those types of 
dangerous errors that caused vulnerabilities. However, the success of 
these proposed solutions is doubtful due to many reasons and are 
discussed further in Section 2.14. This section gives discussion to some 
secure software engineering practices to reduce vulnerabilities rather than 
trying to do exhaustive research. 
 
 
 
Safer 
Libraries 
 
C/C++ PHP 
• The security development 
lifecycle 
• Secure Coding in C and C 
• Guidelines for Secure Coding 
• The design and evolution of C 
• C coding standards: 101 rules, 
guidelines, and best practices 
• Security Development 
Lifecycle (SDL) banned 
function calls 
(Howard and Lipner 2011, Meyers 
2005, Seacord 2006, Sutter 2002, 
Schumacher et al. 2013, 
Stroustrup 1994) 
• Programming PHP 
with security in mind 
• Programming PHP 
with security in mind 
(Loureiro 2002, The 
PHP Group 2017) 
Table 3 Literature summary in order to improve programming languages with safer libraries 
1. C/C++ Banned Function Calls 
Over three decades ago, when the C runtime library (i.e. CRT Microsoft 
terminology) was first created, computer threats were different. Computers 
were not as interconnected as they are today, and attacks were not as 
prevalent. Therefore, a subset of the C runtime library has been deprecated 
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for new code and, over time, removed from the earlier code.  Usage of 
these outdated functions easily leads to vulnerabilities because of its 
unsecured behaves. Even the provided replacement functions had 
suggested with no guarantees of security. Because of this danger in 
C/C++, (Howard and Lipner 2011) a list was compiled of dangerous 
functions composed of known bad functions that must be avoided to reduce 
vulnerabilities and need to be updated as part of secure software practices.  
According to (Howard 2005), It is recommended from their experiences 
with real-world security bugs (occurred due to banned function calls), which 
are focused primarily on functions that can lead to vulnerabilities. Existing 
code must either replace the banned function with a more secure version 
or be re-architected so that the banned function is not used. Importantly, 
for the functions marked as “recommended”, developers consider these 
functions a strong recommendation and evaluate the function against the 
systems own security requirements, elevating them to “required” as 
necessary. It is strongly suggested that, none of the listed banned functions 
should be used in new code during the Software Development Lifecycle 
(SDLC). For example, developers use dangerous functions such as 
strcpy(), strcat(), and sprintf() that do not check bounds and lack the 
assurance that the bounds will never get exceeded. 
Once the program executes, it invokes a potentially dangerous 
function that would provide an opportunity for a malicious attacker to exploit 
this vulnerability. However, these functions can be used safely. Microsoft 
Safe CRT is included starting with Visual Studio 2005 that provides 
somehow tool support against these dangerous function calls. For 
example, the Visual Studio 2005 (and later) compiler has built-in 
deprecations against dangerous functions, developers must investigate all 
C4996 compiler warnings to make sure that the function in question is not 
on the preceding banned list. 
2. PHP Deprecated Functions 
A similar approach can be found in PHP programming practices. To 
address growing concerns related to security, researchers are keeping 
revising PHP libraries or functions to assist developers in creating more 
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secure web-applications. For example, PHP 5.3.0 introduces two new error 
levels: E_DEPRECATED and E_USER_DEPRECATED.  
The E_DEPRECATED error level is used to indicate that a function 
or feature has been deprecated (The PHP Group 2017). They also 
competed to industrialise their knowledge such as secure PHP 
programming practices in order to achieve the security posture of web-
applications (Loureiro 2002). 
3.  Microsoft SDL 
The software industry’s past is littered with security exploitation. Microsoft 
has learned from and has been proposed the Microsoft Security 
Development Lifecycle (SDL) to remedy past mistakes. The Microsoft SDL 
may be defined as Microsoft’s security assurance process, which builds 
security into every phase of software development and offers defence-in-
depth guidance and protection. It suggests a practical and holistic 
approach to addressing security concerns of developing software and to 
implement security enforcing postures such as privacy and reliability. 
Furthermore, incorporation of Cybersecurity standards, such as ISO 27001 
[30] into Microsoft SDL ensures that any software produced with this 
process complies with industry recognised standards. The Microsoft SDL 
goes beyond the traditional software development process and 
incorporates the overarching information security management system that 
requires the specification of security guidelines for policies, processes, and 
systems within an organization. The Microsoft SDL is continuously evolving 
and improving to deal with ever more complicated, and sophisticated 
attacks (Howard and Lipner 2006, Howard and Lipner 2009). In contrast to 
traditional SDLC, Microsoft SDL is an add-on with two additional phases. 
For example, a core security training phase and repose phase (Howard 
2005). Usability analysis of Microsoft  SDL is discussed further in Section 
2.14.2 
4. OWASP CLASP 
OWASP CLASP - short for Comprehensive, Lightweight Application 
Security Process - has been developed to embed security considerations 
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during the early stages of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) for 
web-applications. It includes a set of guidelines for web security 
requirements, cheat sheets, a development guide, a code review and a 
testing guide, an Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS), a risk 
rating methodology, tools and a top 10 of web security vulnerabilities. This 
is explored further in Section 2.14.2. 
5. SP  
Security Patterns (SP) are used to describe a solution to stop or mitigate a 
set of specified threats through certain security mechanisms. These are 
patterns designed to assist software developers who are not security 
experts with embedding security in their systems. It can also be a useful 
tool for teaching security concepts (Brenner 2007). This is explored further 
in Section 2.13. Security Patterns are an enhanced form of design pattern 
for software developers’ assistance to add security inside their 
applications. They are not, however, based directly on the vulnerability 
knowledge stored in VDBs which is necessary for achieving currency and 
timely response to new threats (Halkidis, Chatzigeorgiou and Stephanides 
2006). 
2.10.2 Cybersecurity Experts: Attempts to Capture Security 
Approaches to the problem of building security domain knowledge into the 
Software Development Lifecycle originating from the cybersecurity domain 
can be considered under two headings: Attempts to catalogue 
vulnerabilities and attempts to communicate vulnerabilities using patterns. 
2.10.2.1 Attempts to Catalogue Vulnerabilities 
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) comprises CWE, CVE, and 
CAPEC which are the three most comprehensive vulnerability databases 
(VDBs). They are open-source and maintained by MITRE (MITRE 
Corporation 2013, MITRE Corporation 2015b, MITRE Corporation 2015a), 
based on the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP). 
• CWE: The Common Weakness Enumeration database (CWE) 
catalogues weaknesses that can occur in software. These 
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weaknesses are described as software bugs that can lead to 
vulnerabilities. For example, in Figure 3, CWE- 250: Execution with 
Unnecessary Privileges, and as such can be considered as an 
abstract, top-down view of the types of errors that can occur in 
software. The CWE aims to raise awareness and understanding of 
software flaws in software in order to eliminate these from released 
versions. 
 
Figure 3 Vulnerability information in CWE-250  
• CVE: The Common Vulnerabilities Enumeration database (CVE) 
catalogues specific examples of publicly known vulnerabilities that 
exist in software and is designed to facilitate the sharing of 
information about these vulnerabilities across a number of different 
capabilities, including IDS, scanners, repositories. For example, 
CVE-2007-3931. A malicious attacker can execute arbitrary code 
and successful exploitation may result in compromising rights of the 
system. 
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Figure 4 Attack pattern example in CAPEC-501 
• CAPEC: The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification database (CAPEC) provides formal attack patterns 
and is designed to bridge the knowledge between the CWE and the 
CVE and offer guidance to software developers on how software 
weaknesses are likely to be exploited by a malicious hacker as 
shown in Figure 4, which demonstrates attack pattern example: 
CAPEC-501. 
All of the above described databases are organized by NVD (NIST 
2015), which enables these databases to contain information to be 
interlinked and searchable as shown in Figure 5. To improve usability and 
functionality, these databases share similar formats, styles and fields. 
There are, however, problems surrounding information redundancy, 
information conflicts and information representation across these 
databases such as methods of attack, CIA impact and mitigation 
techniques (MITRE Corporation 2015b). As such, it can be especially 
challenging for software developers to implement security 
recommendations. These databases will be critiqued further in the 
succeeding Section 2.15. 
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Figure 5 Interconnection of vulnerability databases (VDBs) 
2.10.2.2 Attempts to Use Patterns to Communicate 
Vulnerabilities 
In addition to the above VDBs, security experts have also attempted to 
embed vulnerability related security knowledge in the form of patterns such 
as SFP, AP and Misuse pattern. Figure 6 presents the author’s proposed 
conceptual VDBs information flow model, which explains how to bridge the 
gap between VDBs developers and users. This will be explored further in 
Section 2.13. 
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Figure 6 Vulnerability information flow among VDBs 
1. Software Fault Pattern (SFP)  
SFP (Mansourov 2011) has been designed to provide a formal 
specification of weaknesses (vulnerabilities) and are aligned with the CWE 
database. These will be explored further in Section 2.13. The idea of SFPs 
is based upon intelligence from CWE that might help to make such 
information more understandable and easier to use. However, a lack of 
detailed information about the structure and format of SFP presents a 
considerable obstacle for software developers (Arnold, Hyla and Rowe 
2006). 
2. Attack Patterns (AP)  
AP sources information from the CAPEC database, which describes a 
procedure of a particular vulnerability attack format. It is not intended as a 
source of design patterns (like standard software pattern) and software 
developers’ attitude towards APs is not an effective means of 
understanding in regard to vulnerability attack. Software developers do not 
use AP to find the vulnerabilities due to their lack of understanding (Bunke, 
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Koschke and Sohr 2012). In other words, they fail to appreciate the 
purpose of the AP fundamental to support developers in order to provide 
an understanding of attacks and its procedures. This research has shown 
that APs are rarely used by software developers’ due to their inherent 
complexity, but also because AP, tend to be written in a format that is not 
easily understood by software developers (see Section 2.13). 
3. Misuse Pattern 
A misuse pattern describes the malicious hacker point of view in a generic 
way while considering sub-dimensions to classify it as a set of attack 
actions and enumerating with possible security patterns as a 
countermeasure (Schumacher et al. 2013). Although, the misuse pattern 
groundwork clearly illustrates that VDBs sources are not utilised in defining 
its attack actions, there is definitely mutual knowledge sharing with security 
patterns. Furthermore, so far there are not well-supported pieces of 
evidence of their practical usage. This clearly has shown that misuse 
patterns have certain construction deficiencies and lack considerable 
usage for software developers (see Section 2.13), such as undefined 
attack pattern knowledge sources and less practical values. 
4. Anti-Pattern 
Anti-pattern “describes a commonly occurring solution to a problem that 
generates decidedly negative consequences”. While there are no solutions 
against prevailing vulnerabilities, it is practicable to address recurring and 
frequent prevalent software vulnerabilities through anti-patterns (Julisch 
2013). From this, the question that is formed is “which pattern will be 
considered for better transformation into an anti-pattern particularly as a 
solution?” One of the aims of this research is to determine which 
mechanism of integration will lead to enabling the different patterns’ (such 
as SFP, AP) transformation in generating a general solution (anti-pattern). 
It appears one of the most appropriate and communicable solutions for 
providing awareness of vulnerabilities and an effective understanding to 
software developers (Walker et al. 2014). 
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2.11 Why There Exists a Distinct Knowledge Gap Between 
Software Developers and Cybersecurity Experts? 
One of the essential elements shared by every modern information system 
is the software that determines how the system behaves. Today’s software 
problems have led to spectacular real-world failures of many different 
kinds, including security problems, reliability problems, and safety 
problems. It is probably only a matter of time before software causes the 
demise of a large company. What do software developers need to do in 
order to combat dangerous software errors occurring especially due to the 
rush to embrace e-commerce and the intense pressure of Internet time? 
2.11.1 Inadequate Knowledge Sharing  
The lack of a shared understanding of both communities - cybersecurity 
and software engineering - is well-documented (Howard 2004, Borstad 
2008, Bunke, Koschke and Sohr 2012, Arnold, Hyla and Rowe 2006). This 
gap in communication generates biased knowledge partly by the way the 
practices of penetration-testing/ethical hacking has evolved, and partly due 
to cultural/sociological factors between the two communities. Although 
there are exceptions, security testing sometimes takes place as an activity 
separate from the SDLC. Cybersecurity experts such as penetration-
testers communicate with and report to system administrators and IT 
managers. There is relatively little communication from those doing 
security testing to that building software. There is no (formal, 
methodological) feedback path from the security testing activities to 
software development activities (Poller et al. 2017). Lack of knowledge is 
present in individual software engineers, software engineering teams and 
organizations as a consequence of being unable to learn from poor 
software practices (vulnerabilities knowledge from VDBs). The same kinds 
of insecurities are built into the next generation of software systems.  
This lack of awareness was also in evidence due to some prejudiced 
cultural reasons among these communities. Although, there is some 
crossover between the basic knowledge and skill-set of a software 
engineer and an ethical hacker/ penetration-tester, they represent some 
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very distinct technical domains, with different educational paths, different 
technical languages and different professional bodies. To fill the basic 
knowledge gap the teaching of cybersecurity during undergraduate 
Computer Science courses can help (Roumani et al., 2012; Fahl et al., 
2013), and reflects improvement evidenced through the practices of 
recently employed software engineer graduates, those likely to have a 
better appreciation of techniques of support) cybersecurity than one whose 
education is less recent, software engineering (SE) teams are likely to 
include a variety of ages/experiences.  
Software developers are responsible for the development of 
software systems that will represent their company’s reputation and ensure 
the safe conduct of business online, thus, appreciate the seriousness of 
creating secure software. Despite this, discussions around security are 
often avoided because instigating meaningful change is too complex, too 
slow and too expensive. There is a general perception that development 
mistakes are caused by inexperienced developers or developers who do 
not understand the tool, language or technology; however, this is not the 
case. In fact, even experienced developers make common security 
mistakes. The more senior engineers/managers may give a lower priority 
to producing secure code than to producing working code. Mistakes made 
by software developers are generally seen as the primary cause of security 
flaws in software systems. We argue instead that the fault lies with the 
process: developers lack an understanding of how malicious hackers can 
exploit software flaws, and this understanding is necessary for the creation 
of secure software. One key explanatory factor for this is a lack of 
awareness about poor software practices that cause exploitation. 
One of the best solutions proposed by (Yun-hua and Pei 2010) is 
the creation of an ‘ecosystem’, bridging the knowledge gap and providing 
a common ground of understanding to ethical hackers/ penetration testers 
and software developers to facilitate in collection and accumulation of 
cybersecurity knowledge needed for security assurance, and to ensure its 
efficient and affordable delivery to software developers (Acar et al. 2016) 
to the defenders of cyber-systems, as well as to other stakeholders.  
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2.11.2 The Hacker’s Time Advantage  
Generally, a malicious hacker does not work under the same constraints 
of project schedules and deadlines as a software engineer does. If they 
wish to spend six months examining, in minute detail, the state of the stack 
under a particular attack condition, they will not have employers 
pressurising them, to deliver. Thus, they have the advantage of time. This, 
coupled with the extensive knowledge-sharing that takes place amongst 
the hacking community means that a hacker may be more familiar with the 
weaknesses of a particular piece of software than those who created it, 
which is explained in Section 2.9.1. The evidence for this is the frequency 
of newly discovered vulnerabilities. Ethical hackers and software 
developers, on the other hand, can lack efficiency in their knowledge 
sharing due to corporate barriers (Van and McGraw 2005, McGraw 2012).  
This research concluded that the main reason for software 
developers’ lack of security understanding is because their focus is on 
delivering features rather than on ensuring security. Accordingly, 
developers often consider security as something to be added to a system 
as a bolt-on component in later stages of development (McGraw 2012).  
2.11.3 Lack of Knowledge Industrialization  
As software systems become ever more complex and connected by the 
internet, security is a growing concern. The frequency and reoccurrence of 
mostly discovered vulnerabilities undoubtedly confirm that poor software 
practices are continuously adopted, repeated, and implemented by 
developers during the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). It may be 
fruitful to study failures and identify recurring problems such as poor 
software practices to find solutions against these problems. Some 
researchers (Mansourov and Campara 2010, Shiralkarand 2009) have 
mainly been interested in a question concerning: why software developers 
generally overlooked security issues throughout the Software 
Development Lifecycle? In particular, as mentioned vulnerabilities or faults 
(Section 2.3.1.1) are introduced accidentally through the supply chain and 
slip through into delivered systems due to the adoption of poor software 
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practice. The industry has realised that with traditional system security 
engineering, the error-free, the failure-free, and the risk-free operation is 
not usually achievable, within acceptable cost and time constraint during 
SDLC. As far as security is concerned in the software development 
process, there is no single technique, which could be considered as a 
100% secure. Arguably, software developers have consistently failed to 
develop secure software systems (Ilyin 2015). One question that needs to 
be asked, however, is whether during the software development process, 
developers intentionally make the development mistakes or whether they 
lack the necessary understanding of ‘how a malicious attacker can 
exploit/misuse these software development errors’. Arguably, malicious 
hackers have a time advantage, indicating that the effectiveness of 
attackers can be traced back to their extensive knowledge sharing (see 
Section 2.11.2.) However, security experts and software developers in this 
regard, fail to share their knowledge with each other efficiently, and 
although the problem of frequently recurring software vulnerabilities is very 
well known, no standard solution has been universally adopted (Aslam, 
Krsul and Spafford 1996). Questions have been raised, such as how both 
communities’ experts capture and share their experiences of poor software 
practices (failures in solving problems) in a form that is suitable for the other 
party that is with clarity, rationale, and context in a way which could be 
applied to a new solution.  
In theory, all software systems have some vulnerabilities as 
discussed in previous section 2.3.2.2; whether or not they are serious, 
depends on whether they are used to cause damage to the system. In 
cyberspace, poor software development may be considered as one of the 
most serious threats, and the principal reason for this is a lack of 
information sharing about the prevalent software flaws that can easily lead 
to vulnerabilities (Morgan 2016, Busch, Koch and Wirsing 2014). According 
to McGraw (2012) the existing software design and engineering processes 
provide little guidance about preventing security exploitation during SDLC. 
This information disconnects (gaps) between software developers and 
cybersecurity experts have led to widespread software vulnerabilities 
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(Kalaimannan and Gupta 2017). The researcher proposed an idea called 
“Caution before exploitation”, which basically means to provide essential 
security awareness to developers through industrialised security 
knowledge. To be successful, these knowledge forms need to be 
presented in an understandable format (Acar et al. 2016, Fahl et al. 2013). 
This would consequently lead to an efficient “safe environment” which 
could amplify in order to industrialise the necessary security knowledge 
from a few highly skilled developers/security experts. This would transfer 
necessary security knowledge to a large number of less skilled but highly 
motivated developers.  
2.12 What is Pattern-Oriented Research Methodology? 
“Cyber-patterns are predictable regularities in cyberspace that may help us 
to understand, design, implement and operate successful and reliable 
cyber systems.” (Blackwell and Zhu 2014b). The pattern-oriented 
methodology has been proposed by (Blackwell and Zhu 2014a), to 
introduce the concept of reusability of cyber-patterns. For example, the 
methodology applied to the design pattern to answer the following research 
questions 
• How to identify and document design patterns 
• How to catalogue and develop pattern language of design patterns? 
• How to design formal specification of design patterns? 
• How to develop software tools from design patterns? 
2.12.1 Why Use Patterns to Find the Solution? 
The pattern-oriented research methodology is used to address problems 
through the general features of patterns: 
• Finding the regularities of complicated problems in cyberspace. 
• Providing the core understanding of reoccurring problems through 
the discovery of underlying mathematical structures. 
• Facilitating the observation of problems in order to detect the 
occurrences of its repetition. 
• Defining the operations to predicts, detect and prevent problems. 
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• Devising the mechanisms of solutions for classifying and 
categorising problems. 
• Formulating the standard set of vocabulary of the recurring 
problems to form pattern languages. 
2.12.2 How Do Cyber-Patterns Interact and Interrelate with each 
other? 
As stated previously in pattern-oriented research methodology (Section 
2.12), cyber-patterns are certainly interlinked and connected to each other. 
The interaction of similar types of cyber-patterns is known as composition 
(Riehle 1997), hybridization is defined as an interaction of different types 
of cyber-patterns.  
Furthermore, these types of interaction among cyber-patterns 
significantly provide a more effective means to use and protect the 
infrastructure and resources on the internet. For example, a security 
pattern is sub-set of design patterns and each security pattern protects or 
detects more than one type of attack patterns. 
2.12.3 Cyber-Patterns for Vulnerabilities 
Evaluation of cyberspace that includes progressively complex 
infrastructure, is a complex task specially to find solutions via applying the 
contemporary approaches. The Cybersecurity community has made efforts 
to identify, categorise and classify software vulnerabilities. However, such 
information lacks formal representation in the form of patterns (McGraw 
2004). Besides, cyber-patterns individually (without having the 
cybersecurity domain knowledge) are insufficient to provide an 
understanding of prevalent vulnerabilities. Consequently, software errors 
are constantly reoccurring, and potential reasons for this are: lack of 
intuitive knowledge of vulnerability databases, outdated knowledge 
sources, and insufficient awareness about underlining root-causes (Busch, 
Koch, and Wirsing 2014, Ghani et al. 2013, Yun-hua and Pei 2010).  
Generally, cyber-patterns’ core objectives are to support software 
developers while providing guidance and assistance during the software 
development process (SDLC) different aspects. For example, design 
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patterns consider the functional or non-functional requirements aspect of 
the system, security patterns concern security issues of the system and 
attack patterns focus the security attack procedures of the system. 
Nevertheless, most of the cyber-patterns do not have sufficient evidence 
of their industrial use and lack detailed descriptions of their practical 
implementation during software development. The main concern is 
whether these cyber-patterns themselves give information about prevalent 
software flaws that can easily be exploited by the attacker as a 
vulnerability. This means that the education of software developers is 
paramount to successes on those patterns that are related to security flaws 
of software weaknesses (vulnerabilities), rather than the existing design 
patterns that only focus on functional and non-functional requirements. 
The research performs a comparative analysis of relevant cyber-
patterns, which have been carefully selected to fulfil developers’ need in 
order to attain adequate information about vulnerabilities. Ultimately this 
will determine the most effective way of repeating vulnerabilities 
information. Security knowledge intervention will increase the software 
developer’s ability to identify and mitigate software vulnerabilities. Thus, 
there is a definite need to configure/channel cybersecurity community 
efforts related to vulnerabilities into a formal organisation. This 
formalisation could certainly help software engineers to understand 
vulnerabilities root-causes through assigning a common language, namely 
a pattern. 
The work in this thesis proposes a solution based on hybridisation 
of patterns which allows the generation of an optimal solution, referred to 
as a “Vulnerability Anti-Pattern”. As shown in Figure 7 design patterns, 
security patterns, and attack patterns have been selected from the list of 
cyber-patterns.  
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2.13 The Shortcomings of Previous Pattern-Based Approaches 
are Sourced from Both Communities - Software 
Engineering and Cybersecurity   
Trying to capture and address security in the form of patterns represents 
an on-going issue amongst cybersecurity experts and software engineers. 
For example, Figure 7 presents the existing cyber-patterns, software 
engineers attempt to capture security (see Section 2.10.2.2), which is 
described as Security Pattern, Misuse Pattern, and Anti-Pattern; 
cybersecurity experts’ efforts to use patterns to communicate 
vulnerabilities Software Fault Pattern and Attack Pattern. 
 
Figure 7 Existing cyber-patterns capture security in cyberspace 
1. SP (Security Pattern) 
As discussed in Section 2.10.1, the SP defines the security forces and its 
consequences, which are summarized in Figure 8. However, there exists 
little research on the categorization of SPs, which have been proposed for 
use against vulnerabilities. It is still not clear to inexperienced developers 
what pattern should be adapted and applied during development. Other 
impediments that are often present to developers include the lack of 
communication with cybersecurity experts’ knowledge as sourced from 
VDBs having considerable significance to achieve currency and a timely 
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response against new threats (Halkidis, Chatzigeorgiou and Stephanides 
2006). 
 
 
Figure 8 Anatomy of security pattern  
 
In addition, it is evidenced by the literature exemplified in Table 4 
that there is a number of proposed catalogues to organize security 
patterns. For example, An inventory of security patterns (Yskout et al. 
2006), Core Security Patterns: Best Practices and Strategies for J2EE, 
Web Services, and Identity Management (Steel and Nagappan 2006), 
Classifying security patterns (Fernandez et al. 2008), A Natural 
Classification Scheme for Software Security Patterns (Alvi and Zulkernine 
2011), Enterprise security pattern: a new type of security pattern (Moral-
García et al. 2014), and Vulnerability-Based Security Pattern 
Categorization in Search of Missing Patterns (Anand, Ryoo and Kazman 
2014). Despite all of these above efforts, it does not work due to the lack 
of standard format and lack of association with VDBs. 
 
Key Issues  References  
• Lack of standard format 
• No association with 
VDBs 
• Inconclusive debates by 
software engineering 
community vulnerability 
(Bunke 2015, Yoshioka, Washizaki and 
Maruyama 2008, Skout, Scandariato, 
and Joosen 2012, Borstad 2008),  
Table 4 Security patterns key issues  
2. Misuse Pattern 
As discussed above in Section 2.10.2.2, the Misuse Pattern describes the 
attack, forensic data and mitigation, which are summarised in Figure 9. 
Security Pattern 
(SP)
A Set of Forces A Set of Consequences
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Although, the misuse pattern groundwork clearly illustrates that VDBs 
sources are not utilised in defining its attack actions, mutual knowledge is 
shared with security patterns. In fact, misuse patterns complement security 
patterns to stop a specific attack. Although, to date, there is no well-
supported evidence of their practical use as further described in Table 5. 
This demonstrates that misuse patterns have certain construction 
deficiencies and lack considerable usages from software developers’ 
perspective, such as undefined attack pattern knowledge sources and less 
practical values. 
 
Figure 9 Anatomy of misuse pattern  
Misuse Pattern 
Attack Description Forensic Data Mitigation Strategy to Stop Attack
 70 
 
Key issues  References  
• Lack of basic structure and 
standard format 
• No association with VDBs 
(Fernandez, Yoshioka and 
Washizaki 2010, Fernandez, 
Yoshioka, and Washizaki 2009) 
Table 5 Misuse pattern key issues  
3. Anti-Pattern 
As discussed above in Section 2.10.2.2, in the late 1990’s the Anti-Pattern 
concept originated, which are summarised in Figure 10. This field lacks up-
to-date knowledge restoration. Despite the fact that the industry has been 
creating and employing anti-patterns since the invention of programmable 
computers (see Table 6), there is no recent literature evidence of its usage 
to capture vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 10 Anatomy of anti-pattern 
Key issues Reference  
• No association with 
VDBs  
• Lack of up-to-date 
structure and standard 
format 
(Foote and Yoder 1997, Dias e Silva 2014, 
Brown et al. 1998)1998). 
Table 6 key issues of anti-pattern 
4. SFP (Software Fault Pattern) 
As mentioned above in Section 2.10.2.2, the SFP describes the faulty 
computation, which is summarised in Figure 11. Although SFP was 
primarily designed by security experts to automate the CWE (Vulnerability 
Database) intelligence in the form of patterns, a lack of detailed information 
about the structure and format of SFP presents a considerable obstacle for 
software developers. Potential shortcomings concerning developers’ 
understanding are listed in Table 7. 
Anti-Pattern
Common Software 
Development problem 
with their variation
Symptoms and 
Consequences
Method to Avoid the 
Problems
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Figure 11 Anatomy of SFP 
Key issues  References  
• Absence of configuration and 
standardization 
• Difficult to understand and 
implement 
• Complicated structure  
• poor communication with 
software engineering community  
(Mansourov 2011) 
Table 7 Key issues of SFP 
5. AP (Attack Pattern) 
As mentioned above in Section 2.10.2.2, the AP presents attack vectors, 
which are summarised in Figure 12. However, AP primarily intends to 
present the vulnerability exploitation, it lacks a standard formulation. 
Literature research found that attack patterns are rarely used by software 
developers’ due to their inherent complexity as shown in Table 8, 
additionally AP tend to be written in a format that is not easy for developers 
to understand. 
 
Figure 12 Anatomy of AP 
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Key Issues Reference  
• Difficult to understand 
and implement 
• Complicated structure  
• poor communication 
with software 
engineering community 
(MITRE Corporation 2015c, MITRE 
Corporation 2013, Blackwell and Zhu 
2014b) 
Table 8 Key issues of AP 
2.14 Software Engineering Community Problems: Transferring 
knowledge from cybersecurity to Software Engineering  
As mentioned previously in Section 2.10.1, the software engineering 
community has been trying for a long time to integrate security, and to crack 
security challenges of software development processes. Each effort has 
separate shortcomings.  
2.14.1 Continuous Efforts to Improve Libraries, Implementation 
Languages, and Language Processors  
As mentioned above in Section 2.10.1.1, programming languages and their 
runtime environments are continuously being refined in order to deal with 
ongoing security challenges. Operating systems (OS) vendors are 
maintaining the pace on sustaining core operating systems security. 
Software engineering community has been developing in-house and add-
on approaches to deal with the security posture of systems. There is a 
whole industry that has been trying to implement and operate security in 
cyberspace for some time, and it is important to understand 
interdependencies between software and their runtime environments. 
Because it became evident that everything is relative such as 
computer systems, running software and operating runtime environments. 
It is reasonable to say that failure and success of a software system 
security have been highly influenced by the running environments such as 
OS, using programming languages such as C/C++, and their libraries.  
For example, when the C runtime library (CRT) was first created 
over three decades ago, the security issues for computers was different as 
mentioned above in Section 2.2.1.  However, computer systems incredible 
level of interconnectedness has created a vast threat environment in 
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cyberspace, hence escalating threats. The first question that probably 
comes to mind is “Why are these persistent efforts not sufficient to fulfil the 
security holes?” The answer is simple: standalone attempts to retrofit the 
programming languages and their runtime environment in order to stop 
security erosion of the system are not enough. Indeed, this requires a high 
level of collaboration and understanding between developers and security 
experts. 
2.14.1.1 Continuing Challenges  
In order to address security concerns as a part of software development 
processes, detailed analysis of the software engineering literature (Section 
2.10.1) revealed the following particular issues. The main reasons why 
these efforts are not enough to provide a sufficient level of security; what 
preventive measures they lack against prevalent vulnerabilities are listed 
below: 
• Deprecated & Banned functions still in use 
• Legacy systems 
• Developers lack the up-to-date awareness about update 
vulnerabilities 
 
Key Issues References  
Deprecated & 
Banned 
functions still in 
use 
• Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input 
('Classic Buffer Overflow') 
• Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) banned 
function calls 
(MITRE Corporation 2015, Howard and Lipner 2011) 
Legacy systems • System assurance: beyond detecting 
vulnerabilities 
(Mansourov and Campara 2010) 
Developers lack 
the up-to-date 
awareness 
• You Get Where You're Looking For: The Impact 
of Information Sources on Code Security 
• Rethinking SSL development in an amplified 
world 
• Toward Formalization of Software Security 
Issues 
• Bridging the gap between software development 
and information security 
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• Cyber-patterns: Unifying Design Patterns with 
Security and Attack Patterns 
(Acar et al. 2016, Fahl et al. 2013, Van and 
McGraw 2005, Blackwell and Zhu 2014b) 
Table 9 Issues with software engineering community efforts to improve libraries 
 
1. Deprecated & Banned Functions Still in Use 
Deprecated functions or dangerous function are commonly used in 
developers’ practices regardless of their vulnerable behaviour. It seems 
that developers’ awareness of these functions is questionable. 
Questions that need to be asked, are whether developers are aware of 
these functions misused or unsafe behaviour or whether they are aware of 
these safe alternatives to the functions. 
As mentioned in Section 2.10.1.1, C/C++ programming language 
researchers and industrial practitioners have been proposed and 
developed a list of the unsafe functions that should be replaced or be re-
architected to avoid C/C++ related vulnerabilities as part of secure software 
practices. Developers may be not aware of these alternative functions. If 
used properly, these do not directly pose a security risk but can introduce 
a weakness if not used incorrectly. These are regarded as potentially 
dangerous functions. A well-known example is the strcpy() function, in 
which, if a destination buffer size is provided which is larger than its source 
size, strcpy() will not overflow or cause a vulnerability. However, the misuse 
of strcpy() is so common in developers’ practices that some companies 
prohibit strcpy() use entirely (MITRE Corporation 2015d). Similarly, in the 
case of PHP deprecated functions, which are mentioned in Section 
2.10.1.1. 
2. Legacy Systems 
There are a large number of legacy systems, which represent enormous 
commercial value, and therefore their life span has been extended and 
enhanced to accommodate new market requirements and governmental 
regulations (Russinovich and Solomon 2009). When legacy systems were 
developed, these systems security requirements were more relaxed, 
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based on the not at the time deprecated and unsafe version of libraries 
functions.  
For example, all those web-based systems, which are developed 
based on using earlier versions of PHP 5.3.0, due to use of deprecated 
functions, are now vulnerable and ready for attack. This creates a serious 
problem to maintain and provide security in legacy systems. As developers 
have previously overlooked these security systems and very often apply 
quick fixes based on the partial investigation are used to make them 
secure. Essentially, this add-on fix aggravates the problem and further 
comprises the security of the system (Mansourov and Campara 2010). This 
raises the big question of how we should address the security postures of 
such systems. 
3. Developers Lack Up-To-Date Awareness  
This research accentuates the realisation that in many cases developers’ 
naively copy-paste insecure code obtained from internet resources (Van 
and McGraw 2005, Blackwell and Zhu 2014b). This highlighted a number 
of reasons explaining why developers do not very often use the official 
documentation or up-to-date resources. Arguably, official sources are less 
accessible in the comparison of other solutions and difficult to understand.  
Stack-overflow is commonly used instead of CWE (Acar et al. 2016). The 
issue is related to poor usability (Hans 2010) discussed in Section 2.3.1 
usability. In addition, developers working under in a time constraint and 
under economic pressure choose resources that are easy to use and 
access.  Software developers lack awareness because they have not been 
educated in this regard (Fahl et al. 2013). Developers may be unaware that 
those functions, have been deprecated because of their vulnerabilities, or 
that safe alternatives have been introduced. These practices are especially 
prevalent in those software developers’ practices who are unfamiliar with 
secure coding practices (Dimitrov 2016). 
2.14.2 Issues with Building Security into the Software Development 
Processes 
During the 1990’s researchers argued that security needs should be 
merged into the software development process and not considered an add-
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on endeavour. The literature on building security into Software 
Development Processes and their relevance to implementing security are 
analysed. The literature review identified critical issues, which are 
summarised in Table 10. In particular, commonly used software 
development practices do not include security as an integral part of the 
software development process as it costs too much money and consumes 
a lot of time (Banerjee and Pandey 2009).  
 
Critical analysis:  Issues with Building Security into the Software 
Development Process 
Software 
Development 
Process               
 
 
Microsoft 
SDL 
• Risk management and compliance  
• Experiences threat modelling at 
Microsoft 
• System and methods for detecting 
software vulnerabilities and malicious 
code 
(Brenner 2007, Shostack 2008, Lomont 
and Jacobus 2014) 
OWASP 
CLASP 
• On the secure software development 
process: CLASP, SDL and 
Touchpoints compared 
• On the secure software development 
process: CLASP and SDL compared 
(Gregoire et al. 2007, De Win et al. 2009) 
Poor up-take of security  • How Do They Do It? A Look Inside the 
Security Development Lifecycle at 
Microsoft 
• On the secure software development 
process: CLASP, SDL and 
Touchpoints compared 
• Gregoire, Johan, 2007, On the secure 
software development process: 
CLASP and SDL compared 
• System and methods for detecting 
software vulnerabilities and malicious 
code 
• Risk management and compliance 
(Howard 2005, De Win et al. 2009, 
Gregoire et al. 2007, Lomont and 
Jacobus 2014, Brenner 2007, Shostack 
2008)  
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Table 10 Critical analysis of building security into the software development process efforts 
1. Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) 
As mentioned in Section 2.10.1.1, SDL, proposed by Microsoft, is the 
initiator, attempting to integrate security into the development lifecycle. 
However, Microsoft SDL arguably appears complicated for developers in 
term of understanding to implement and follow guidelines 
Firstly, Microsoft SDL is not free; developers require special training to use  
Microsoft SDL, which means it increases the software development and 
maintenance cost.  
Secondly, Microsoft SDL compliance with ISO 27001 (Brenner 
2007), which makes it complicated in terms of threat modelling, requires a 
specialised security experts’ team. Consequently, this is challenging for 
small software companies with fewer expert developers (Shostack 2008). 
In addition, standard compliance does not necessarily result in the 
elimination of vulnerabilities. The reduction of vulnerabilities is 
predominantly based on awareness and developers’ education about how 
to build secure software (Lomont and Jacobus 2014). For example, the 
Microsoft SDL does not embed any source knowledge from cybersecurity 
experts, such as VDBs, which can be challenging for those software 
developers with limited awareness and understanding of the security 
vulnerabilities to apply the security guidelines effectively.  
Furthermore, this has imposed paradoxical enforcement on 
software developers for complying with security standards regardless of 
developers’ lack of security issues understanding and knowledge of how 
to prevent vulnerabilities. The organizational emphasis of Microsoft SDL 
may also be of limited applicability in the informal world of cross-platform 
application deployment.  
2. OWASP CLASP 
OWASP developed a process referred to as CLASP (Comprehensive, 
Lightweight Application Security Process) as discussed in Section 
2.10.1.1. This consists of a set of independent activities that have to be 
integrated into the development process and its operating environment. 
The choice of the activities to be executed, and the order of execution, is 
left open for the sake of flexibility. Essentially, the execution frequency of 
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activities is specified per individual activity and the coordination and 
synchronization of activities are therefore not straightforward. (De Win et 
al. 2009). 
OWASP CLASP implementation is limited to web-based systems. 
For example, like Microsoft SDL, CLASP implementation also requires a 
security advisor, which is not cost-effective and reasonable for small scale 
companies (Gregoire et al. 2007). 
3. Poor Up-Take of Security  
Software developers generally consider security an add-on feature 
(Howard 2005, Poller et al. 2017). In reality, it is not a simple feature that 
developers can add to a system at any phase of the development process 
(McGraw 1999). For example, the fact that 80% of 1998’s CERT alerts 
involved buffer overflow problems emphasizes the point referred to Section 
2.3.2.2. There is no reason that any code today should be susceptible to 
buffer overflow problem, yet they remain the biggest source-code security 
risk today (OWASP, 2015; Allen et al., 2001; Park et al., 2010; McGraw 
and Viega 2000).  The question which needs to be addressed is: “what we 
can do to educate software developers, so they can understand 
security errors with knowledge of how to mitigate them?” It is 
suggested that security should be considered as a property as part of a 
complete system rather than considering it to be a bolt-on feature.    
2.15 Cybersecurity Community Problems: Pushing Knowledge 
from Cybersecurity to Software Engineering  
Attempts of the cybersecurity community to share their knowledge with 
software engineers (see Section 2.10.2.1) also have a number of 
shortcomings which create a big knowledge gap. 
2.15.1 VDBs Issue 
The detailed analysis of existing VDBs literature and their efficacy, 
particularly in order to transfer vulnerability knowledge for software 
developers revealed the following key issues, which are summarised in 
Table 11. 
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As discussed in Section 2.10.2.1, cybersecurity experts attempt to 
catalogue vulnerabilities in the form of Vulnerability databases (VDBs). 
These VDBs have retained a wealth of security issues and their 
exploitation. However, it is clear that the intended audience for these 
databases is not software engineers involved in developing software but 
rather systems administrators looking to secure their existing systems. It 
might be possible that the information is simply not generalized enough to 
be directly relevant to software developers during the development 
process. Literature analysis with vulnerability databases’ effectiveness 
which was studied in order to understand software developers' vulnerability 
knowledge reflected upon the following issues. These are enumerated in 
Table 11. 
 
Issues Description  
Lack 
Standardization 
No standard taxonomy/classification scheme for 
existing VDBs, thus each of them uses their own 
approach, none of which were explicitly designed to 
use during SDLC. As such, these VDBs can typically 
appear complex and ambiguous to the software 
developer (Hui et al. 2010, Huang et al. 2013, 
Dimitrov 2016). 
Limited 
knowledge 
Closed source VDBs, such as the Carnegie-Mellon 
US Cert database and Secunia, are of necessity 
limited in the information that they can show 
concerning code-level errors (Carnegie Mellon 
University 2015, Secunia 2015). 
Complex 
knowledge 
It is clearly shown by many research studies, which 
have compared vulnerability information across the 
multiple VDBs that these repositories are deficient in 
providing interoperability, knowledge consistency 
and are not following standard classification schemes 
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(Ghani et al. 2013, Chen, Zhang and Chen 2009, 
Yun-hua and Pei 2010). 
Inadequate 
Automated 
tools  
Researchers have tried to address VDBs complexity 
issue while creating a number of different tools which 
designed to automate the detection of vulnerabilities 
during development phase such as use of VDBs 
knowledge via text mining bug databases 
(Wijayasekara, Manic, and McQueen 2014, MITRE 
Corporation 2004, Liu and Zhang 2011, Yun-hua and 
Pei 2010). Nonetheless, it is clearly evident from the 
literature that problematic ambiguities still exist in 
their classification strategies. 
Table 11 Issues of VDBs usability for developers 
2.16 Conclusion 
90% of security incidents result from exploitation of flaws in software 
systems (DHS 2017). In reality; however, software developers struggle 
against recurring and consistent software flaws (i.e. buffer overflows, and 
integer overflows), which are exploited on a daily basis by malicious 
hackers. Questions arising from this are: 
• Why do malicious hackers know more about our systems than 
developers and security experts? 
• What are the knowledge gaps or disconnects between developers 
and security experts that allow malicious hackers to succeed? 
Nonetheless, a large body of knowledge about software 
vulnerabilities exists within the cybersecurity community, in particular 
amongst penetration testers and ethical hackers. Currently, cybersecurity 
experts put much effort into classifying discovered vulnerabilities and 
developing taxonomies of these vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities are 
then catalogued in publicly available vulnerability databases (VDBs). 
Similarly, software developers have worked to embed security within the 
software development process in order to improve the security of software 
systems. Various attempts to capture and formalise the transferring 
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knowledge in a manner appropriate to software engineers have been made 
such as improving libraries C/C++ and PHP, introducing secure 
development lifecycle ( Microsoft SDL, and OWASP CLASP), and including 
Misuse Patterns, Software Fault Patterns (SFP), and Security Patterns 
(SP). 
Despite the software engineering community’s best efforts, the 
number of dangerous software exploitations is increasing at an alarming 
rate. It is thus clear that these resources are not being utilised effectively 
in providing the necessary knowledge to the software developer due to the 
following reasons: information overload, lack of techniques to 
systematically annotate flaws’ rectification and insufficient analysis of the 
data relating to these prevalent vulnerabilities. In fact, other impediments 
include the knowledge transfer mechanisms between the work on 
vulnerability databases (VDBs), developers’ perceptions of security issues 
and the complexity of the Microsoft security development lifecycle (SDL) is 
complex, which creates a distinct communication gap between 
cybersecurity experts and software engineers. Interruption of (knowledge) 
communication directs software developers to repeat practices that lead to 
vulnerabilities and gives rise to software flaws exploitation. The need for a 
better understanding of vulnerabilities via a usable knowledge transfer 
mechanism and our proposed solution is the subject of the remainder of 
this dissertation.  
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Contribution 
This section of the thesis comprises of three chapters, chapter 3 derivation 
of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs), chapter 4 Vulnerability Anti-Patterns 
(VAPs), and chapters 5 creating the catalogue of VAPs. 
Chapter 3 critiques existing pattern-based approaches and define 
the derivation process of VAPs. This chapter describes the motivation and 
context for investigating and addressing the following problem. VAP can 
bridge the security knowledge gap faced by developers while successfully 
transferring the usable security information from the cybersecurity 
community to software developers. The goal of VAP development is to 
provide security awareness of flaws that lead to vulnerabilities.  
Chapter 4 elicits the main work product VAP and its design 
structure. This chapter explains the VAP types which will use during the 
evaluation process.  
Chapter 5 describes the created catalogue of VAPs, which 
comprises of 9 “Informal” and 11 “Formal” VAPs. 
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3 Criticism of Existing Pattern-Based Approaches and the 
Derivation of a New Approach: Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
(VAP) 
This chapter introduces the methodology used for evaluating the contribution of 
this dissertation. The research examines how the cybersecurity and software 
engineering communities’ deal with the concept of poor development practices 
and vulnerabilities based on the use of patterns as a research topic. Informed by 
these different approaches, this chapter describes an approach based on Anti-
Patterns to use within this dissertation. 
The key objectives of the chapter are: 
• Section 3.1 provides an overview and criticism of current pattern-based 
security research. 
• Section 3.2 performs the comparison Analysis of selected Cyber-
Patterns against Vulnerabilities  
• Section 3.3 describes a proposed methodology. 
• Section 3.4 describes steps engaged in capturing vulnerability knowledge 
in the form of vulnerability anti-patterns. 
3.1 Pattern-Based Research Approaches  
An analysis of both software engineering and cybersecurity communities’ pattern-
based approaches has performed. This includes the knowledge sources that are 
required to design a methodology for an effective transfer of vulnerability 
knowledge to improve software developers’ awareness. Pattern-based 
approaches originating in the cybersecurity domain are considered in Section 
3.1.1, followed by those from the software engineering community in Sections 
3.1.2 and 3.4.1, leads to the derivation of VAPs. 
To deal with the inadequacies of existing pattern-based approaches, while 
fulfilling developers’ needs to understand vulnerabilities and their root-causes, 
specific vulnerability knowledge is obtained from each selected pattern-based 
approach to provide an optimal solution. 
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3.1.1 Cybersecurity Pattern-Based Research Methods 
In cybersecurity, pattern-based research tends to focus on evaluating the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities or misuse of errors, rather than investigating why 
the errors occur or why errors constitute vulnerabilities. This position is based on 
the assumption that poor software development practices will stop if usable and 
understandable knowledge is provided, and the appropriate knowledge transfer 
methods are used to help software developers during Software Development 
Lifecycle (SDLC) as shown in Figure 13. Two pattern-based approaches related 
to security have been carefully chosen from the cybersecurity community for this 
purpose: Software Fault Patterns (SFP) (Mansourov 2011) and Attack Patterns 
(AP) (MITRE Corporation 2014) 
3.1.1.1 Software Fault Pattern  
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) and s catalogue of weaknesses provide 
for the most commonly known open source vulnerability database. SFPs are 
associated with the CWE database, which provides a formal specification of 
weaknesses (vulnerabilities). As mentioned in Section 2.13, the CWE 
restructuring into a cluster is known as a Software Fault Pattern that aims to make 
a vulnerability database such as CWE more understandable and easier to use. 
However, a lack of detailed information about the structure and format of SFP 
posits a considerable obstacle for software developers in understanding them 
(Mansourov 2011). 
3.1.1.2 Knowledge Sourced from Software Fault Pattern 
From SFP the useful set of information is considered based on the need of 
software developers in order to provide with an understanding of vulnerability, its 
root-cause and traceability in the code. The derivation process of VAPs includes: 
a) White-box Vulnerability Pattern 
This provides transparency to trace a vulnerability and its properties (c.f. 
white-box testing). 
b) Footholds 
This draws attention to vulnerability characteristics during the development of 
system artefacts such as code, database schemas and platform configuration. 
c) Code path (the condition of this pattern) 
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Necessary conditions for the connecting elements of the code to find coding 
errors/mistakes. 
3.1.1.3 Attack Pattern 
An Attack Pattern is considered analogous to a design pattern, which describes 
how a particular type of attack is performed as an abstract pattern (Blackwell and 
Zhu 2014a p.115). As explained in the literature review chapter Section 2.10.2.2. 
CAPEC (MITRE Corporation 2015c) introduced the concept of Attack Patterns to 
describe the attack procedure. However, it lacks the standardisation of design 
patterns. Consequently, software developers do not use Attack Patterns as they 
usually appear to be complicated and difficult to understand (Faily, Parkin and 
Lyle 2014). It is also apparent from the literature that adoption of attack patterns 
is not common in software developers’ development practices due to their 
inherent complexity and lack of standardisation, but also because attack patterns, 
do not tend to be written in a usable format according to software developers’ 
needs (Section 2.13). 
3.1.1.4 Knowledge Sourced from Attack Pattern 
From Attack Pattern the useful set of information is considered based on the need 
of software developers in order to provide an understanding of vulnerability, it 
includes an overview of attack and its formats: 
a) Pattern Name and Classification 
A unique, descriptive identifier for the pattern. 
b) Attack Prerequisites  
What conditions must exist or what functionality and what characteristics must 
the target software have, or what behaviour must it exhibit, for this attack to 
succeed? 
c) Description 
A description of the attack including the chain of actions taken. 
d) Related Vulnerabilities or Weaknesses 
What specific vulnerabilities or weaknesses does this attack leverage? 
e) Method of Attack 
What is the vector of attack used (e.g., malicious data entry, maliciously 
crafted file, protocol corruption)? 
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f) Attack Motivation-Consequences 
What is the attacker trying to achieve by using this attack?  
g) Attacker Skill or Knowledge Required  
What level of skill or specific knowledge must the attacker have to execute 
such an attack?  
h) Resources Required 
What resources (e.g., CPU cycles, IP addresses, tools, time) are required to 
execute the attack? 
i) Solutions and Mitigations 
What actions or approaches are recommended to mitigate this attack, either 
through resistance or through resiliency? 
j) Context Description 
In what technical contexts (e.g., platform, OS, language, architectural 
paradigm) is this pattern relevant?  
k) References 
What are further sources of information available to describe this attack? 
 
Figure 13 Relationship between pattern-based approaches and cybersecurity & software engineering experts 
3.1.2 Software Engineering Pattern-Based Research Methods  
This section presents software engineering pattern-based research methods as 
discussed in Section 2.10.2 included in this thesis are: Security Patterns (SP) 
(Schumacher et al. 2013) and Anti-Patterns (Brown et al. 1998). 
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3.1.2.1 Security Pattern 
SP defines a solution against a set of specific threats which are controlled via 
applying a specifically designed security mechanism. Moreover, SP defines a 
solution, rather than directly revealing the underlying cause of software errors 
(Schumacher et al. 2013). 
3.1.2.2 Knowledge Sourced from Security Pattern 
From a security pattern, the useful set of information is considered based on the 
need of software developers in order to provide an understanding of vulnerability. 
The useful set of information of SP that is considered for developers in this 
research includes: 
a) Example 
Problem situation where the use of this pattern may provide a solution. 
b) Context 
Relevant context and its characteristics in which a solution is applicable. 
c) Problem 
It indicates the risk forces that affect the possible solution. 
d) Solution 
Describes the idea of the pattern. 
e) Structure 
The static view of the solution and some dynamics aspects in the form of a 
sequence diagram. 
f) Dynamic 
UML diagrams such as class diagram, sequence diagram and use cases. 
g) Implementation 
Set of recommendations when or where to do to use this pattern. 
h) Example resolved 
Following contents of the above pattern will lead to resolutions.  
i) Consequences 
The benefits and liabilities of the solution embodied in this pattern. 
j) Known uses 
Minimum three examples of its use in a real system. 
k) See also 
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Related other known patterns. 
3.1.2.3 Anti-Pattern 
An Anti-pattern is a mechanism to describe poor development practices to a 
developer that have the potential to generate significant negative consequences. 
Anti-Patterns examine the causes, symptoms, and consequences of poor 
software development practices and in return, offer a refactored solution that 
provides a successful solution (Brown et al. 1998). 
3.1.2.4 Knowledge Sourced from Anti-Pattern 
The useful set of information of anti-pattern that is considered for developers 
in this research includes: 
a) Name 
The key problem name is addressed in this Anti-pattern. 
b) Also known as 
 This identifies an additional popular, descriptive name and phrases for the 
Ani-pattern. 
c) Most frequent scale 
This section identifies where this anti-pattern fits into predefine scale SDLM 
o Global 
o Enterprise 
o System 
o Application 
o Framework 
o Micro-architecture 
o Object 
d) Refactored solution name 
The refactored solution patterns name is a key reference, particularly when 
paired with the Anti-pattern name for the problem. 
e) Refactored solution type 
This will identify the type of improvement that results from applying the Anti-
pattern solution: 
o Software, involving the creation of new software 
o Technology, solving the problem by the adoption of technology 
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o Processes, providing the definition of activities that are consistently 
repeatable 
o Role, allocation of clear responsibilities to organizational stakeholders. 
f) Root causes 
The general causes for this Anti-pattern. 
g) Unbalance forces 
The identifiers the primal forces that are ignored, misused or overused in this 
Anti-pattern. 
h) Anecdotal evidence 
Common phrases and humorous anecdotes that succinctly describes the 
problem. 
i) Background 
This section briefly describes the context of the problem. 
j) General form 
General characteristics of the Anti-pattern are identified and an overview of 
the nature of the problem is presented. 
k) Symptoms and consequences 
It provides a list of symptoms that direct to the resulting consequences. 
l) Typical causes 
The specified problem causes of this Anti-pattern. 
m) Known expectations 
Potential cases in which the usage expectations can occur. 
n) Refactored solution 
It resolves the symptoms and consequence, typical causes and unbalances 
forces issues.  
o) Variation 
It has shown the variation in known expectations. 
p) Example 
A real-world experience which provides the refactored solution. 
q) Related solution 
Other related solution against this Anti-pattern. 
r) Applicability to other viewpoints and scales 
 A viewpoint of users or an appropriate scale is described. 
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3.2 Comparison Analysis of Cyber-Patterns against Vulnerabilities  
A comparative analysis of the selected types of patterns related to a security 
described in Section 3.1.1 to Section 3.1.2 is investigated in Table 12. The 
literature review of existing cyber-patterns related to cybersecurity or software 
engineering communities and highlighted the deficiencies of transfer vulnerability 
knowledge. In addition, Table 12 explicates the existing cyber-patterns 
inadequateness including the vulnerability databases issues as mentioned 
previously 2.15.1. Consequently, it is beneficial to do a comparison analysis of 
existing pattern-based approaches; subsequently, we can find and design an 
effective solution.  
The headings used in Table 12 are discussed below: 
• Pattern Name: pattern original name 
• Context: Pattern implementation perspective   
o Software developers 
o Cybersecurity experts 
• Usability: Usability in the context of providing understanding to software 
developers range from Poor-high 
• Security Concerns: pattern enactments to the security of the system and 
answer will be in yes or no 
• Functionality concerns: pattern ratification of the system requirements 
and the answer will be in yes or no 
• Target Audience: The main user of the pattern such as software 
developer and security experts 
• Knowledge Source Community: cybersecurity community or software 
engineering community 
• Developer Expertise Level: Developers require expertise to use this 
pattern and is divided into three levels: low, medium, high 
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C
ybersecurity 
Pattern- based 
Approaches  
Pattern 
Name 
Context VDBs 
Knowledge 
Association 
Usability  Security 
Concerns 
Functionality 
Concerns 
Target 
Audience 
Knowledge 
Source 
Community 
Developer 
Expertise 
Level 
Software 
Fault 
Pattern 
Faulty 
Computation 
Template 
Yes Poor Yes No Security 
Experts 
Cybersecurity 
Community 
High 
Attack 
Pattern 
Attack 
Mechanism 
Template 
Yes Poor Yes No Security 
Experts 
Cybersecurity 
Community 
High 
Softw
are 
engineering 
Pattern -Based Approaches  
Security 
Pattern 
Security 
Mechanism 
Template 
No Poor Yes No Software 
Developers 
Software 
Engineering 
Community 
High 
Anti-
Pattern 
 
 
 
Refactored 
Solution 
Template 
No No  No No Software 
Developers 
Software 
Engineering 
Community 
Low-high  
Table 12 Analysis Table of existing pattern-based approaches and their relation to capture and  transfer  vulnerability knowledge 
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3.3 Improved Use of Pattern-Based Approaches to Capture Poor 
Software Development Practices (Vulnerabilities) 
Software developers are generally trained to develop software systems in an ideal 
scenario, in contrast to security experts (ethical hackers or pen testers) who generally 
investigate exploitation mechanisms of software systems (Van and McGraw 2005). 
As mentioned previously Section 2.15.1, the complicated structure of 
vulnerability databases (VDBs), and their inadequacies in capturing and transferring 
vulnerability knowledge via existing pattern-based approaches pose major challenges 
to software developers in order to understand the root causes of vulnerabilities (Hans 
2010, Nafees et al. 2017).  
Furthermore, cyber-patterns are ineffective in intimating a common 
understanding with adequate communication among software engineering and 
cybersecurity communities’ experts (Blackwell and Zhu 2014b). As a result, Software 
developers repeatedly commit common development errors. As discussed in the 
literature review chapter (Sections 2.10.2 and 2.11) the research concludes the 
following potential reasons:  
• Lack of intuitive knowledge communicated from vulnerability databases (VDB). 
• Common use of outdated knowledge sources and transfer mechanisms. 
• Insufficient awareness of development errors and their underline root causes 
that lead to vulnerabilities. 
To address this problem, this work proposes a means of expressing 
vulnerability knowledge in the form of anti-patterns to provide guidance and assistance 
to software developers.  
The concerns this thesis raises are: how can patterns encapsulate essential 
understanding of security related vulnerabilities and how can patterns effectively 
present the exploitation of errors to developers (Yun-hua and Pei 2010).  
The contention between raising vulnerability awareness of developers and transfer of 
security knowledge is paramount to success as an effective way of capturing and 
transferring of vulnerability knowledge, in comparison to existing efforts such as 
security patterns, attack patterns and software fault patterns that failed to do so. This 
study performs a comparative analysis among selected vulnerability related cyber-
patterns to evaluate and identify the reasons why existing cyber-patterns are 
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ineffective in providing useful knowledge of vulnerabilities. The literature review 
Section 2.10.2.2 explained patterns in detail. Table 13 provides a brief overview of 
existing cyber-patterns’ ineffectiveness, which is based on the criteria of their 
availability, understanding and usability for developers. CIA impact and mitigation 
techniques (MITRE Corporation 2015b) are commonly used within the cybersecurity 
industry, to transfer usable knowledge of the vulnerability, we have chosen three main 
categories: vulnerability knowledge availability while providing in a format that is 
understandable and useful for developers. 
Table 13 main headings description are: 
• Availability: Lack of accessibility and its usage information. For example, 
software fault patterns are less accessible in comparison to the design pattern.   
• Understanding: Lack of a standard format makes it difficult to understand. For 
example, attack patterns lack the standard format of representation. 
• Usability: Lack of usable knowledge format sourced from Cybersecurity 
community. For example, security patterns lack communication with 
vulnerability knowledge sources. 
 
The following table provides pattern content information. Such as  
• Mostly: Publicly available, easy to understand, easy to use 
• No: Not publicly available, difficult to understand, difficult to use. 
 
 
 
Pattern Type Availability Understanding  Usability 
Design Pattern Mostly Mostly No 
Security Pattern Mostly No No 
Software Fault 
Pattern 
No No Mostly 
Attack Pattern Mostly No No 
Anti-Pattern No Mostly No 
Table 13 Comparative analysis of cyber-patterns to measure ineffectiveness in order to vulnerability understanding 
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3.4 Proposed Solution 
From this review of existing pattern-based approaches to security, it can be concluded 
that any new approach needs to deal with the following considerations: 
• The new method needs to use cybersecurity knowledge sources. However, 
knowledge extracted from cybersecurity sources should be presented in a 
usable format which software developers can understand. 
• The new approach needs to contribute a new pattern-based approach that can 
be used to identify and capture any vulnerability within the Software 
Development Lifecycle (SDLC) and provide mitigation solutions. 
The pattern-based approach proposed in this dissertation, which is known as 
“Vulnerability Anti-Pattern”, is described in more detail in the following section. 
3.4.1 Derivation of Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) 
There are three main derivation processes of the VAP approach: 
1. Knowledge Extraction Process (KEP) 
The KEP involves “pulling” information about vulnerability from appropriate 
sources, e.g. existing vulnerability databases (e.g. CWE, CAPEC, and CVE) 
and security patterns (SP).  
2. Knowledge Provision Process (KPP) 
The KPP involves taking the output of KEP and storing /expressing it in the form 
of a VAP. 
3. Knowledge Awareness Process (KAP) 
This is the activity of presenting the VAP to software developers for knowledge 
awareness of vulnerabilities.  
As shown in Figure 14, the proposed methodology is divided into sub-parts to 
achieve simplicity and reduce complexity. The KEP in Section 3.4.1.1 explains the 
“Knowledge pulling”, to extract knowledge from different VDBs, security patterns and 
attack patterns sources; The KPP in Section 3.4.1.2 describes the “Knowledge 
pushing”, to encapsulate the normalised knowledge into anti-pattern to apprehend the 
necessary knowledge of vulnerabilities.
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Figure 14 Derivation of VAP3
                                            
3  1-knowledge extraction is KEP, 2-knowledge provision is KPP, 3-Knowledge Awareness is KAP 
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3.4.1.1 Knowledge Extraction Process (KEP) 
KEP is a process during which cybersecurity knowledge sources are used to extract 
developer centric knowledge, which is essential to improve developer awareness of 
how malicious hacker exploit their development errors. To follow up, KEP maps 
extracted knowledge into SDLC, which provides knowledge to developers about which 
stage of the development lifecycle the vulnerability originates and what root causes 
leading to the vulnerability. KEP comprises: 
• Knowledge extraction 
o Create nomenclature of Vulnerabilities 
• Knowledge mapping into SDLC  
o Generate a Decision tree  
Knowledge extraction: During this process, knowledge is extracted from multiple 
sources such as VDBs (CWE, CVE), security patterns and attack pattern databases 
(CAPEC) as shown in Table 14, which explains the knowledge sources such as 
Software Fault Patterns (SFP), Design Patterns (DP), Anti-Patterns and Attacks 
Patterns (AP) and describes accrued knowledge from these sources. Based on 
extracted knowledge, a nomenclature of vulnerabilities is created. 
Knowledge mapping into SDLC: After extraction, the vulnerability knowledge is 
mapped into the SDLC. The mapping to SDLC provides awareness to developers 
about which stage of development lifecycle the vulnerability originates in and what root 
causes leading to the vulnerability. A mapping process is used to generate a decision 
tree, which maps vulnerabilities to root causes within the SDLC and generates “injury” 
and “safeguard” paths based on extracted knowledge from VDBs and security related 
cyber-patterns within SDLC. 
Table 14 illustrates the general overview of the knowledge extraction process 
and its mapping to cyber-patterns within the SDLC. This SDLC mapping of 
vulnerability adds value to VAP design. Basically, this approach helps developers to 
trace the vulnerability root cause from the initiated level within the SDLC. The research 
includes three main phases of the SDLC during which poor security coding practices 
generate weaknesses that have the potential to turn into vulnerabilities. The mapping 
considers the following the SDLC phases: 
1) Requirement specification  
2) Design  
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3) Implementation  
 
 
Vulnerability level in 
SDLC 
Software Fault 
Pattern 
Vulnerability 
Databases 
Analysis Process of 
Security Related Cyber-
patterns 
Requirement Level 
Vulnerabilities 
Injury, 
safeguard 
CWE Security objectives  
Design Level 
Vulnerabilities 
Injury, 
safeguard 
CWE, CVE Design patterns/anti-
pattern 
Code/Implementation 
Level Vulnerabilities 
Injury, 
safeguard 
CAPEC Secure coding/attack 
patterns 
Table 14 Mapping between vulnerabilities and cyber-patterns within SDLC 
 
1) Requirement Specification Phase: During this phase, inaccurate security 
requirements and any security weaknesses violating security requirements are 
potential security flaws. Security objectives present the solution for these 
security flaws. The knowledge is extracted from Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) (MITRE Corporation 2015b), which can provide a list of 
security flaws that can help find and resolve vague requirements and achieving 
the security objectives (Alvi and Zulkernine 2011). 
2) Design Phase: During the design phase, the wrong algorithm approach, 
incorrect data conversion and unsafe exception handling are design flaws 
which may result in vulnerabilities being introduced into the software. The 
knowledge is extracted from CWE and CVE, while using the Anti-Pattern 
approach. This creates a link between the security flaws and properties to 
inform upon the reasons of anti-patterns within the VAP. 
3) Implementation phase: During the implementation phase, there are many 
security guidelines to be used for preventing possible security risks (Hans 2010, 
Shiralkar and Grove 2009). The main focus should be on a secure coding 
pattern to attack patterns. Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification (CAPEC) (MITRE Corporation 2015c) are very helpful for linking 
software flaws to attack patterns. 
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Primarily, the KEP is designed to transfer vulnerability knowledge, which 
comprised of vulnerabilities nomenclature to assign developers understandable 
vocabulary and decision tree to find the injury (flaw leads to vulnerability) and (safe 
solution against flaw) safe path. This process includes:  
1) Nomenclature of Vulnerabilities 
2) Decision Tree 
These are detailed below.
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1. Nomenclature of Vulnerabilities  
During the KEP, a nomenclature is generated based on the extracted knowledge that 
is sourced from CWE, CVE, CAPEC and security patterns. This vocabulary helps 
developers to understand cybersecurity experts’ terminologies. The including 
information are:  
• Vulnerability Information: General vulnerability information comprises ID, 
registered CVE vulnerable examples CVE and other general names given to 
vulnerability, which are sourced from CWE, and CVE. 
• Vulnerability Footprints or Characteristics: This category includes the 
context in which vulnerabilities generally occur, Software Development 
Lifecycle phase in which vulnerability originates, and vulnerability software fault 
pattern to expose the faulty computation. All information is obtained from CWE 
and SFP. 
• Mitigation: To find solutions against these vulnerabilities, we include possible 
threat information, related solution patterns, and attack patterns that are 
sourced from STRIDE threat model, a catalogue of security pattern and attack 
pattern from CAPEC.  
The vulnerability nomenclature is demonstrated in Table 15 with the knowledge 
source information. This is used as a sanitised knowledge bank for designing the 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern. During KEP, vulnerabilities nomenclature is manually 
generated by the researcher and updated quarterly since 2015, but as a part of 
future work which is described in Section 10.5.1. Automated tool will create to 
capture and sanitise recent vulnerability information, which will automatically 
update vulnerabilities nomenclature information regularly.
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4 Vulnerability databases searched between 15/07/2015 -12/11/2017 
Vulnerability information4 Vulnerability fingerprint or characteristics  Mitigation 
CWE-ID CVE Generally known 
as  
Context  Lifecycle SFP STRIDE SP AP 
CWE-89 CVE-
2016-
1393, 
CVE-
2015-
0161 
SQL Injection Software fails to 
correctly escape 
special elements 
used in SQL 
commands. 
Design Phase  CWE-990: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Tainted Input to 
Command 
Spoofing  Intercepting 
Validator   
CAPEC-7, 
CAPEC-66, 
CAPEC-108,  
CAPEC-109 
CAPEC-110 
CWE-
862:  
CVE-
2009-
3168,  
CVE-
2009-
3597,  
CVE-
2009-
2282 
Missing 
Authorization 
The software does 
not perform an 
authorization check 
when an actor 
attempts to access 
a resource or 
perform an action. 
Design Phase  Information 
Disclosure 
Role-based access 
control 
CAPEC-1, 
CAPEC-17, 
CAPEC-58 
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CWE-
306 
CVE-
2004-
0213, 
CVE-
2008-
6827, 
CVE-
2002-
1810 
 
 
Missing 
Authentication for 
Critical Function 
The software does 
not perform any 
authentication for 
functionality that 
requires a provable 
user identity or 
consumes a 
significant amount 
of resources. 
Design phase CWE-952: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Missing 
Authentication 
Spoofing  Authentication CAPEC-225,  
CAPEC-12,  
CAPEC-36,  
CAPEC-40,  
CAPEC-62 
CWE-
120 
CVE-
2016-
5108, 
CVE-
2016-
5108 
Buffer Copy without 
Checking Size of 
Input ('Classic 
Buffer Overflow') 
The program copies 
data to a buffer 
without checking 
the size of the input. 
Implementation 
phase 
CWE-970: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Faulty Buffer 
Access 
Tampering Safe Data Structure CAPEC-8, 
CAPEC- 9, 
CAPEC-10, 
CAPEC-14, 
CAPEC-24 
CWE-
676 
CVE-
2011-
0712, 
CVE-
2009-
3849, 
CVE-
2006-
2114 
Use of Potentially 
Dangerous Function 
The program uses a 
potentially 
dangerous function 
that may introduce 
a vulnerability if 
used incorrectly. 
Design and 
Implementation 
Phase 
CWE-1001: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Use of an Improper 
API 
NONE NONE CAPEC-113 
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CWE-
131 
CVE-
2004-
1363, 
CVE-
2008-
0599 
Incorrect Calculation 
of Buffer Size 
 
The software does 
not correctly 
calculate the size to 
be used when 
allocating a buffer,  
Implementation 
Phase 
CWE-974: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Incorrect Buffer 
Length Computation 
Tampering  NONE CAPEC-47, 
CAPEC-100 
CWE-
190 
CVE-
2010-
2753, 
CVE-
2005-
0102, 
CVE-
2005-
1141 
Integer Overflow or 
Wraparound 
The software 
performs a 
calculation that can 
produce an integer 
overflow or 
wraparound. 
Implementation 
Phase 
CWE-998: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Glitch in 
Computation  
 
Tampering  NONE CAPECE-92 
CWE-79 CVE-
2008-
5080, 
CVE-
2007-
5727 
Improper 
Neutralization of 
Input During Web 
Page Generation 
The software does 
not properly escape 
attacker-provided 
data when 
generating HTML 
content. 
Design and 
Implementation 
Phase 
CWE-990: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Tainted Input to 
Command 
Information 
disclosure, 
Tampering 
Container Managed 
Security, 
Message Interceptor 
Gateway 
CAPEC-18, 
CAPEC-19, 
CAPEC-32, 
CAPEC-63, 
CAPEC-85 
CWE-
352 
CVE-
2009-
3759, 
CVE-
2009-
3520, 
Cross-Site Request 
Forgery (CSRF) 
The web application 
does not sufficiently 
verify that the 
source of the 
request is the same 
as the target of the 
request. This 
Design and 
Implementation 
Phase 
NONE Spoofing  Synchronizer token 
pattern 
CAPEC-62, 
CAPEC-111 
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CVE-
2005-
1674 
enables a 
command (triggered 
from a malicious 
application) to be 
sent to a trusted 
website using the 
user’s browser. 
CWE-
134 
CVE-
2007-
2027, 
CVE-
2006-
2480, 
CVE-
2002-
1788 
Uncontrolled Format 
String 
The software uses 
formatted output 
functions with a 
format string 
controlled by an 
attacker. 
Implementation 
Phase  
CWE-990: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Tainted Input to 
Command 
NONE NONE CAPEC-67 
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CWE-78 CVE-
2012-
1988, 
CVE-
2007-
3572, 
CVE-
2008-
4796 
Improper 
Neutralization of 
Special Elements 
used in an OS 
Command 
The software does 
not properly escape 
the special 
elements used in an 
operating system 
command, which 
may enable 
execution of 
arbitrary commands 
by an attacker. 
Design and 
Implementation 
Phase 
CWE-990: SFP 
Secondary Cluster: 
Tainted Input to 
Command 
NONE NONE CAPEC-6, 
CAPEC-15, 
CAPEC-43, 
CAPEC-88 
Table 15 Taxonomy of vulnerabilities   
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2. Decision Tree 
In the KEP, after categorisation using the developed nomenclature, the vulnerabilities 
are based on their extracted knowledge, Decision tree generation has two main aims: 
firstly, to carry out the vulnerability mapping for finding the root-causes within the 
SDLC, secondly, to apply the obtained VDBs and vulnerability related pattern 
information to indicate the “Injury” and “Safeguard” paths.  
• “Injury Path” means that flaws lead to vulnerability. 
• “Safeguard Path” means that the flaw can be avoided to prevent the 
vulnerability from occurring.  
Consequently, the decision tree can depict safeguarding and injury flows which 
are associated with security incidents, including their low-level and high-level root 
causes within the SDLC phases, as shown in Figure 15.  
• Green paths are safeguards that direct the developer to avoid software 
vulnerabilities. 
• Following Red (injury) paths can lead to the creation of a vulnerability. 
 
Figure 15 Vulnerability flow decision Tree in SDLC 
To illustrate a decision tree, CWE-190: Integer overflow or wraparound is 
exemplified in the following section. This vulnerability occurs due to an incorrect logic 
assumption, in which larger integers are stored in a small size integer value. 
Implementation/Cod
ing Phase
Design Phase
Requirement 
Specification Phase
SDLC Vulnerability 
Injury
Injury
Injury
Safeguard
Injury
Injury
Safeguard
Injury Safeguard
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i) Decision Tree Example: CWE-190, Integer Overflow or Wraparound 
Figure 16 is an example of a decision tree for the Integer Overflow vulnerability, which 
is chosen from the list of OWASP “Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors”. The 
CWE-190 vulnerability explanation mapping within SDLC is described below: 
• Requirement Specification Phase:  During this phase, Information is sourced 
from the CWE and OWASP, and VDBs, which helps us find the security 
objectives5 for integer overflow vulnerability. It can conclude that careful 
language selection6 is the green (safeguarding) path that performs bound 
checking otherwise it can lead to the injury path of numeric error (sourced from 
software fault pattern-CWE-998) at this stage.  
• Design Phase: During the design phase, information passed from the above 
phase leads to the further subdivision. The injury path (numeric error) 
knowledge sourced from software fault pattern that can turn into integer 
overflow vulnerability and safeguard path knowledge scoured from security 
pattern that follows secure coding practices such as Safeint libraries, which is 
linked to a security pattern called Safe Data Structure7.  
• Code/Implementation Phase: The CAPEC information source helps the 
developer find the related attack patterns and interlinked vulnerabilities, such 
as related attack patterns are CAPEC- 92 forced integer overflow, and 
interlinked vulnerability CWE-680 integer overflow to buffer overflow that can 
occur due to the injury path. However, to follow the safe path, such as the 
bounds-checking library (gcc 2.7.0) and related security pattern (Safe Data 
Structure), can help to avoid introducing this vulnerability. 
                                            
5  System requirement specifications to deal with security concerns  
6 The CWE recommends (MITRE Corporation 2015c) using a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides 
constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. If possible, choose a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds 
checking. 
7 Security pattern  
 108 
 
 
Figure 16 Decision tree mapping example: CWE-190 
The point to be noted here is that an “injury” path in one phase always leads to 
an “injury” path in subsequent phases. 
The CWE-190 vulnerability originated during the design phase due to poor 
requirement specification, which is confirmed with decision tree mapping. Use of safe 
language will lead developers to the safeguard path. Once an injury is induced, it is 
difficult to mitigate. For example, CWE-190 is exploited as CAPEC-92(forced integer 
overflow) and leads to its chain vulnerability (CWE-680) that is called interlinked 
vulnerability (vulnerability always triggers another vulnerability, also called a chained 
vulnerability). For example, integer overflow mostly causes a buffer overflow. 
  
implementation
/coding phaseDesign phase
Requirement 
specification 
phase
SDLC
CWE-190 
Numeric Errors Integer overflow
Forced Integer 
Overflow-92
CWE-680: Integer 
Overflow to Buffer 
Overflow
language
selection
Integer overflow
Forced Integer 
Overflow-92
CWE-680: Integer 
Overflow to Buffer 
Overflow
CERT C & C+ 
Secure Coding 
(SafeInt (C++) or 
IntegerLib (C or 
C++))
bounds-checking 
library (gcc 2.7.0)
Forced Integer 
Overflow-92
CWE-680: Integer 
Overflow to Buffer 
Overflow
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3.4.1.2 Knowledge Provision Process (KPP) 
The Knowledge Provision Process makes use of anti-patterns to capture and integrate 
the extracted information which forms the output of the KEP, so that software 
developers have access to the distilled wisdom of cybersecurity experts in dealing with 
recurring development errors related to security. The extracted knowledge is pushed 
into the Anti-pattern to encapsulate the necessary knowledge of the vulnerability.   
a) Anti-Patterns to Capture Vulnerabilities knowledge 
For a software engineer, a design pattern generally describes a good practice, and in 
turn, an anti-pattern, poor practice. However, sometimes good development practices 
are ineffective and turn into poor development practices. The use of anti-patterns 
allows developers to recognise commonly occurring problems, which may result from 
a lack of knowledge, insufficient experience in solving a particular type of problem, or 
applying a correct pattern in the wrong context (Foote and Yoder 1997, Dias e Silva 
2014). Similarly, design patterns can turn into anti-patterns. The result is that a pattern 
that may be commonly used and generally considered good practice but is now 
ineffective and counterproductive in practice.  
For example, common anti-patterns in critical or legacy systems are called 
KEEPING IT WORKING (Foote and Yoder 1997, Foote, Rohnert and Harrison 1999), 
which means do what it takes to maintain the software and keep it going and working. 
This anti-pattern is common in critical systems because when an essential element is 
broken, or a single failure will affect the entire system. An example is a system 
developed in C/C++ that uses unsafe function calls. 
b) A Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
This is a final stage in which vulnerability knowledge is pushed into an anti-pattern 
structure to capture poor security practices. This leads to the derivation of a 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern, a hybrid solution against prevalent vulnerabilities. This 
research proposed a VAP that captures cybersecurity domain knowledge and provides 
distilled knowledge access to enhance developer understanding so that software will 
not be exploited due to recurring vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the VAP offers precise 
information that extracted from specified knowledge sources such as vulnerability 
Databases (VDBs), Security Pattern (SP), Software Fault Pattern (SFP) and Attack 
Pattern (AP) to fulfil the need to provide essential vulnerability information.  
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a. General Structure of Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) 
This section introduces the VAP general structure, which is comprised of  
• Anti-pattern 
• Pattern 
VAP general structure explained further by VAP types in the following chapter. 
a) Vulnerability Anti-Pattern General info  
Anti-Pattern 
a. Anti-Pattern Name: 
b. Also Known as: 
c. Most Frequent Scale in SDLC:  
i. Requirement Specification Phase 
ii. Design Phase  
iii. Implementation/Coding Phase 
d. Problem Description: 
e. CWE Mapping: 
i. CWE-ID 
ii. General name  
f. Related CWEs: 
CWE-ID Name  
 
g. CVE Example: 
b) Anti-Pattern Problematic Solution  
a. Refactored Solution Name: 
b. Refactored Solution Type: 
i. Software Pattern 
ii. Technology Pattern 
iii. Process Pattern 
iv. Role Pattern 
c. Root Causes(Context): 
d. Unbalanced Forces  
 
Unbalanced forces Attack Example(code) 
i. Management of functionality: meeting the 
requirements.  
  
ii. Management of performance: meeting the 
required speed of operation.  
  
iii. Management of complexity: defining 
abstractions.  
  
iv. Management of change: controlling the 
evolution of software. 
  
v. Management of IT resources: controlling the 
use and implementation of people and It 
artefacts 
  
vi.  Management of technology transfer: 
controlling technology change.  
  
Pattern 
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e. Risk patterns and Consequences: 
Risk Patterns Consequences  Context Description 
 STRIDE threat model  
f. Typical Causes  
c) Problem Fingerprints(SFP) 
i. Software Fault Pattern 
d) Known Exploitation (Attack patterns-CAPEC) 
i. Attack Pattern 
e) Mitigation (Refactors the problem) 
ii. Refactored Solutions: 
i. Solution Steps  
SDLC Phase Solution 
 
a. Examples: (Real world Patch example) 
Product versions Comment Vulnerability  CVE-ID Patch(solution) 
 
b. Related Solutions (SP): 
i. General Solution (All in one solution) 
 
3.4.1.3 Knowledge Awareness Process (KAP) 
Knowledge Awareness Process aims to provide vulnerability information to software 
developers through Vulnerability Anti-Patterns. The Notion of Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern is a hybrid solution that intended to provide the developers with awareness of 
security flaws, so they will understand the vulnerabilities and their root-causes to 
deploy mitigation solutions. To achieve this, KAP is designed to measure the 
effectiveness and usability of VAPs for developers in identifying and understanding 
how malicious hackers can exploit vulnerabilities. The KAP is explained in detail in the 
evaluation Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a critique of existing pattern-based approaches to security and 
suggested the formulation of a Vulnerability Anti-Pattern. The motivation of the 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern approach was to create a pattern-based technique that 
resolves the problem of: 
• Ineffectiveness of existing pattern-based approaches to providing information 
about the most commonly-occurring vulnerabilities. Software developers can 
use these to learn how a malicious hacker can exploit their software systems.  
• A distinct knowledge gap between software engineers and cybersecurity 
experts in terms of how to create secure software systems. 
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The first problem requires a novel approach to capture vulnerabilities, one that 
is easily understood by developers. 
The second problem requires a form of management that provides essential 
information flow of vulnerabilities to bridge the knowledge gap to help developers to 
create secure software. The VAP detailed design and created catalogues are 
presented in the next chapters, and then the performed evaluation is reported in 
subsequent Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
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5 Creating a Catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs) 
This chapter presents a catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs) that currently 
captures 12 vulnerabilities. However, each VAP has two types: formal and informal, 
so the catalogue includes 24 VAPs defending against 12 vulnerabilities. The included 
vulnerabilities in the catalogue chosen from OWASP Top 25 software errors list (Martin 
et al. 2011). These consist of the most critical security problems faced by today’s 
developers. VAPs are clustered together by various classification schemes such as 
language-based or aggregation-based cluster. 
The way VAPs are organised helps to explain to developers which VAP can be 
used against a particular type of vulnerability, coupled with prevention in the future. 
This chapter describes how the VAP catalogue was derived, and how the VAPs are 
organised in the catalogue.  
This chapter’s key objectives are: 
• Sections 5.1 and 5.2 detail and explain the organisation of Vulnerability Anti-
Patterns to develop a catalogue. 
• Section 5.3 explains the organisation of VAPs. 
• Section 5.4 describes the formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern catalogue. 
• Informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern catalogue describes in Section 5.5. 
 
5.1 Developing the Catalogue  
The catalogue was created while considering evaluation studies of this thesis, in which 
vulnerabilities have been selected on the basis of participants’ knowledge of the 
particular programming language and platform dependencies, so the evaluation study 
can assess the selected vulnerabilities awareness in participants and provide 
intervention through its related VAPs.  
Catalogue of VAPs is comprised of most serious development errors identified 
by surveying various vulnerability databases and their recent trend reports. Then this 
research explored the root causes of development errors by surveying the multiple 
pattern-based approaches in order to deal with security such as security patterns, 
software fault patterns, and attack patterns. This was aided by the fact that this 
research proposed a new approach based on anti-pattern to capture software 
vulnerabilities as mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1. The catalogue contributes to 
the organisation of all developed Vulnerability Anti-Patterns and its software errors. 
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There are multiple approaches to developing a catalogue, the most rigorous 
way to build a catalogue of VAPs is to enumerate every possible development error 
and their refactored solutions, build tools to implement candidate solutions as optimal 
answers, allow developers to use the tools and identify which refactored solutions are 
more useful, and finally include them in the catalogue. It is impossible for a researcher 
to follow this rigorous path; building tools and user testing each vulnerability (software 
error) in the catalogue would take hundreds of person years. 
The proposed approach to develop a catalogue is mainly focused on fulfilling 
the recurrent vulnerabilities awareness need for software developers. However, 
instead of finding all possible vulnerabilities that occur due to poor coding practices, 
this research restricted to the most important 12 vulnerabilities, identified by the 
OWASP as “Most Dangerous Development Errors”. Furthermore, this research 
explores the most optimal and usable security solutions suggested by both 
communities (cybersecurity and software engineering). The catalogue of VAP is a 
summation of selected poor security coding practices and refactored solutions against 
vulnerabilities; it covers the solution space better than any arbitrary approach. 
 
5.2 Vulnerability Anti-Patterns Clustering  
5.2.1 Language-Based Cluster  
In Figure 22, Language-based cluster represents all included vulnerabilities that are 
inherited in developers’ common devolvement practices not only due to a lack of poor 
understanding of security core concepts such as proper memory allocation and bound 
checking but important platforms, such as C/C++, also shared in the responsibility of 
the vulnerabilities’ reoccurrence. The motivation to put together this group of 
vulnerabilities into clusters are: 
 
• All vulnerabilities occur due to specific languages such as C/C++ or PHP. 
• All vulnerabilities have their origins in a lack of input validation or improper input 
validation checks. 
• All vulnerabilities are mitigated to some extent by implementing/ following the 
secure coding practice. 
• All vulnerabilities are led to information breaches such as denial-of-service 
(DoS) attack. 
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Figure 22 Language-based cluster 
As shown in Figure 22, the language-based cluster appears to have two main 
languages:  
• PHP 
• C/C++ 
The leaf nodes of the cluster define the vulnerabilities and the middle nodes 
explain the lack of input validation or improper input validation checks that have been 
taken from the software fault pattern. Therefore, faulty computation leads to 
vulnerability.  
Vulnerability
PHP
Use of an Improper API Use of DeprecatedFunctions
Glitch in Computation Integer Overflow or Wraparound
C/C++
Faulty Buffer Access
Buffer Copy without 
Checking Size of Input 
('Classic Buffer Overflow')
Incorrect Calculation of 
Buffer Size
Tainted Input Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
Use of an Improper API Use of Potentially Dangerous Functions
Glitch in Computation
Integer Overflow or 
Wraparound(Exception in 
some cases)
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5.2.2 Aggregation-Based Cluster Organisation 
The cluster shown in Figure 23 is based on aggregation, which is a specialised form 
of association among vulnerabilities in order to indicate a significant correlation among 
vulnerabilities’ root-causes.  Fundamentally, “Use of Potential Dangerous function” is 
a parent vulnerability and “Integer Overflow”, “Buffer Overflow”, “Incorrect Calculation 
of Buffer Size”, “Use of Externally-Controlled Format String” are child objects 
(vulnerabilities). This association among vulnerabilities help us to signify a hierarchical 
relationship as one of simplicity. 
• Parent Vulnerability: Use of Potentially Dangerous Function 
• Child Vulnerabilities: Integer Overflow, Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size, 
Use of Externally Controlled Format String, Buffer Overflow. 
    
 
Figure 23 Aggregation-based cluster to display root causes with linkage parent and child vulnerabilities. 
  
Use of 
Potentially 
Dangerous 
Function
Integer 
Overflow
Incorrect 
Calculation of 
Buffer Size
Use of 
Externally-
Controlled 
Format String 
Classic Buffer 
Overflow
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5.3 Organising Vulnerability Anti-patterns 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern catalogue organised into formal or informal types and then follows the language-based clustering as 
shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24 Organisation of Vulnerability Anti-Pattern
Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern
Formal
Langauage-Based
C/C++
Incorrect 
Calculation of 
Buffer Size
Buffer Copy without 
Checking Size of 
Input
Use of potential 
Dangerous / 
Depercated 
Functions
Integer Overflow
Use of Externally-
Controlled Format 
String
PHP
SQL Injection
Use of potential 
Dangerous / 
Depercated 
Function
Language-
Independent
Missing 
Authentication
Missing 
Authorization
Cross Site Scripting
Cross Site Request 
Forgery
Command Injection
Infromal
Langauage-Based
PHP
Use of PHP 
Potentially 
Dangerous Function 
(Deprecated) 
PHP Integer 
Overflow or 
Wraparound 
SQL Injection  
C/C++
Buffer Copy without 
Checking Size of 
Input 
Use of C/C++ 
Potentially 
Dangerous Function
Incorrect 
Calculation of 
Buffer Size
C/C++ Integer 
Overflow or 
Wraparound 
Lanaguage-
Indepenedent
Missing 
Authentication for 
the Critical Function
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5.4 Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Catalogue  
Figure 25 demonstrates the catalogue of included vulnerabilities with their sub-
division into formal and informal arrangements.   
1. Formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Catalogue: 
As mentioned above in Section 4.6.2, the formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
follows the standard format of anti-pattern to capture and present vulnerability. 
2. Informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Catalogue:  
As mentioned in Section 4.6.1, the Informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
exemplifies the way in which a vulnerability can occur in a specific context. 
 
  
 139 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25 Hierarchical view of VAP catalogue 
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5.5 Informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Catalogue 
As explained in Section 4.6.1, Informal vulnerability Anti-Pattern is exemplified 
the exploitation prospect for developers in an understandable format. The 
informal catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns includes 9 vulnerabilities: 
1) Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input  
2) Use of C/C++ Potentially Dangerous Function  
3) Use of PHP Potentially Dangerous Function (Deprecated)  
4) Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size  
5) C/C++ Integer Overflow or Wraparound  
6) PHP Integer Overflow or Wraparound  
7) Missing Authentication for the Critical Function  
8) Missing Authorization  
9) SQL Injection  
Details of each VAP explains in the appendix Section 1.2, which elucidates 
the relationship between vulnerability and its exploitation behaviour in the form of 
a pattern and anti-pattern. 
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5.6 Formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Catalogue 
As explained previously in Section 4.6.2, formal vulnerability Anti-Pattern is 
extended explanatory configuration which elucidates detailed information of 
vulnerability for developers in an understandable format. The formal catalogue of 
Vulnerability Anti-Patterns includes 12 vulnerabilities: 
1) Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input  
2) Use of Potentially Dangerous/ Deprecated Function  
3) Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size  
4) Integer Overflow or Wraparound  
5) Missing Authentication  
6) Missing Authorization  
7) SQL Injection  
8) Improper Neutralization of Input during Web Page Generation  
9) Cross-Site Request Forgery  
10) Use of Externally-Controlled Format String  
11) Shell Injection  
Details of each pattern are explained in the appendix Section 1.1 that 
elucidates the factors involved to cause the vulnerability (i.e. anti-pattern and 
pattern). 
5.7 Conclusion 
The catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAPs) has been created to match 
12 vulnerabilities. VAPs have different types: formal and informal, which further 
is sub-categorised based on programming languages, such as PHP and C/C++. 
The included vulnerabilities in the catalogue have been chosen from the OWASP 
Top 25 software errors list (Martin et al. 2011) that consist of the most important 
security problems faced by today’s developers. The way VAPs are organised 
helps explain to developers which VAPs can be used against a particular type of 
vulnerability coupled with prevention in the future. This chapter describes the 
VAP catalogue by various classification schemes such as language-based or 
aggregation-based clusters. The chapter concluded by presenting informal and 
formal VAP catalogues.  
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 Evaluation 
This section of the dissertation consists of four chapters to detail the results of 
three experimental studies: Pilot study-I (PS-I), which was conducted to test the 
proposed experiment design with Computing and Ethical hacking students at 
Abertay University, Pilot study-II (PS-II), which was performed only with 
Computing related degree students at Abertay University and an Industrial 
study performed with professional software engineers at a UK-based leading 
software development company. The evaluation is divided into three parts. 
Chapter-6 Pilot study-I: the key objective was to evaluate developers’ (in 
this case, students’) understanding of security flaws that lead to vulnerabilities. 
We concluded this study by specifying outcomes which re-inform Vulnerability 
Anti-Patterns (VAPs) and the design of the subsequent pilot study-II and industrial 
study. 
Chapter-7 Pilot study-II and Chapter-8 Industrial study: the key 
objectives were to evaluate developers’ and students’ understanding of security 
flaws that lead to vulnerabilities and to measure the effectiveness of VAPs to help 
developers in improving their understanding about vulnerabilities. 
A mixed methods approach is used to evaluating developers’ awareness about 
recurrent vulnerabilities and measuring the effectiveness of Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern to provide understanding in a series of experiments as shown in Figure 
26. 
 
 
Figure 26 Experimental studies and their research methods approach 
 
Pilot Study-I
• Quantitative 
Approach 
Pilot Study-
II
• Quantitative 
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The derived pattern-based approach (VAP) mentioned in Chapter 4 is 
used as an intervention during PS-II and Industrial study. 
Based on literature review analysis and Pilot-study-I results, it was 
apparent that the use of a pattern-based approach and subsequent development 
of VAP would be an appropriate solution. Therefore, an evaluation of VAPs was 
conducted via the PS-II and Industrial study. 
Chapter-9 discusses all performed studies results and concludes by 
proving a brief summary of results to measure the effectiveness of the VAP for 
developers in order to provide essential awareness of vulnerabilities with support 
to the creation of secure software systems.  
Table 20 describes the study questions (SQ) of pilot study-I, pilot study-II 
and industrial study. By analysing data in multiple ways, the results seek to 
determine: 
Pilot Study-I 
SQ-1 Do software developers have an effective understanding of recurrent 
vulnerabilities? 
Pilot Study-II & Industrial Study 
SQ-1 Do software developers have an effective understanding of recurrent 
vulnerabilities? 
SQ-2 Can interventions based on Vulnerability Anti-Pattern help developers 
in improving their understanding of vulnerabilities? 
Table 20 Study Objectives (SO) of the experimental studies. 
The evaluation section of this dissertation is organised into 4 chapters: 
Chapter 6 presents the Pilot-study-I results and their statistical analysis; Chapter 
7 presents the Pilot-study-II results, and their statistical analysis; Chapter 7 
presents the Industrial study results and their qualitative analysis. Followed by 
Chapter 8 discusses all studies results. 
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6 Pilot Study-I (PS-I) 
6.1 Introduction 
Initially, a pilot study (PS-I) was conducted, to investigate the question that does 
software developers have an effective understanding of recurrent vulnerabilities? 
Furthermore, does PS-I designed questionnaire appropriately capture and 
present information about the selected vulnerabilities to participants in order to 
evaluate their understanding of vulnerabilities. In addition to this, there was a 
need to assess the complexity of the designed questionnaire for participants, the 
length of time required to complete the questionnaire and to identify any 
preliminary problems. 
A small sample group of 30 computing degree related students were 
recruited as participants for PS-1. This study was performed to test the designed 
questionnaire appropriateness and selection of vulnerabilities. The PS-I 
participants were students of computer science majors at the Division of 
Computing and Mathematics, Division of Cybersecurity at Abertay University. 
The main issue reported by participants was the lengthy and time-consuming 
nature of the questionnaires as it was comprised of 10 vulnerabilities. To address 
these comments, the vulnerability sample size was reduced to 5. 
The second pilot-study and the industrial study included only 5 
vulnerabilities. The results of the pilot study are presented independently in 
Section 9.1. 
6.1.1 General Description	
This chapter reports the results of pilot study-I, which aimed to evaluate the 
developers’ existing understanding of recurrent vulnerabilities. This study does 
not test an intervention based on Vulnerability Anti-pattern. 
Furthermore, the PS-I analysed the results to determine the statistical 
significance to confirm the proposed hypothesis (as discussed in Section1.8). 
The results revealed that software developers lack an effective understanding of 
how to identify recurring security flaws (weaknesses) that enable the malicious 
attacker to carry out an attack. 
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6.1.2 Key Objectives  
The Study Question (SQ) is described: 
Do software developers have an effective understanding of recurrent 
vulnerabilities? 
6.1.3 Experiment Hypothesis 
The experiment study posits the following hypothesis (Experiment 
hypothesis=EH): 
EH-1 Participants can identify recurring security flaws and know how 
malicious hackers can exploit these. 
EH-0  Participants cannot identify recurring security flaws and do not know 
how malicious hackers can exploit these.  
 
6.2 Method  
6.2.1 Experiment Study Description 
A pilot study was performed with students from the School of Design and 
Informatics at the University of Abertay Dundee. The study comprised a 
questionnaire, which investigated their awareness of the most commonly 
occurring software errors (i.e. vulnerabilities) and techniques for their mitigation. 
Computing related degree students such as BSc Ethical Hacking, BSc 
Computing, BSc Computer Games Technology, BSc Computer Application 
Development and MSc Ethical Hacking students were surveyed.  All students 
share computer science as common knowledge background. However, ethical 
hacking degree students are different due to their major in cybersecurity, and they 
are also called penetration testers. Pilot study participants had alternative 
background knowledge. For example, ethical hacking students were expected to 
know some of the included vulnerabilities and their exploitation in comparison to 
computing or gaming degree students. The questionnaire consisted of 10 
questions. Each question represented one particular vulnerability. The selected 
vulnerabilities were chosen from the “2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous 
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Software Errors” list (Martin et al. 2011).  30 students participated and completed 
the questionnaire. Please see Appendices 1.2. For information. Each question 
was divided into three sub-parts,  
Part-1: Investigated developers’ (students) awareness of why a given 
piece of vulnerable code or UML diagram is insecure. 
Part-2: Investigated developers’ (students) ability to describe how this 
security flaw can enable a malicious attacker to carry out an attack.  
Part-3: Investigated developers’ (students) awareness of commonly used 
cybersecurity terminology to describe a security flaw. 
In the questionnaire, each question has been assigned one of 4 points, which 
are distributed as follows: 
• 0 = Student is unaware of the vulnerability. 
• 1 = student is slightly aware of the vulnerability 
• 2 = student is aware of the vulnerability 
• 3 = student is well aware of the vulnerability 
Each question sub-divided into 3 parts as shown in Table 21; each part is 
manually marked based on the answers of participants by researchers and 
moderated by someone else. The points assigned to the participants according 
to the above mentioned criteria (between 0 to 3). An example question is 
explained below: 
Use the C# code sample below to answer the following questions I, II 
and III? 
1. string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName(); //function call to 
get user name 
2. string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" 
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '" + ItemName.Text + "'"; // database 
query to retrieve item information using user name and itemname as 
an input value from user. 
3. sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);// execute the query 
 
 The program output will retrieve item information that corresponds to the 
username and itemname. 
Part-1 I. The above code contains a flaw, which may not be 
detected by the compiler. Please describe below why 
you think this code is wrong.  
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Part-2 II. A malicious hacker could exploit this code to 
concatenate malicious input to build SQL command to 
skip any input validation on username and can be used 
to gain access to database information. Can you explain 
how this code would enable a malicious hacker to carry 
out such an attack? 
Part-3 III. Can you explain this security flaw?  
Table 21 PS-I question example 
6.2.2 Experiment Design Structure  
The rationale for the experimental design displayed in Table 22, which comprised:  
• Assessment Survey Study 
Accessing and measuring participants’ (software developers’) awareness about 
prevalent vulnerabilities. 
Stage-1 
 
Assessment Survey Study  
Input Questionnaire with 
vulnerable code/ UML 
diagram 
 
Output Assessed result of 
developers’ awareness of 
vulnerabilities  
Table 22 Pilot-Study-1 experiment design structure  
6.2.3 Experiment Questions’ Structure 
The structure of each question was constructed on the basis of shared 
information accumulated from both communities’ sources: software engineering 
and cybersecurity. Each question consisted of three parts: 
Part-1: Vulnerable code or UML diagram 
Part-2: Misused or exploited technique 
Part-3: Identify the vulnerability’s formal name (Formally defined by 
cybersecurity community) 
 148 
 
6.2.4 Vulnerability Sample Size 
This study considered the NVD (NIST 2011) as the main source of vulnerabilities’ 
related data, which includes CVE as a sub-set repository to trace and track the 
most serious vulnerabilities. This research aims to structure information of those 
software errors that have serious and dangerous consequences for software 
systems. Table 23 presents the information on selected vulnerabilities from the 
list of “2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most dangerous software errors” (Martin et al. 
2011) according to students’ experience of a particular programming language. 
The experiment includes the following vulnerabilities: 
Question 
Number 
Vulnerability 
OWASP 
Rank 
Vulnerability Name Example 
Code 
Language  
Q1 Rank 24 Integer Overflow C/C++, 
PHP 
Q2 Rank 18 Use of Dangerous Function Call  C/C++ 
Q3  Unranked Integer to Buffer Overflow C++ 
Q4 Rank 23 Use of Externally-Controlled 
Format String 
C++ 
Q5 Rank 3 Buffer Overflow C++ 
Q6 Rank 20 Incorrect Buffer Size Calculation C++ 
Q7 Rank 18 Use of Dangerous Function Call C++ 
Q8 Rank 1 SQL Injection PHP 
Q9 Rank 6 Missing Authorization UML Class 
diagram 
Q10 Rank 5 Missing Authentication UML Class 
Diagram 
Table 23 Vulnerabilities included in questionnaire 
6.2.5 Participants’ Sample Size 
In this experimental study, the term “penetration tester” is used here to refer to 
ethical hacker and research students, and the term “software developers” will be 
used in its broadest sense to refer to all students of computing, computer games 
technology and computer games application development technology. Table 24 
presents the participants’ demographics.  
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Number of 
participants  
Degree Title  Year of study  
1 Computer Games Application Development 1st  
1 Computer Games Application Development 3rd  
6 Ethical Hacking 3rd  
4 Computer Games Technology 1st   
1 Computer Games Technology 2nd   
1 Computer Games Technology 3rd   
2 Computing 1st   
7 Computing 3rd  
3 Computing 4th  
2 Post-Grad-Research   
Table 24 Participants information 
All participants were considered to be software developers during PS-I. 
However, after their score analysis, the PS-I found significant trends in the 
participants, whose major were cybersecurity. To investigate significant outcome, 
they were classified in two groups. 
1. Penetration Tester 
• Post-grad Research Students (all participants were from the 
cybersecurity division) 
• Ethical Hacking Students  
2. Software Developers  
• Computer Games Technology Students 
• Computer Application Development Technology Students 
• Computing Students  
 
To evaluate students’ performance depending on their degree, each 
degree is assigned a code:  
1=Computing 
2=Ethical hacking 
3=Computer Games Technology 
4=Computer Game Application Technology 
5=Post-Graduation 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Assessment of Questionnaire Vulnerabilities   
This section presents the mean scores attained for each vulnerability assessed 
by the questionnaire. The result of each question is displayed as a bar chart to 
reflect on how participants' obtained marks and their related degrees. 
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6.3.1.1 Integer Overflow Vulnerability  
When participants were asked about an integer overflow vulnerability during the 
experiments, Computer Game Application students got the highest marks. 
However, computing students got the lowest marks; the mean of their total 
obtained marks out of 3 is shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27 Integer overflow vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.2 Use of Dangerous Function Call in C++ Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about the use of dangerous function calls during 
the experiments, Post-Grad students obtained the highest marks. However, 
computer game application students obtained the lowest marks; the mean of their 
total obtained marks out of 3 is shown in Figure 28.  
 
Figure 28 Dangerous function call in C++ vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.3 Integer to Buffer Overflow Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about an integer to buffer overflow vulnerability 
during the experiments, the majority of participants struggled to find the 
vulnerability in the vulnerable code. However, post-Grad and ethical hacking 
students managed to answer correctly; the mean of their total obtained marks out 
of 3 is shown in Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29 Integer to buffer overflow vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.4 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about the use of an externally-controlled format 
string vulnerability during the experiments, the majority of participants were not 
able to answer any questions relating to this vulnerability. However, some of the 
Post-Grad and ethical hacking students managed to answer correctly; the mean 
of their total obtained marks out of 3 is shown in Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30 Use of externally-controlled format string vulnerability mean score 
  
 155 
 
6.3.1.5 Buffer Overflow Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about a buffer overflow vulnerability during the 
experiments, the buffer overflow vulnerability appeared difficult for computing and 
computer games technology students; the mean of their total obtained marks out 
of 3 is shown in Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31 Buffer overflow vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.6 Incorrect Buffer Size Calculation Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about an incorrect buffer size calculation 
vulnerability during the experiments, like the buffer overflow, this vulnerability 
appeared difficult for computing and computer games technology students; the 
mean of their total obtained marks out of 3 is shown in Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32 Incorrect buffer size calculation vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.7 Use of Dangerous Function Call in PHP Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about the use of a dangerous function call in PHP 
vulnerability during the experiments, Post-Grad students got the highest scores; 
the mean of their total obtained marks out of 3 is shown in Figure 33.  
 
Figure 33 Use of Dangerous function call in PHP vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.8 SQL Injection Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about an SQL Injection Vulnerability during the 
experiments, Post-Grad and ethical hacking students got the highest scores; the 
mean of their total obtained marks out of 3 is shown in Figure 34. 
  
Figure 34 SQL injection vulnerability mean score 
  
 159 
 
6.3.1.9 Missing Authorization Vulnerability	
When participants were asked about a missing authorization vulnerability during 
the experiments, for computer game application development students this 
vulnerability was difficult to identify; the mean of their total obtained marks out of 
3 is shown in Figure 35.  
 
 
Figure 35 Missing authorization vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.10 Missing Authentication Vulnerability 
When participants were asked about missing authentication vulnerability during 
the experiments, computing and computer games application students found it 
difficult to identify this vulnerability. The mean of their total obtained marks out of 
3 is shown in Figure 36.  
 
 
Figure 36 Missing authentication vulnerability mean score 
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6.3.1.11 Discussion 
Students with a cybersecurity background performed well in identifying 
vulnerabilities. This group includes ethical hacking and post-grad students only 
however, computing-related degree student group performed well in 
demonstrating knowledge of vulnerabilities related to coding such as buffer 
overflow and incorrect buffer size calculation. 
In PS-I, all participants were considered to be software developers, 
because they all studied computer science. However, their scores showed that 
penetration testing groups performed better in all questions. 
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6.3.2 Results Discussion for Total Scores of Vulnerabilities Questions  
The Mean Total Score was performed to evaluate and compare all participants’  
scores with respect to their degree. Figure 37 graph x-axis represents the 
students’ degree and the y-axis representing the mean total score obtained by 
participants.  The score of ethical hacking and post-grad students appeared to be 
higher, although the score belonging to students of the Computing, Computer 
Games Technology and Computer Games Application Development degrees are 
lower indicating that penetration testers (Ethical Hacking degree students) are 
more efficient in finding vulnerabilities in vulnerable code samples relative to 
software developers. In other words, software developers received lower scores 
than penetration testers. It may be due to influences in their background 
knowledge and awareness of vulnerabilities. penetration testers and post-grad 
students studied ethical hacking modules that provide students with a deep 
understanding of vulnerabilities. This is in comparison to software developers, 
whose background knowledge is influenced by programming languages and 
advanced software development modules.  
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Figure 37 Total scores mean  
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6.3.3 Results Discussion of Mean of Total Score Graph 
Figure 38 shows the accumulated results after combining all computing-related 
degree students as software developers and comparing to post-grad and ethical 
hacking degree students. The mean total score comparison of software 
developers and ethical hackers reveals that there was a sharp difference in 
ethical hackers scores, in comparison to software developers scores. Ethical 
hackers score 50% better than software developers in finding vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 38 Total score mean comparison between software developers and pen tester 
6.3.4 Assessment of Questionnaire Data-Statistical Analysis  
A number of statistical methods were used to analyse the data gained from the 
questionnaires. 
6.3.4.1 Checking for Normality Distribution 
The author performed a four-step procedure to check if parametric assumptions 
are satisfied or not while using SPSS. 
Step-1: Means and median are not similar between degree code 2 (Ethical 
hacking) and 3 (Computer Game Technology) as shown in Table 25. 
Step-2: However, the means of all degree codes are higher than the 
standard deviation. 
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Table 25 illustrates that the degreecode 5 (post-graduate) students 
perform very well and degreecode 2 (ethical hacking) students perform second 
best among all other degrees’ students, though, degreecode 1 (Computing) 
students perform least good. 
Descriptives 
 degree Statistic Std. Error 
TotalScor
e 
Computer Mean 6.6013 1.57611 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
2.8743  
Upper 
Bound 
10.3282  
5% Trimmed Mean 6.5108  
Median 7.6650  
Variance 19.873  
Std. Deviation 4.45792  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 14.83  
Range 14.83  
Interquartile Range 4.83  
Skewness .442 .752 
Kurtosis .949 1.481 
Computin
g 
Mean 5.5700 1.07363 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
3.2308  
Upper 
Bound 
7.9092  
5% Trimmed Mean 5.5411  
Median 5.4900  
Variance 14.985  
Std. Deviation 3.87104  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 11.66  
Range 11.66  
Interquartile Range 6.75  
Skewness .192 .616 
Kurtosis -1.062 1.191 
Ethical Mean 13.3833 2.02251 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
8.1843  
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Upper 
Bound 
18.5824  
5% Trimmed Mean 13.4448  
Median 14.9100  
Variance 24.543  
Std. Deviation 4.95412  
Minimum 7.16  
Maximum 18.50  
Range 11.34  
Interquartile Range 9.96  
Skewness -.507 .845 
Kurtosis -2.093 1.741 
Post-
Grad 
Mean 17.6250 5.29500 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
-
49.6544 
 
Upper 
Bound 
84.9044  
5% Trimmed Mean .  
Median 17.6250  
Variance 56.074  
Std. Deviation 7.48826  
Minimum 12.33  
Maximum 22.92  
Range 10.59  
Interquartile Range .  
Skewness . . 
Kurtosis . . 
 
Table 25 Descriptive analysis 
Step-3: Test of Normality 
The Tests of Normality as shown in Table 26, it is clear that the p-values 0.333, 
and 0.604 are higher than 0.05 so it can be assumed that the data is normally 
distributed. 
Tests of Normality  
degreecode Develop_EH 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk  
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
1 TOT_score 1 .181 12 .200* .925 12 .333 
2 TOT_score 2 .213 6 .200* .933 6 .604 
Table 26 Tests of Normality 
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Step-4: Histogram  
Figure 39 shows a histogram that was generated to explore the data. The graph 
is not bell-shaped, and data is not symmetrical around the mean. 
 
Figure 39 Histogram from the data explore output 
Step 5: Normality Plots 
Figure 40 shows that data is not normally distributed. There are some noticeable 
outliers at the top and bottom ends.  
 
Figure 40 Normality plot from the data explore output 
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6.3.4.2 Normality Results Discussion  
During PS-I, the author performed the test for normality using SPSS to verify if 
normality test conditions are valid or not.  
1. Normality condition-1 Means and medians are not similar: This condition 
is not valid. Table 25 shows that the mean and median are similar. 
2. Normality condition-2 Means are higher than standard deviations: This 
condition is valid as shown in Table 25. 
3. Normality condition-3 Normality tests show all p-values are higher than 
0.05: This condition is valid as shown in Table 26.   
4. Normality condition-4 Histogram must show perfect bell curve: This 
condition is not valid as shown in Figure 39; the histogram does not show 
a perfect bell-curve.  
5. Normality condition-5 Data points will be close to the diagonal line in Q-Q 
Plot. This condition is not valid as shown in Figure 40; the data points are 
not closed to the diagonal line. 
From these above conditions, it can be concluded that the data is not normally 
distributed as not all five conditions are correct. 
6.3.4.3 Mann-Whitney Test 
Mann-Whitney test is one of the most common tests used to analyse non-
parametric and small sample size data. It was performed to measure the 
significant differences between computing and ethical hacking students’ scores 
in order to identify the students understanding of recurring security flaws, and 
whether they know how these flaws can be exploited. 
The results obtained from the Mann-Whitney test analysis of software 
developers and ethical hackers scores can be compared in Table 27. It can be 
seen from the data in ranks table that the software developers score about 150 
points in Q4, about 125 points in Q5 and about 163.5 points in Q7 more than 
ethical hackers, due to the difference in sum of ranks. This is a significant 
difference in mean scores between ethical hackers and software developers as 
p=.005, .009 and .035 respectively.  
A Mann-Whitney test showed that there was a statically significant 
difference in Q4, Q5 and Q7 scores between software developers and ethical 
hackers as shown in Table 28, it is interesting to note that software developers 
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perform well in those questions that related to coding in contrast to ethical 
hackers. 
Based on the results, it stated that software developers (computing related 
degree students) are more aware than ethical hackers of those vulnerabilities that 
occur during writing code because all these questions are related to 
implementation or coding phase.    
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Ranks 
 Develop_EH N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Q1 1 22 14.64 322.00 
2 6 14.00 84.00 
Total 28   
Q2 1 22 14.43 317.50 
2 6 14.75 88.50 
Total 28   
Q3 1 22 13.25 291.50 
2 6 19.08 114.50 
Total 28   
Q4 1 22 12.64 278.00 
2 6 21.33 128.00 
Total 28   
Q5 1 21 11.98 251.50 
2 6 21.08 126.50 
Total 27   
Q6 1 22 13.89 305.50 
2 6 16.75 100.50 
Total 28   
Q7 1 22 12.93 284.50 
2 6 20.25 121.50 
Total 28   
Q8 1 22 13.02 286.50 
2 6 19.92 119.50 
Total 28   
Q9 1 22 13.34 293.50 
2 6 18.75 112.50 
Total 28   
Q10 1 22 13.23 291.00 
2 6 19.17 115.00 
Total 28   
Table 27 Ranks table 
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Mann-Whitney Test Statisticsa 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Mann-Whitney U 63.000 64.500 38.500 25.000 20.500 52.500 
Wilcoxon W 84.000 317.500 291.500 278.000 251.500 305.500 
Z -.182 -.093 -1.764 -2.788 -2.623 -1.054 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .855 .926 .078 .005 .009 .292 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .892b .935b .126b .020b .010b .460b 
 
Mann-Whitney Test Statisticsa 
 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Mann-Whitney U 31.500 33.500 40.500 38.000 
Wilcoxon W 284.500 286.500 293.500 291.000 
Z -2.111 -1.950 -1.543 -1.623 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .051 .123 .105 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .052b .068b .157b .126b 
 
Table 28 Mann-Whitney test statistics  
a. Grouping Variable: Develop_EH 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
6.3.4.4 Results Discussion of Mann-Whitney Test 
Results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate that computing students were aware 
of code level vulnerabilities such as  
• Q4: Use of Externally-Controlled Format String Vulnerability 
• Q5: Buffer Overflow Vulnerability 
• Q7: Use of Dangerous Function Call in PHP Vulnerability 
For the following vulnerability questions, the two-tailed p-value: was .005, 
.009 and .035. p<0.05; therefore, these are significant results as shown in Table 
28. 
From this data, it can be concluded that ethical hackers scores were 
significantly higher than software developers, except in Q4, Q5, and Q7 where 
(U = 25, p = .005, U=20.5, p=.009, and U=31.5, p=.035). Therefore, these are 
significant results. 	 	
 172 
 
6.3.5 Assessment of Questionnaire Internal Consistency 
6.3.5.1 Cronbach's Alpha  
Cronbach's Alpha is a measure used to determine the scale reliability in the 
questionnaire. For example, the pilot-study-I had included 10 questions to 
measure computing and ethical hacking students’ ability to identify the 
vulnerabilities during the software development process. Let us consider the four 
scale items that used to measure participants’ vulnerability understanding 
ranging from “not aware” to “well aware”. A Cronbach's alpha was run on a 
sample size of 30 students. 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.844 .845 10 
Table 29 Reliability statistics 
6.3.5.2 Results Discussion of Cronbach's Alpha 
As shown in Table 29, the alpha coefficient for the ten items is .844, suggesting 
that the items have relatively high internal consistency.  (Note that a reliability 
coefficient of .70 or higher is considered “acceptable” in most social science 
research situations.). 
A reliability analysis was carried out on the perceived task values scale 
comprising 10 Items. Cronbach’s alpha showed the questionnaire to reach 
acceptable reliability, α =0.84. Most items appeared to be worthy of retention, 
resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted. See appendix Section 2.1 for 
correction and other related results.  
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6.3.6 Pilot-Study-I Overall Results Summary  
There is a multitude of factors in the empirical literature, and because it is 
impossible to control all factors, it is often very difficult to get a meaningful result. 
The results of the PS-I, although statistically significant, due to a very sample size 
it is difficult to conclude that participants struggle to identify the vulnerabilities or 
lack sufficient understanding of recurrent vulnerabilities. 
The primary goal of PS-I was to investigate the participants (software 
developers) ability to identify the software development errors that lead to 
vulnerabilities. Participants were given vulnerable code samples or UML class 
diagrams and asked to identify development errors. Exploring the participants’ 
ability to know how malicious hackers could exploit these vulnerabilities was 
difficult due to the fact that all participants studied the same courses relating to 
software development and programming languages in the 2nd year. Thus, initially, 
all of them were considered to be software developers. However, after analysing 
participants’ results, as shown in Figure 38 that students studying a cybersecurity 
major performed better than students studying with a computing major. The 
problem here is that students with a computing major learnt more about 
programming languages and software development modules in comparison to 
students with a cybersecurity major who learnt more about ethical hacking and 
computer security modules. Therefore, the PS-I split the participants into two 
groups: penetration testers (ethical hackers) and software developers 
(computing). 
The statistically significant result has shown that ethical hacking students’ 
scores were significantly higher than computing students’ scores. This will be 
discussed in detail later in the discussion chapter. The results of this case study, 
therefore, raise the concern that computing students lack awareness of 
vulnerabilities and do not know how malicious hackers can exploit these. This 
case study also highlighted another fact that ethical hacking students lack the 
understating of coding level vulnerabilities.  
It can be concluded that software developers are different from ethical 
hackers due to their background knowledge and working perspectives to achieve 
such as software developers worked to develop software, however, ethical 
hackers worked as penetration testers in order to find security flaws or 
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vulnerabilities.  Both groups: penetration testers and software developers do not 
share common ground knowledge in order to develop or exploit software. 
The results from PS-I raised some concerns and justified further investigation in 
PS-II such as vulnerable code samples would need to understandable and easy 
to explain the target vulnerability, as discussed in the following chapter PS-II. The 
study also had a number of limitations, namely: 
• Not all computing relating degree students were software developers 
• Sample size was very small. 
• Experiment was very lengthy and time consuming with difficulty to 
understand vulnerable code samples. 
• Participants were not aware of all vulnerabilities because of lack of 
awareness of some of the programming languages used in the 
questionnaire.  
Based on these limitations, the next study was designed to avoid some of these. 
In particular, we used a language that all participants would be familiar with. The 
number of vulnerabilities to be examined was halved. The next study is described 
in Chapter 7. 
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7 Pilot Study–II (PS-II) 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 General Description  
The second pilot study aimed to analyse the effectiveness of the proposed 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP), for software developers, both in terms of 
providing an effective understanding of vulnerabilities and an awareness of how 
to mitigate them. Furthermore, the study analysed the experimental results to 
determine the statistical significance to confirm the proposed hypothesis and 
ascertain its usefulness as a representative model. Through the process of 
vulnerabilities’ awareness, recommendations would be that software developers 
could be better informed about recurrent vulnerabilities and their mitigation, 
without having to be an expert in cybersecurity. 
7.1.2 Key Objectives 
The Study Questions (SQ) are described in the following table 
SH-1 Do software developers have an effective understanding of 
recurrent vulnerabilities? 
SH-2 Can interventions based on Vulnerability Anti-Pattern help developers 
in improving their understanding of vulnerabilities? 
7.1.3 Experiment Hypotheses   
The study posits the following hypotheses (Experiment hypothesis=EH): 
Experimental Study 
EH-1 The intervention study, which is based on Vulnerability Anti-Pattern, will 
improve participants' ability to identify the root causes of vulnerabilities 
during the different stages of the software development process 
EH-2 The intervention will improve participants' ability to recognise and 
classify vulnerabilities using the terminology of the security community. 
EH-0  There is no significant difference in participants' ability to 
identify the root-causes of vulnerabilities with and without intervention. 
EH-3 There is no difference between “formal” and “informal” intervention in 
order to raise awareness of vulnerabilities.   
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EH-0  There is no significant difference between “formal” and 
“informal” intervention in order to raise awareness of vulnerabilities. 
EH-4 Software developers will be able to retain awareness of vulnerabilities 
through interventions after a gap of one week. 
EH-0 There is no significant difference in software developers’ 
obtained scores in the stage3 after a gap of one week. 
Control Study  
EH-5 There is a significant difference between the performance of 
participants provided with intervention and those not provided with 
intervention. 
EH-0 There is no significant difference between the performance of 
participants provided with intervention and those not provided with 
intervention. 
 
7.2 Method 
The experimental study and control study both followed the same method.  The 
experimental study used intervention; however, the control was carried out 
without intervention. The sample size of both studies is not the same, which 
discussed further in limitation section 9.2.2. 
7.2.1 Study Description 
Experimental study designs, also called interventional study designs, are those 
where the researcher intervenes at some point throughout the study. A pre-post 
study survey measures the occurrence of an outcome before and after a 
particular intervention is applied. Both studies consisted of three sets of 
questionnaires, each of which consisted of pre-set and open-ended questions 
designed to investigate the core understanding and mitigation knowledge 
regarding the most commonly occurring software errors (Vulnerabilities). All 
participants were studying computing-related degrees such as Computing, 
Computer Games Technology and Computer Games Application Development.  
The sample dataset was from a series of survey exercises conducted with 
3rd and 4th year students of the School of Design and Informatics at the 
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University of Abertay Dundee. Overall, 39 participants took part in three stages 
of survey exercises. 
1) Pre-Assessment Survey Study 
2) Post-Assessment Survey Study 
3) Post-Post-Assessment Survey Study 
7.2.2 Studies Design Structure  
The rationale for the experimental design is displayed in Table 30, which is 
comprised of four stages:  
1. Stage1: Pre-Assessment Survey  
Accessing and measuring participants (software developers) actual knowledge 
about prevalent vulnerabilities  
2. Intervention-Stage: Security Training Session 
Providing security training through the Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (Formal and 
Informal)  
3. Stage2: Post-Assessment Survey  
Accessing and measuring improvement or decline in participants (software 
developers) actual knowledge about prevalent vulnerabilities after the secure 
training  
4. Stage3: Post-Post-Assessment Survey  
Evaluating participants’ long-term memory to show how much information they 
retained from the stage-2 provided secure training, after a gap of one week. 
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 Group A Group B 
Stage-
1 
 
Pre-Assessment Survey Study  
Input Questionnaire comprised of vulnerable codes or UML diagram 
Output Evaluate participants results to measure their awareness of 
vulnerabilities  
Interve
ntion-
stage  
Intervention Session 
Input 
 
Group A-Formal 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
Group B-Informal Vulnerability 
Anti-Pattern 
Output Provide information about vulnerabilities  
 
Stage-
2 
 
Post-Assessment Survey Study 
Input Questionnaire comprised of vulnerable codes or UML diagram 
 
Output  Evaluate participants results to measure improvement/ 
deterioration after intervention provided by VAPs 
After 1 Week (one week gap) 
Stage-
3 
Post-Post-Assessment Survey Study 
Input Questionnaire comprised of vulnerable codes or UML diagram 
Output  Evaluate results to measure how much participants were able 
to retain the information from the provided intervention based 
on VAPs after a gap of one week. 
Table 30 Description of the Vulnerability Anti-Pattern experimental study structure, including a description of the 
inputs and outputs of all stages inputs. 
7.2.3 Survey Questions’ Structure  
Table 31 details the question used during the experiment, which was essentially 
constructed based on accumulated necessary information from both 
communities’ sources - software engineering and cybersecurity. The design of 
each question primarily demonstrated the connection of vulnerabilities root-
causes with the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) phases from where they 
originated rather than categorised all of them as a coding error. It could be better 
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to find out why this error has occurred due to one of the following reasons: 
requirement specification phase error, design phase error or implementation 
phase error. Subsequently, this directs developers’ attention towards the SDLC 
phase from which this vulnerability initiated. Each question was designed to ask 
software developers about the following necessary information. Part-1 of each 
question assessed participants’ actual knowledge of the vulnerability while 
providing vulnerable codes or UML diagrams, Part-2 investigated participants’ 
understanding of misuses or exploitations, and Part-3 inspected participants' 
ability to recognise and classify the vulnerabilities using the terminology of the 
cybersecurity community. The question structure is as follows: 
1. Part-1: Vulnerable code or UML diagram 
2. Part-2: Misused or exploited explanation 
3. Part-3: Identify vulnerability formal name 
Each questionnaire consisted of five sets of questions, and each set of 
questions investigated the developers’ knowledge to find a vulnerability. The 
selected vulnerabilities were chosen from the “2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most 
Dangerous Software Errors” list. Of 90 students doing to computing degrees, 39 
successfully completed the questionnaire. Each question was divided into three 
sub-parts:1) identifies developer (students) awareness of the provided vulnerable 
code or UML diagram; 2) investigated vulnerability root-cause description in a 
formal and informal way; 3) explored related attack pattern and exploitation 
knowledge.  
Part-1: 
Vulnerable code 
or UML diagram 
Use the PHP code sample below to answer questions I, II 
and III below. 
1. $id = $_COOKIE["mid”] ;//Assign cookie value to id 
variable 
2. mysqli_query("SELECT MessageID, Subject FROM 
messages WHERE MessageID = 
'$id'");// mysqli query to retrieve message 
number(id) 
The program output will print a message that corresponds 
to the message ID. 
The above code contains a flaw, which may not be 
detected by the compiler. Please describe below why you 
think this code is wrong. 
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Part-2: Misused 
or exploited 
explanation 
 
 Use the PHP code sample below to answer questions I, II 
and III below. 
1. $id = $_COOKIE["mid”] ;//Assign cookie value to id 
variable  
2. mysqli_query("SELECT MessageID, Subject FROM 
messages WHERE MessageID = 
'$id'");// mysqli query to retrieve message 
number(id). 
The program output will print a message that corresponds 
to the message ID. 
A malicious hacker could exploit this code because it lacks 
input validation on $id and can be used to gain access to 
the database information. Can you explain how this code 
would enable a malicious hacker to carry out such an 
attack? 
  
Part-3: Identify 
vulnerability 
formal name 
 
Use the PHP code sample below to answer questions I, II 
and III below. 
1. $id = $_COOKIE["mid”] ;//Assign cookie value to id 
variable  
2. mysqli_query("SELECT MessageID, Subject FROM 
messages WHERE MessageID = 
'$id'");// mysqli query to retrieve message 
number(id). 
The program output will print a message that corresponds 
to the message ID. 
In your opinion, which of the following best describes the 
flaw (tick all that apply)? 
□ Injection Flaw 
□ Improper Input Validation 
□ SQL injection 
□ Information leakage 
□ String format error 
 
 
Table 31 PHP sample question 
Another example of a question used during the experiment. 
Use the C# code sample below to answer the following questions I, II 
and III? 
1. string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName(); //function call to 
get user name 
2. string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" 
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '" + ItemName.Text + "'"; // database 
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query to retrieve item information using user name and itemname as 
an input value from user. 
3. sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);// execute the query 
 
 The program output will retrieve item information that corresponds to the 
username and itemname. 
I. The above code contains a flaw, which may not be detected by the 
compiler. Please describe below why you think this code is wrong.  
 
II. A malicious hacker could exploit this code to concatenate malicious 
input to build SQL command to skip any input validation on username 
and can be used to gain access to database information. Can you 
explain how this code would enable a malicious hacker to carry out 
such an attack? 
III. In your option, which of the following best describes the flaw (tick all 
that apply)?  
Injection Flaw 
□ Improper Input Validation 
□ SQL injection 
□ Information leakage  
□ String format error 
Table 32 Experiment question related to C# 
Tables 31 and 32 represent the questions used during the experiment. The 
answers of each participant have been marked as follows: 
• 0 = Student is unaware of the vulnerability. 
• 1 = student is slightly aware of the vulnerability 
• 2 = student is aware of the vulnerability 
• 3 = student is well aware of the vulnerability 
7.2.4 Questionnaire Design 
PS-II included questions based on the vulnerable code, which were written by the 
researcher with the help of ethical hacking, PHP and C\C++ lecturers. The 
research considered the students’ (participants’) level of understanding and 
degree of code complexity during the questionnaire design. For generating 
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vulnerable codes, a penetration training environment was used such as OWASP 
Mutillidae II (Druin 2011) and bWAPP (Happel 2017). 
7.2.5 Security Intervention Session 
 As a part of the knowledge awareness process (KAP), explained in Section 
3.4.1.3, an intervention8 was provided, based on the VAP, during the intervention-
stage. The intervention stage was designed to measure VAPs’ effectiveness in 
subsequent stages: post-assessment and post-post-assessment as shown in 
Figure 41. There are two types of interventions: formal and informal, which were 
evaluated in  
• Post-Assessment stage, just after it was provided. 
• Post-Post-Assessment stage, after a gap of one week. 
 
 
Figure 41 Security intervention link with assessment phases   
                                            
8 Researcher had provided the intervention to intervene at stage-2 throughout the study. A pre-post 
study measures the occurrence of an outcome before and again after a VAPs based intervention is 
implemented. 
Intervention 
Session
•Fomal 
Intervention
•Informal 
Intervention
Post-
Assessment 
Survey Study
•Just after 
intervention
Post-Post-
Assessment 
Survey Study
• After a one 
week gap in 
intervention
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7.2.6 Security Intervention Types 
The intervention, which is based on the concept of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns, 
was provided to participants during the experiment. As shown in Figure 42, the 
intervention was designed in two formats: 
• Formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern: the reason to call it formal is that the 
standard “Anti-Pattern” format has been followed while designing the 
formal version. Through the formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern, software 
developers may be able to raise awareness of vulnerabilities that include 
problem descriptions relating to vulnerability databases (CWE, CVE), 
vulnerability risk patterns pointing to software fault patterns, 
consequences and countermeasures offered by security patterns included 
in code examples. 
• Informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern: it followed an informal way of 
presenting similar information to the formal version. A vulnerable scenario 
was presented in the informal version because software developers would 
gain awareness of the vulnerability through a detailed example, which 
demonstrated the root-causes, consequences and countermeasures of 
the vulnerability. 
 
Figure 42 Security intervention types 
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Using two types of security intervention, the study evaluates the following 
hypothesis: 
EH-3: There is no difference between “formal” and “informal” intervention 
in order to improve awareness about the particular vulnerability.   
7.2.7 Control Experiment Description 
The goal of the control experiment was to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
intervention. The control experiment was carried out with 14 participants. The 
experimental structure was identical but excluded the intervention stage. Control 
participants did not receive any intervention. The study measured the scores’ 
difference between the experimental and control groups as shown in Table 33, 
which detailed in Section 7.4. 
 
Experimental Group  Control Group  
Stage-1 without intervention Stage-1 without intervention 
Stage-2 with intervention Stage-2 without intervention 
Stage-3 with intervention Stage-3 without intervention 
Table 33 Experimental and control group comparison   
7.2.8 Vulnerability Sample Size 
The selection of vulnerabilities was purely based on those programming 
languages, which students already taught and were well aware of. The module 
lecturers were consulted to ensure that experiment questions were 
understandable and not too complicated for the students. During PS-I, 10 
vulnerabilities were tested with students. This study’s feedback mentioned that 
the experiment was too lengthy and time-consuming. Consequently, in the PS-II 
only 5 vulnerabilities were selected. 
This study considered the NVD to be the primary source of data relating 
to vulnerabilities, which included CVE as a sub-set repository to trace and tracks 
the most serious vulnerabilities. This research aims to raise awareness of those 
software errors that had serious and dangerous consequences for the system. 
Five vulnerabilities were selected from the list of ‘2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most 
dangerous software errors’, which is purely based on students’ knowledge 
(software developers) of the programming language.  
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The students had different background knowledge, depending on their 
degree choice. They are divided into two categories: Computing and Gaming, 
based on their expertise and competence in programming languages. 
• Computing students: The experiment included the five vulnerabilities for 
the ‘COMPUTING’ students in Table 34. 
 
Question 
Number 
Vulnerability 
OWASP 
Rank 
Vulnerability 
Name 
Stage-
1 
Stage-
2 
Stage-
3  
Example 
Code 
Language  
Q1 Rank 1 SQL Injection √ √ √ PHP, C# 
Q2 Rank 5 Missing 
Authentication 
√ √ √ UML 
Class 
Diagram 
Q3 Rank 6 Missing 
Authorization 
√ √ √ PHP 
Q4 
 
Deprecated 
Function Call  
√ √ √ PHP 
Q5 Rank 24 Integer 
Overflow 
√ √ √ PHP 
Table 34 Survey summary for the computing students, its included vulnerabilities and vulnerable code or UML 
diagram description 
• Gaming students: The experiment included the following five 
vulnerabilities for the ‘GAMING’ students in Table 35. 
 
Question 
Number 
Vulnerability 
OWASP Rank 
Vulnerability 
Name 
Stage-
1 
Stage-
2 
Stage-
3  
Example 
Code 
Language  
Q1 Rank 5 Missing 
Authorization 
√ √ √ UML 
Sequence 
Diagram 
Q2 Rank 3 Buffer 
Overflow 
√ √ √ C++ 
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Q3 Rank 18 Use of 
Dangerous 
Function Call 
√ √ √ C++ 
Q4 Rank 24 Integer 
Overflow 
√ √ √ C++ 
Q5 Rank 20 Incorrect 
Calculation 
of Buffer 
Size 
√ √ √ C++ 
Table 35 Survey summary for the gaming students, its included vulnerabilities and vulnerable code or UML diagram 
description 
 
• Vulnerability Anti-patterns: As shown in Table 36, the experiment 
included the proposed design “Vulnerability Anti-Patterns” as a security 
intervention for gaming and computing students. 
# Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Computing Gaming Example 
Code 
Language 
1 SQL Injection Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern 
√  PHP 
2 Missing Authentication for Critical 
Functions Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern 
√  PHP 
3 Missing Authorization Vulnerability 
Anti-Pattern 
√ √ PHP 
4 Buffer Overflow Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern 
 √ C/C++ 
5 Use of Deprecated Function 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
√  PHP 
6 Use of Potentially Dangerous 
Function Vulnerability Anti-Pattern  
 √ C/C++ 
7 Integer Overflow Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern 
√ √ PHP, C/C++ 
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8 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
 √ C/C++ 
Table 36 Used Vulnerability Anti-Patterns as security intervention for computing and gaming students 
7.2.9 Participant Sample Size 
In this experiment, the term “software developers” will be used in its broadest 
sense to refer to all students of Computing, Computer Games Technology and 
Computer Games Application Development. Table 37 presents participants’ 
information about their Numbers, Degree Title, Year of Study and stages in which 
they had participated. 
 
Number of 
Participants  
Degree Title  Stage-
1 
Stage-
2 
Stage-
3  
8 Computer Games Application 
Development 
 √ √ 
5 Computer Games Application 
Development 
√ √ √ 
4 Computer Games Technology √ √ √ 
12 Computer Games Technology  √ √ 
5 Computing √ √ √ 
5 Computing √ √ √ 
Table 37 Participants information 
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7.3 Experimental Study   
7.3.1 Research Hypotheses   
The statistical analysis evaluates two successive measurements of paired 
samples to know whether their means are significantly different (Table 38).  
Research 
Question 
Does intervention, based on the use of “formal or 
informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern”, improve 
participants' ability to identify the root-causes of 
vulnerabilities? 
EH-1 The intervention will improve participants' ability to identify 
the root causes of vulnerabilities during different stages of 
the development process. 
EH-2 The intervention will improve participants' ability to recognise 
and classify vulnerabilities using the terminology of the 
security community. 
EH-0 There is no significant difference in participants' ability to 
identify the root-causes of vulnerabilities with and without 
intervention. 
Depended 
Variables 
Total_Score_stage-1  Total_Score-stage-2 
Independent 
Variables 
 
DegreeCode 
1=Computing 
2=Gaming 
 
Table 38 Research questions and hypotheses: two samples test 
7.3.2 Examining Significant Difference between Two Scores Samples 
The dataset consisted of participants’ scores (software developers), called 
Total_Score_stage-1 and Total_Score_stage-2. Each participant completed the 
predefined questionnaire twice during the experiment study: Firstly, without any 
security training; secondly, after the secure training. They were marked based on 
their answers and a total score of each stage was calculated. Thus, 
Total_Score_stage-1 was a total obtained score by a participant in stage-1 and 
Total_Score_stage-2 was a total obtained score by a participant in stage-2. 
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Specifically, we are interested in the difference between 
Total_Score_stage-1 and Total_Score_stage-2 for each participant. In other 
words, the intention was to determine whether participants performed better after 
receiving the intervention in order to recognise and identify vulnerabilities in 
stage-2 than their first time in stage-1. 
7.3.2.1 Key Terms 
• Intervention: this process raises security awareness. It comprised of the 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (a proposed solution to educate the software 
developers of recurrent vulnerabilities). 
• Independent variable: degree_code, 1=Computing, 2= Gaming 
• Dependent variables: Total_score_stage1, Total_score_stage2 
7.3.3 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Before performing any formal statistical tests, it was necessary to perform a 
detailed exploration and description of the sample data through descriptive 
analysis. For the sample data, this was an essential preliminary step. For that 
reason, during the descriptive statistical analysis, the sample data was explored 
thoroughly, while including a wide range of useful statistics, i.e. exploration of 
frequencies, mean values and median values. To supplement the descriptive 
statistics, a graphical representation (Histogram) was included to provide a 
validation of the data. The study included the following descriptive statistics: 
1. Mean, median and mode 
2. Frequency differences between the two samples 
3. Histograms 
1. Compare the Mean, Median and Mode 
As shown in Table 39, the descriptive analysis of the total_stage-1 and 
total_stage2 compared the mean value, median value and mode value. A total of 
18 participants, data were collected, one missing value that was not excluded. 
Total_stage1 score (score obtained by participants in the stage1) mean value 
was 6.72 and median value 7.00, in contrast to total_stage2 score (score 
obtained by participants in the stage2) mean value of 11.72 and the median value 
of 11.500. 
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Thus, it is apparent from Table 39 that participants scored double with 
average mean value 11.7222 in stage 2, which was performed after the 
intervention study.  
Mean, Median and Mode Statistics 
 
TOTAL_stage1 TOTAL_stage2 
N Valid 18 18 
Missing 1 1 
Mean 6.7222 11.7222 
Median 7.0000 11.5000 
Mode 7.00 11.00 
Std. Deviation 1.84089 1.36363 
Table 39 Compared the mean, median and mode of Total_stage1 and Total_stage2 and presented the total number 
of participants 
2. Frequency Table	
The difference in frequencies was analysed and the central tendency across the 
stage-1 and the stage-2 scores (Total_stage1 and Total_stage2) calculated. 
Table 40 displayed the numbers of participants in stage-1. Those obtained scores 
ranging from 4 to 10. Table 40 shows that frequently obtained score by 
participants during the stage-1 was 7 (also known, as the central tendency of 
Total_stage1 was 7). The minimum score value was 4 and the maximum score 
was 10. 
TOTAL_stage1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 4.00 2 10.5 11.1 11.1 
5.00 4 21.1 22.2 33.3 
6.00 1 5.3 5.6 38.9 
7.00 6 31.6 33.3 72.2 
8.00 2 10.5 11.1 83.3 
9.00 1 5.3 5.6 88.9 
10.00 2 10.5 11.1 100.0 
Total 18 94.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 5.3   
Total 19 100.0   
Table 40 Numbers of participants in the stage1. 
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Table 40 presents participants’ frequencies with respect to their obtained 
scores in stage-2. The highest obtained score was 15 and the lowest 9.  Table 
41 shows that a median of obtained scores during the stage-2 was 11 (also 
known, as the central tendency of Total_stage-2 was 11).  
 
TOTAL_stage2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 9.00 1 5.3 5.6 5.6 
10.00 1 5.3 5.6 11.1 
11.00 7 36.8 38.9 50.0 
12.00 4 21.1 22.2 72.2 
13.00 4 21.1 22.2 94.4 
15.00 1 5.3 5.6 100.0 
Total 18 94.7 100.0  
Missing System 1 5.3   
Total 19 100.0   
Table 41 Numbers of participants in the stage2. 
  
Data from Table 40 can be compared with data in Table 41, which clearly 
demonstrates that the stage-1 maximum score is equal to the stage-2 minimum 
obtained score. These results suggest that the security training method had 
considerably improved participants' ability to identify the root causes of 
vulnerabilities during different stages of the development process. The themes 
identified in these responses can be compared by both stages’ average means, 
which illustrates a substantial difference in their mean values such as Stage-
1=6.7222 and Stage-2=11.7222 in Table 39. 
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3. Histograms 
Figures 43 and 44 show stage-1 and stage-2 score distributions. On the x-axis, the total score of each stage is displayed and on the 
y-axis, the frequency (numbers of participants) score obtained was presented. The graphical presentation of two histograms shows 
that both stages’ maximum frequency was almost the same, although there is a tendency for participants to score higher in stage-2 
after receiving the intervention, in comparison to stage-1. In addition, after comparing the total score of both stages, it can be noticed 
in their mean and standard deviation values that participants appear to have been performed differently before and after receiving 
the intervention. Overall, these results indicated that the intervention had considerably improved participants' ability to identify the 
root causes of vulnerabilities. 
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Figure 43 Showing distribution of scores in stage-1 participants                                            Figure 44 Showing the distribution of scores in stage-2 participant 
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7.3.3.1 Selection of Appropriate Statistical Test for Related Sample Data 
To explore the significance of the difference between the two sample sets of scores, 
the study performed a statistical test. As a guide to choosing an appropriate statistical 
test for the sample data, Figure 45 presents a flow chart, which can be used to show 
researchers how to implement the recommended tests when there are two samples 
of scores. This is done in order to compare students’ scores to measure the 
effectiveness of the ‘VAPs’.  
The observation has paired for each subject (participants) in the sample and 
two successive measurements had performed with the same set of participants 
without and with intervention (security training). As shown in Figure 45, this study had 
chosen a Paired-Samples t Test. The detail of the decision process, which included 
the explanation of why the Paired-Samples t Test was chosen, has been described 
further in the below sub-sections. 
 
Figure 45 Choosing the appropriate statistical test for related two samples to measure the effectiveness of the proposed 
intervention study 
7.3.3.2 Type of Data: Related Samples 
During statistical analysis, it is essential to know what the type of data we have, as we 
are aware that the same group of participants (software developers) performed two 
sets of questionnaires twice and, from them, two sets of total scores were generated, 
which clearly shows we need to categorise the sample data as a related samples or 
paired samples. 
Assumptions 
of Paired-
Sample t Test
Testing for 
Normality 
•Parametric Data
•Paired Sample t 
Test
Type of Data
•Related Sample
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7.3.3.3 Testing for Normality 
A normality test was used to determine if the data were normally distributed. There are 
two main methods of assessing normality:  
1. Graphically: Histograms  
2. Numerically: Test of normality 
 196 
 
1. Histograms 
The visual examination of both stages total scores data in the histograms, in Figures 46 and 47 show that data is normally distributed.  
  
Figure 46  Total_Stage1 scores frequency regarding the students' degree                                  Figure 47 Total_Stage2 scores frequency regarding the students’ degree 
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2. Test of Normality 
Table 42 presents the results from two well-known tests of normality; namely the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test and the Shapiro-Wilk Test. Because of the small sample 
size, which included only 18 participants with one missing value), the Shapiro-Wilk test 
was recommended as being more appropriate for this experiment (< 50 samples). For 
this reason, the author used the Shapiro-Wilk test numerical means for measuring 
normality.  
From Table 42, it would be claimed that for Degree_code the dependent 
variable "Gaming" and "Computing”, with the independent variables "Total_stage1" 
and “Total_stage2”, data were normally distributed.  
To validate the test of normality, it is vital to know that, if the Sig. value of the 
Shapiro-Wilk Test is higher than 0.05, then the data is normal. If it is below 0.05 then 
the data significantly deviates from a normal distribution. 
Tests of Normality 
 
DegreeCode 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TOTAL_stage1 Gaming .237 9 .154 .930 9 .486 
Computing .236 9 .161 .864 9 .106 
TOTAL_stage2 Gaming .240 9 .144 .941 9 .595 
Computing .196 9 .200* .872 9 .130 
Table 42 Normality tests shown in the 'sig columns’. 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
In Table 42 tests of normality, there were no significant results in the sig 
columns value that is equal or less than 0.05. Neither normality test includes any 
statistically significant results, and this has been confirming observations from the 
histograms in Figures 46 and 47. Taken together, these results suggest that the data 
was normally distributed.  
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7.3.3.4 Assumptions of Paired-Sample t Test 
1. Assumption #1: Dependent variable should be measured on 
a continuous scale. The dependant variables are on a continuous scale such 
as Total_stage1 scores range from 0 to 3. 
2. Assumption #2: Sample independent variables should consist of two 
categorical, "related groups" or "matched pairs". The sample independent 
variable consists of two categories “Gaming” and “Computing” participants  
3. Assumption #3: There should be no significant outliers in the differences 
between the two related groups. There is no prominent outlier in the sample. 
4. Assumption #4: The distribution of the differences in the dependent 
variable between the two related groups should be approximately normally 
distributed. The test of normality confirms this. 
7.3.3.5 Paired-Samples t Test Discussion 
The paired-samples t Test compares the means between two related groups on the 
same continuous, dependent variable. For example, the study uses the paired-
samples t-test to measure whether there was a difference in participants (software 
developers) performance related to finding vulnerabilities during software 
development process before and after receiving the intervention (a secure training 
method). In this case, the dependent variable is “total score”, and related groups 
(gaming and computing) would be the obtained score values “before=Total_stage1” 
and “after=Total_tsage2” the intervention study. 
The subject in the sample was the same and focused on the difference between 
two successive measurements: stage-1 (Pre-Assessment) score and stage-2 (Post-
Assessment) score. Specifically, we were interested in the difference between the first 
and second scores for each participant. The test is performed to see if scores 
improved. To test the hypothesis the researcher had to perform the test. Therefore, in 
this test, the null hypothesis suggests that there was no improvement in the 
participants’ scores. 
• Stage-1-Pre-Assessment Survey Study: Participants (software developers) 
were asked to answer a series of questions in order to measure their knowledge 
of common software errors (vulnerabilities). The stage-1 questions included 
SQL Injection (CWE-89), Buffer Overflow (CWE-120), Missing Authentication 
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for Critical Function (CWE-306), Missing Authorization (CWE-862), Use of 
Potentially Dangerous (Deprecated) function (CWE-676), Incorrect Calculation 
of Buffer Size (CWE-131). 
• After receiving the “intervention”. 
• Stage-3-Post-Assessment Survey Study: Participants (software developers) 
were asked to answer similar questions in order to measure how much they 
had improved in their knowledge about common software errors 
(vulnerabilities). The stage-2 questions followed the same format and included 
similar questions, such as SQL Injection (CWE-89), Buffer Overflow (CWE-
120), Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306), Missing 
Authorization (CWE-862), Use of Potentially Dangerous (Deprecated) function 
(CWE-676), Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size (CWE-131). 
7.3.3.6  Result Discussion of Paired-Samples t Test  
Table 43 provides summary statistics for the two conditions. This includes the sample 
size (N=18), mean, standard deviation and standard error mean for the dependent 
variables (Total_stage1 and TOTAL_stage2) for each condition of the independent 
variable (Gaming and Computing).  
The detailed analysis included all questions to measure significant differences. 
The experiment hypotheses state that participants would score more after receiving 
the intervention, which was intended to help participants to identify the root causes of 
vulnerabilities, in contrast to participants’ scores before receiving the intervention. The 
null hypothesis is rejected, and participants improved their ability to identify the root 
causes of vulnerabilities after the intervention, during stage-2. 
7.3.3.6.1 Paired Sample Statistics Table 
Table 43 presents the mean number of participants and the standard deviation values 
of the variables. As shown in Table 43, there were six pairs: the first pair presented 
the difference between both stages’ total scores and the remaining pairs described the 
difference in both stages of each set of questions’ scores. The mean column defined 
all six pairs mean value differences, N column included the number of participants, 
and then the St. Deviation column explained the standard deviation differences.  
 
 200 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 
 
Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 TOTAL_stage1 6.7222 18 1.84089 .43390 
TOTAL_stage2 11.7222 18 1.36363 .32141 
Pair 2 Q1-s1 1.22 18 1.060 .250 
Q1-S2 2.11 18 .963 .227 
Pair 3 Q2-s1 1.22 18 .647 .152 
Q2-S2 2.06 18 1.056 .249 
Pair 4 Q3-s1 1.75 16 1.291 .323 
Q3-S2 2.63 16 .500 .125 
Pair 5 Q4-s1 1.39 18 .916 .216 
Q4-S2 2.56 18 .511 .121 
Pair 6 Q5-s1 1.41 17 .712 .173 
Q5-S2 2.41 17 .618 .150 
Table 43 Paired samples statistics for total and all questions scores 
From Table 44, it would be suggested that there was a significant correlation 
between pair2 and pair6 (Q1 and Q5). 
Paired Samples Correlations 
 
N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 TOTAL_stage1 & TOTAL_stage2 18 .085 .739 
Pair 2 Q1-s1 & Q1-S2 18 .550 .018 
Pair 3 Q2-s1 & Q2-S2 18 .325 .188 
Pair 4 Q3-s1 & Q3-S2 16 -.052 .849 
Pair 5 Q4-s1 & Q4-S2 18 .014 .956 
Pair 6 Q5-s1 & Q5-S2 17 .584 .014 
Table 44 Paired samples statistics and correlations 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired 
Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper 
Pair 1 TOTAL_stage1 - 
TOTAL_stage2 
-3.90783 -9.659 17 .000 
Pair 2 Q1-s1 - Q1-S2 -.410 -3.915 17 .001 
Pair 3 Q2-s1 - Q2-S2 -.315 -3.389 17 .003 
Pair 4 Q3-s1 - Q3-S2 -.125 -2.485 15 .025 
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Pair 5 Q4-s1 - Q4-S2 -.648 -4.745 17 .000 
Pair 6 Q5-s1 - Q5-S2 -.685 -6.733 16 .000 
Table 45 Result of the paired samples t test 
 
Table 45 reports that the mean score during stage-2 (M= 11.7222, 
SD=1.36363) is significantly (t= -9.659 and p< 0.05) greater than the mean score of 
the same participants during stage-1 (M= 6.7222, SD=1.84089). 
7.3.3.7  Conclusion  
As t (17) = -3.9078, p < 0.001 and the mean values of the two score pairs values and 
from the direction of the t-value, it can be concluded that there is a statistically 
significant improvement in participants’ scores after receiving the intervention, which 
ranges from 6.722 ± 1.84 to 11.72.52 ± 1.84 (p < 0.001). Hence, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, which indicates that there is no significant difference in participants' ability to 
identify the root-causes of vulnerabilities with intervention. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the proposed intervention improved participants' ability to identify the 
root causes of vulnerabilities during different stages of the development process. 
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7.4 Research Hypothesis  
 
Research 
Question 
Is there a difference between “formal” and “informal” 
intervention in order to provide information of 
vulnerabilities? 
EH-3 There is a difference between “formal” and “informal” 
interventions in order to provide information of vulnerabilities.   
EH-0  There is no significant difference between “formal” and 
“informal” interventions in order to provide information of 
vulnerabilities.   
Dependent 
Variables 
Total_Score-Stage2 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Code  
1=Formal 
2=Informal 
Key Terms Formal training method= Formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
Informal training method= Informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
Table 46 Research question and hypothesis 
7.4.1.1 Descriptive Analysis of Total_Score_Stage2 Based on the Intervention 
Type 
Table 47 presents a case processing summary, in which there were 39 participants. 
During stage2, participants trained using “Vulnerability Anti-Pattern” about prevalent 
vulnerabilities while using two types of formats: 1=Formal training method, 2=Informal 
training method. Out of 39, 18 participants had received the formal intervention and 
21 participants had received the informal intervention. 
Case Processing Summary 
 
VulnerabilityAntiPatternCode 
Cases 
Valid Missing 
N Percent N Percent 
Total_Score_Stage2 Formal 18 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Informal 21 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Table 47 Case processing summary stage2 
Simple statistical analysis was used to measure the mean of both types of 
interventions to evaluate the difference in participants’ scores. The means of 
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total_Score_Stage2 for “Formal intervention” is 11.83, whereas the “Informal 
intervention” mean is 11.33. Thus, it can be concluded that there is no difference in 
participants mean scores as shown in Table 48. 
Descriptives 
 
VulnerabilityAntiPatternCode Statistic Std. Error 
Total_Score_Stage2 Formal Mean 11.83 .390 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 11.01  
Upper Bound 12.66  
5% Trimmed Mean 11.93  
Median 12.00  
Variance 2.735  
Std. Deviation 1.654  
Minimum 8  
Maximum 14  
Range 6  
Skewness -.668 .536 
Kurtosis .385 1.038 
Informal Mean 11.33 .634 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 10.01  
Upper Bound 12.66  
5% Trimmed Mean 11.74  
Median 12.00  
Variance 8.433  
Std. Deviation 2.904  
Minimum 0  
Maximum 15  
Range 15  
Skewness -3.156 .501 
Kurtosis 12.403 .972 
Table 48 Descriptive analysis  
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Table 49 presents the highest and lowest obtained scores during each type of 
intervention. Interestingly, the participant who got “informal intervention” case number 
6 obtained full marks. Case number 10 is an outlier because this participant performed 
stage-1 but did not complete the questionnaire in stage-2. 
Extreme Values 
 
VulnerabilityAntiPatternCode Case Number Value 
Total_Score_Stage2 Formal Highest 1 19 14 
2 20 14 
3 23 14 
4 2 13 
5 4 13a 
Lowest 1 21 8 
2 18 9 
3 22 11 
4 15 11 
5 13 11b 
Informal Highest 1 6 15 
2 8 13 
3 29 13 
4 31 13 
5 33 13a 
Lowest 1 10 0 
2 25 9 
3 36 10 
4 26 10 
5 34 11b 
Table 49 Highest and lowest scores’ table during stage-2 
a. Only a partial list of cases with the value 13 are shown in the table of upper 
extremes. 
b. Only a partial list of cases with the value 11 are shown in the table of lower 
extremes. 
 
7.4.1.2 Selection of Appropriate Statistical Tests for the Sample Data 
A normality test was performed similar to Section 7.3.4, Table 50 presents the results 
from two well-known tests of normality. In this case, the Shapiro-Wilk Test is more 
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appropriate for small sample sizes (< 50 samples). As can be seen from Table 51, the 
data normality assumption is correct. 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
VulnerabilityAntiPatternCode 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Shapiro-
Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic 
Total_Score_Stage2 Formal .196 18 .066 .910 
Informal .264 21 .001 .642 
Table 50 Tests of normality 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
VulnerabilityAntiPatternCode 
Shapiro-Wilka 
df Sig. 
Total_Score_Stage2 Formal 18 .085 
Informal 21 .000 
Table 51 Tests of normality 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
7.4.1.3  One-Way ANOVA Test 
Since the normality test indicated that stage-2 participants’ data (after receiving the 
intervention) was normally distributed, a parametric type of test was required to 
analyse the statistical significance of results gained.  
 The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether there 
are any statistically significant differences between the means of stage-2 participants; 
those received two different types of interventions. The test was run using a 0.05 alpha 
level, and was two-tailed, in a bid to detect an effect in either direction. To this effect, 
if a test achieves a p< 0.05, this was deemed to reflect a statistically significant 
difference between the two samples. 
7.4.1.4 Results Discussion of One-way ANOVA Test 
Table 52 details the results of 39 participants who took part in this study and provides 
some very useful descriptive statistics, including the mean, standard deviation and 
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95% confidence intervals for the dependent variable (Vulnerability anti-pattern) for 
each separate group (Formal, Informal), as well as when all groups are combined 
(Total). The tested conditions of the experiments are based on the type of intervention: 
“1=Formal training” included 18 participants and 21 participants provided “Informal 
training”, as well as the mean rank and sum of ranks for the two groups tested. This 
table is very useful because it indicates that both groups had very similar scores and 
which group can be considered as having the highest score, which we need to know 
if we have to interpret a significant result. 
 
Descriptives 
Total_Score_Stage2   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Formal 18 11.83 1.654 .390 11.01 12.66 8 14 
Informal 21 11.33 2.904 .634 10.01 12.66 0 15 
Total 39 11.56 2.393 .383 10.79 12.34 0 15 
Table 52   One-way ANOVA test rank 
Table 53 shows the output of the ANOVA analysis to determine whether there 
is a statistically significant difference between two group means. We can see that the 
significance value is 0.523, p> 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected 
that there is no significant difference between “formal” and “informal” interventions in 
raising awareness of vulnerabilities.   
 
ANOVA 
Total_Score_Stage2   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.423 1 2.423 .417 .523 
Within Groups 215.167 37 5.815   
Total 217.590 38    
 
Table 53 One-way ANOVA test results 
a. Grouping Variable: 
VulnerabilityAntiPatternCode 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
To examine the observed difference in stage2 total score between those who 
received the intervention through “Formal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern” and “Informal 
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Vulnerability Anti-Pattern”, a one-way ANOVA test was performed and found not to be 
significant. We can conclude from the ANOVA test result that there is no significant 
difference in the participants mean scores depending on their received intervention 
type.  
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7.5 Research Hypothesis  
 
Research 
Question 
Is there a difference in software developers’ obtained 
scores in the stage3 depend on receiving the type of 
intervention, which performed after the one weeks? 
EH-4 Software developers will manage to retain vulnerability 
awareness provided by interventions after a gap of one week. 
EH-0 There is no significant difference in software developers’ 
obtained scores in the stage3 after a gap of one week. 
Dependent 
Variables 
Total_Score_stage-2  Total_Score-stage-3 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern type 
1=Formal 
2=Informal 
 
Key Terms 1=Formal 
2=Informal 
Table 54 Research question and hypothesis  
7.5.1.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Stage_2 and Stage_3 Data 
Before performing any formal statistical tests, it was necessary to do a detailed 
exploration and description of the sample data through descriptive analysis. For the 
sample data, this was an essential preliminarily step. For that reason, during the 
descriptive statistical analysis, the sample data had explored thoroughly while 
including a wide range of useful statistics. For example, exploration of frequencies, 
mean values and median values. To supplement the descriptive statistics, the 
graphical representation (Histogram) was included to have a picture of data. The study 
included the following descriptive statistics: 
1. Compare mean, median and mode 
2. Frequencies difference of two samples 
3. Histograms 
 
1. Compare the Mean, Median and Mode 
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Table 55 compares the Mean, Median and Mode of total_Score_Stage2 and 
Total_Score_Stage3, which show that students had managed to retain enough 
knowledge provided via intervention a week before. However, there is a slight 
declination of their scores in stage-3 in comparison to stage-2. 
Mean, Median and Mode Statistics 
 Total_Score_Stage2 Total_Score_stage3 
N Valid 38 31 
Missing 
1 8 
Mean 11.8684 11.0645 
Median 12.0000 11.0000 
Mode 12.00 11.00a 
Std. Deviation 1.47357 2.04834 
Variance 2.171 4.196 
Range 7.00 7.00 
Minimum 8.00 7.00 
Maximum 15.00 14.00 
Table 55  Descriptive analysis of score of both stages 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown  
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2. Frequency Table 
 
Table 56 analyses the difference in frequencies and measured the central tendency 
across stage-2 and stage-3 scores (Total_Score_Stage2 and Total_Score_Stage3). 
Table 56 presents participants frequency with respect to their obtained scores during 
stage-2, those obtained scores range from 8 to 15. It appears from Table 56 that 
frequently obtained score by participants during stage-2 is 12 (also known, as central 
tendency of Total_stage2 was 12). Although, the lowest score was 8 and maximum-
score 15.  
 
Total_Score_Stage2 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 8.00 1 2.6 2.6 2.6 
9.00 2 5.1 5.3 7.9 
10.00 2 5.1 5.3 13.2 
11.00 9 23.1 23.7 36.8 
12.00 11 28.2 28.9 65.8 
13.00 9 23.1 23.7 89.5 
14.00 3 7.7 7.9 97.4 
15.00 1 2.6 2.6 100.0 
Total 38 97.4 100.0  
Missing 
 
1 2.6   
Total 39 100.0   
Table 56  Stage2 obtained scores frequencies 
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Table 57 presents scores’ frequency obtained during stage3, frequently 
obtained scores range from 7 to 14.  It appears from Table 31 that median in the stage3 
was 11 (also known, as central tendency of TOTAL_stage3 was 11). Although, lowest 
score was14 and highest score 14. 
Total_Score_stage3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 7.00 3 7.7 9.7 9.7 
8.00 1 2.6 3.2 12.9 
9.00 2 5.1 6.5 19.4 
10.00 5 12.8 16.1 35.5 
11.00 6 15.4 19.4 54.8 
12.00 5 12.8 16.1 71.0 
13.00 6 15.4 19.4 90.3 
14.00 3 7.7 9.7 100.0 
Total 31 79.5 100.0  
Missing 
 
8 20.5   
Total 39 100.0   
Table 57 Stage3 obtained scores frequencies 
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3. Histogram 
Figures 48 and 49 show the distribution of participants’ scores of both stage-2 and stage-3. On the x-axis, the total score of each 
stage was displayed; on the y-axis, the frequency (numbers of participants) of participants is presented. The graphical presentation 
of two histograms clearly revealed that both stages highest scores frequency is the almost same, although there is a tendency for 
participants to score higher in the stage-2: just after receiving the intervention rather than in the stage-3, which was conducted after 
a week gap. To compare the total score of both stages, it can be observed especially in their mean and standard deviation values 
those participants’ performance declines after a week gap in receiving the intervention.  
 
Figure 48 Score distribution of participants in the stage2                                                        Figure 49 Score distribution of participants in the stage3 
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7.5.1.2 Discussion 
The null hypothesis is not rejected; hence, software developers manage to retain 
vulnerability awareness provided by interventions after a gap of one week. It can 
be concluded that in stage-3, the average score is 11 that obtained by 6 
participants, although during stage-3 the average score is 12, which was obtained 
by 11 participants., Therefore, it is clearly justified that during stage-2 the highest 
obtained score 14 in comparison to stage-3 where the highest obtained score 
was 15 as shown in Figures 48 and 49. These results suggested that after a gap 
of 7 days since they received the intervention, participants' ability to identify the 
root cause of vulnerabilities had reduced slightly. The themes identified in these 
responses can be compared by the average mean of both stages, which shows 
a difference in their mean values such as Stage-2=11.87 and Stage-3=11.06 in 
Table 55. Overall, this is not a significant result. 
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7.5.1.3 Selection of Appropriate Statistical Test for the Sample Data 
Similar to Section 7.3.4, Table 58 shows that data is normalised. 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
VAP 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Total_Score_Stage2 Formal .225 14 .052 .925 14 .257 
Informal .247 17 .007 .910 17 .099 
Total_Score_stage3 Formal .158 14 .200* .968 14 .847 
Informal .173 17 .189 .905 17 .082 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Table 58 Normality tests shown in the 'sig columns’ 
7.5.1.4 Assumptions of Paired-Sample t Test 
Same assumptions followed liked Section 7.3.4.3 to select the following Paired-
Sample t Test. 
7.5.1.5 Paired-Samples t Test  
Tables 59, 60, and 61 present the overall results of the paired samples t Test. 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 
Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 Total_Score_Stage2 11.8387 31 1.50769 .27079 
Total_Score_stage3 11.0645 31 2.04834 .36789 
Table 59 Both stages paired analysis  
 
Paired Samples Correlations 
 
N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 Total_Score_Stage2 & 
Total_Score_stage3 
31 .295 .107 
Table 60 Correlation table 
 
Paired Samples Correlations 
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N 
 
 Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 Total_Score_Stage2 & 
Total_Score_stage3 
31 .295 .107 
Table 61 Correlation table  
 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired 
Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper 
Pair 1 Total_Score_Stage2 - 
Total_Score_stage3 
1.56493 2.000 30 .055 
Table 62 Paired t test result  
7.5.1.6 Result Discussion of Paired-Samples t Test  
Table 62 reports the following results: The mean score of the participants of the 
stage-2 (M= 11.84, SD=1.50) is greater than the mean score of same participants 
during stage-3 (M= 11.06, SD=2.05) as t= 2.00 and the value of p=.055 is greater 
than 0.05 as shown in Table 62. However, Table 60 and 61 shown a strong 
correlation between both stages scores. The two-tailed p>0.05, therefore this is 
not a significant result.  
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7.5.2 Assessment of Effectiveness of Intervention Types 
7.5.2.1 Research Question  
ü Is there a significant difference between the participants mean scores in 
the formal intervention group and the informal intervention group after a 
week gap?  
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Total_Score_Stage2  * VAP 38 97.4% 1 2.6% 39 100.0% 
Total_Score_stage3  * VAP 31 79.5% 8 20.5% 39 100.0% 
Table 63  Number of participants 
Report 
VAP Total_Score_Stage2 Total_Score_stage3 
Formal Mean 11.8333 10.9286 
N 18 14 
Std. Deviation 1.65387 1.85904 
Informal Mean 11.9000 11.1765 
N 20 17 
Std. Deviation 1.33377 2.24264 
Total Mean 11.8684 11.0645 
N 38 31 
Std. Deviation 1.47357 2.04834 
Table 64 Both stages mean scores difference 
7.5.2.2 Results Discussion 
Participants were divided into two groups. One group received the formal 
intervention, and the other group received the informal intervention. The detail 
means analysis of dependent variables Total_Score_Stage2 and 
Total_Score_Stage3 and both stages independent variable VAP (Formal and 
Informal) has shown in Table 64. It can be concluded that developers have 
managed to retain more information through the informal intervention (based on 
the informal Vulnerability Anti-Pattern) rather than formal intervention after a gap 
of one week. 
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Report 
VAP Degree Total_Score_Stage2 Total_Score_stage3 
Formal Computing Mean 12.0000 10.3333 
N 4 3 
Std. Deviation 1.15470 1.15470 
Gaming Mean 11.7857 11.0909 
N 14 11 
Std. Deviation 1.80506 2.02260 
Total Mean 11.8333 10.9286 
N 18 14 
Std. Deviation 1.65387 1.85904 
Informal Computing Mean 12.6000 10.6000 
N 5 5 
Std. Deviation 1.51658 2.30217 
Gaming Mean 11.6667 11.4167 
N 15 12 
Std. Deviation 1.23443 2.27470 
Total Mean 11.9000 11.1765 
N 20 17 
Std. Deviation 1.33377 2.24264 
Total Computing  Mean 12.3333 10.5000 
N 9 8 
Std. Deviation 1.32288 1.85164 
Gaming Mean 11.7241 11.2609 
N 29 23 
Std. Deviation 1.50941 2.11526 
Total Mean 11.8684 11.0645 
N 38 31 
Std. Deviation 1.47357 2.04834 
Table 65  Means comparison depending on the participants’ degree 
7.5.2.3 Means Results Discussion 
The study sub-divides the participants depending on their degree (C= computing 
and G=gaming) and type of intervention received as explained in Sections 4.6.1 
and 4.6.2. This evaluation gives some interesting outcomes. For example, Table 
65 compares both degree students mean scores and concludes that gaming 
students (G) manage to retain more information in contrast to computing students 
(C) after a week gap of receiving the intervention. 
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7.6 Control Experiment  
7.6.1 Research Hypotheses   
Research 
Question 
Is there a significant difference between the scores of 
the control and experimental groups?  
EH-5 There is a significant difference between the performance of 
participants provided with intervention and those not 
provided with intervention. 
EH-0 There is no significant difference between the performance 
of participants provided with intervention and those not 
provided with intervention. 
Depended 
Variables 
Total_Score_stage-1  
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Security Training  
No= without intervention  
Yes=with intervention 
 
Table 66 Control experiment research question and hypothesis 
7.6.2 Kruskal-Wallis H test to Compare the Scores of Experimental Group 
and Control Group  
The Kruskal-Wallis H test (sometimes also called the "one-way ANOVA on 
ranks") is a rank-based non-parametric test that can be used to determine if there 
are statistically significant differences between two or more groups of an 
independent variable on a continuous or ordinal dependent variable. It is 
considered the non-parametric alternative to the one-way ANOVA, and an 
extension of the Mann-Whitney U test to allow the comparison of more than two 
independent groups. 
7.6.2.1 Stage-1 Control and Experimental Groups Scores Comparison  
Hypothesis Test Summary 
 Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
1 
The distribution of TOTAL_stage1 is 
the same across categories of 
Groups. 
Independent-Samples 
Kruskal-Wallis Test .512 
Retain the null 
hypothesis. 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
Table 67 Stage-1 hypothesis test  
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Table 67 shows that during stage-1 there is no difference between both groups’ 
scores. 
 
Figure 50 Stage-1 control and experimental groups scores comparison 
As shown in Figure 50, the Kruskal-Wallis test could not provide strong 
evidence of a difference (p> 0.05) between the mean ranks of the groups. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected because there is no significant 
difference between the performance of participants provided with intervention 
and those not provided with intervention. 
7.6.2.2 Stage-2 Control and Experimental Groups Scores Comparison  
Hypothesis Test Summary 
 Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
1 
The distribution of Total_Score_Stage2 
is the same across categories of Security 
Training. 
Independent-Samples 
Kruskal-Wallis Test .000 
Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
Table 68 Stage-2 hypothesis test 
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Table 68 shows that during stage-2 there is a difference in scores of experimental 
and control groups. 
 
Figure 51 Stage-2 control and experimental groups scores comparison 
Figure 51 shows that the Kruskal-Wallis test provided very strong evidence 
of a difference (p < 0.001) between the mean ranks of stage-2 scores of trained 
and non-trained groups. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected that there is no 
significant difference between the performance of participants provided with 
intervention and those not provided with intervention. 
7.6.2.3 Stage-3 Control and Experimental Groups Scores Comparison  
Hypothesis Test Summary 
 Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
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1 
The distribution of Total_Score_stage3 is 
the same across categories of Security 
Training. 
Independent-Samples 
Kruskal-Wallis Test .000 
Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
Table 69 Stage-3 hypothesis test 
Table 69 shows that during stage-3 there is a difference in scores of experimental 
and control groups. 
 
Figure 52 Stage-3 control and experimental groups scores comparison 
Figure 52 shows that the Kruskal-Wallis test provided very strong evidence 
of a difference (p< 0.001) between the mean ranks of stage-2 scores of trained 
and non-trained groups. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected that there is no 
significant difference between the performance of participants provided with 
intervention and those not provided with intervention. However, it does not reflect 
which group performed better.  
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7.6.2.4 Conclusion  
The outcome of the Kruskal–Wallis post hoc test indicates that during stage-1 
there are no differences between group scores. However, during stage-2 and 
stage-3 there is a significant difference between group scores. These differences 
are not significant. In order to determine which group is significantly better than 
other, a Mann-Whitney U test was used.   
7.6.3 Mann-Whitney U Test to Compare the Scores of Experimental 
Group and Control Group 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare differences between 
independent groups, such as control and experimental groups. The Mann-
Whitney U test compares the differences between groups scores to determine if 
there are differences between groups.  
7.6.3.1 Stage-1 Scores Comparison: Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks Table 
Table 70 provides information regarding the output of the Mann-Whitney U test. 
It shows the mean rank and sum of ranks for the two groups tested: experimental 
and control. 
Ranks 
 Security Training N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
TOTAL_stage1 No 14 15.75 220.50 
Yes 18 17.08 307.50 
Total 32   
Table 70 Stage-1 Mann-Whitney U test ranks 
The mean rank indicates which group performed better, overall; namely, 
the group with the highest mean rank. Table 70 indicates that the experimental 
group obtained higher scores in comparison to the control group. 
7.6.3.1.1 Mann-Whitney U Test Table 
Table 71 shows the significant value of the test. Specifically, Table 71 provides 
the U statistic, as well as the asymptotic significance (2-tailed) p-value. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa 
 TOTAL_stage1 
Mann-Whitney U 115.500 
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Wilcoxon W 220.500 
Z -.408 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .684 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .694b 
Table 71 Stage-1 Mann-Whitney U statistics outcome 
a. Grouping Variable: Security Training 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
From this data, it can be concluded that scores of the experimental group 
were not statistically significantly higher than the control group 
(U =115.50, p >0.05). There is no significant difference between experimental 
and control groups, which shows both groups obtained the same scores not 
receiving the intervention based on vulnerability anti-pattern. 
7.6.3.2 Stage-2 Scores Comparison: Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks Table 
Table 72 provides information regarding the output of the Mann-Whitney U test. 
It shows mean rank and sum of ranks for the two groups tested: without security 
training, and with security training  
Ranks 
 Security Training N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Total_Score_Stage2 No 14 7.50 105.00 
Yes 38 33.50 1273.00 
Total 52   
Table 72 Stage-2 Mann-Whitney U test ranks  
Table 72 shows the highest mean rank of the trained group, which 
indicates that the trained group performed better as having higher scores. In this 
case, the participants with security training had the highest scores. 
7.6.3.2.1 Mann-Whitney U Test Table 
From Table 73 data, it can be concluded that scores of the trained group were 
significantly higher than the non-trained group (U =.000, p <0.001). There is a 
significant difference between the performance of participants provided with 
intervention, as compared to those not provided with training. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa 
 Total_Score_Stage2 
Mann-Whitney U .000 
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Wilcoxon W 105.000 
Z -5.547 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Table 73 Stage-2 Mann-Whitney U statistics outcome 
a. Grouping Variable: Security Training 
 
7.6.3.3 Stage-3 Scores Comparison: Mann-Whitney U Test Ranks Table 
Table 74 provides information regarding the output of the Mann-Whitney U test. 
It shows mean rank and sum of ranks for the two groups tested: without security 
training, with security training. 
Ranks 
 Security Training N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Total_Score_stage3 No 14 7.50 105.00 
Yes 31 30.00 930.00 
Total 45   
Table 74 Stage-3 Mann-Whitney U test ranks 
Table 74 shows the highest mean rank of the trained group, which 
indicates that the group with security training performed better. In this case, the 
participants with security training had the highest scores. 
7.6.3.3.1 Mann-Whitney U Test Table 
From Table 75, it can be concluded that scores of the trained group were 
significantly higher than the non-trained group (U =.000, p <0.001). There is a 
significant difference between the performance of participants provided with 
intervention, and those not provided with intervention. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test Statisticsa 
 Total_Score_stage3 
Mann-Whitney U .000 
Wilcoxon W 105.000 
Z -5.352 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Table 75 Stage-3 Mann-Whitney U statistics outcome 
a. Grouping Variable: Security Training 
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7.7 Pilot-Study-II Overall Results Summary  
The original hypothesis was formulated in order to determine whether participants 
were able to identify vulnerabilities with interventions based on anti-patterns as 
knowledge transfer mediums.  The experimental groups score statistical analysis 
shows that developers improve their awareness of poor security practices 
(vulnerabilities) using VAPs. The research designed two different types of anti-
patterns (“Informal” and “Formal” Section 4.6). To verify the efficacy of 
interventions, the experimental group was divided into halves and provided 
different interventions. The results indicate that there is no significant difference 
between “Informal” and “Formal” Vulnerability Anti-Pattern in term of retaining the 
vulnerability knowledge. The most interesting finding was that an “informal 
intervention was more effective in helping participants to retain an awareness of 
vulnerabilities after a one week gap in comparison to the formal intervention. 
A control experiment was carried out to determine if there were any significant 
differences between the performance of participants provided with intervention 
and those not provided with an intervention. A Quasi-experiment was chosen 
because the students could not be chosen by chance. The results of the 
experiment rejected the null hypothesis: There is no significant difference 
between the performance of participants provided with the intervention and those 
not provided with the intervention.  
It is evidenced by the statistical analysis of pilot-study-II results (see Table 
78) that developers improve their awareness of poor security practices 
(vulnerabilities). However, there is no significant difference between “Informal” 
and “Formal” Vulnerability Anti-Pattern. The most interesting finding was that an 
“informal intervention was more effective in order to help participants to retain an 
awareness of vulnerabilities after a one week gap in comparison to a formal 
intervention. Table 76 presents the pilot-study-II results summary. 
Questions Test 
name 
p-value Normality 
distribution  
Does intervention, based on the use 
of “formal or informal Vulnerability 
Anti-Pattern”, improve participants' 
Paired-
Samples 
T Test 
P<0.001 Yes 
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ability to identify the root-causes of 
vulnerabilities? 
Is there a difference between “formal” 
and “informal” intervention in order 
to provide information of 
vulnerabilities? 
Mann-
Whitney 
Test 
P>0.05 No 
Is there a difference in the scores 
obtained by software developers in 
stage3 depending on which type of 
intervention they received after a 
week gap? 
Paired-
Samples 
T Test 
P>0.05 Yes 
Is there a significant difference 
between the scores of the control and 
experimental groups? 
Mann-
Whitney 
U Test 
p <0.001 No 
Table 76 Pilot-Study-II results summary 
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8 Industrial Study (Qualitative Approach)  
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter details the results of the experimental study which was performed 
with professional software developers to evaluate the efficacy of the vulnerability 
anti-patterns in improving awareness of vulnerabilities. The industrial study is 
divided into three parts 
• Section 8.2 explains the experiment design and questionnaires structure 
which followed the same experimental design as the pilot-study-II. 
• Section 8.3 summarises the results from this study. 
• Section 8.4 empirically evaluates the results based on the qualitative 
approach to prove/ disapprove the hypotheses of this thesis as mentioned 
in Section 1.7. 
8.1.1 General Description  
The Industrial study’s key objectives were to evaluate professional software 
engineers’ (software developers) understanding of security flaws that lead to 
vulnerabilities and to measure the effectiveness of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns to 
help developers in improving their understanding of vulnerabilities. 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Experiment Study Description 
There is no established method to evaluate Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAP) in 
order to provide essential awareness of vulnerabilities. Evaluating and measuring 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern effectiveness with a limited number of participants is 
fraught with difficulty and potential bias. Due to the small sample size, it is difficult 
to apply a quantitative method to perform statistical evaluation such as that 
applied during the Pilot study-II. Pilot study II shows an improvement in 
developers’ awareness about vulnerabilities via VAPs. Therefore, a qualitative 
approach for evaluating the effectiveness of VAP is adopted here. The purpose 
of this approach is to demonstrate the efficacy of VAP in aiding developers in 
finding the vulnerabilities within the vulnerable code/UML diagram, thus 
determining its overall effectiveness in a professional environment. 
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To eliminate bias in the measurement of effectiveness, the five stage 
experiment study was designed (see Section 8.2.2 design of experiment study). 
The design of the experiment was discussed earlier in the Pilot study-II. The 
experiment was developed independently to avoid any bias towards a particular 
technique, domain or environmental requirement. Instead, it was designed to 
illustrate the many ways that intervention could be measured and evaluated. This 
ensures the evaluation framework is fit for general purpose and reusable as a 
common method of evaluation. 
8.2.2 Experiment Design Structure 
In the qualitative process of evaluation, the experimental study was carried out 
alongside the semi-structured interviews as shown in Table 77. 
The semi-structured interview was conducted with participants to overcome the 
small sample size and time limitations, which provides in-depth analysis with 
feedback on VAP. A suitable method of evaluation in a small sample size is to do 
a detailed assessment (Newton 2010). 
The study comprised of five stages supported by an intervention via 
Vulnerability Anti-Patterns. The engineers completed a questionnaire, which 
consist of 15 questions relating to five vulnerabilities. 
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 Group A Group B 
Stage-
1 
 
Pre-Assessment Survey Study  
Input Questionnaire comprised of vulnerable codes or UML diagram 
Outpu
t 
Evaluate participants’ ability to measure their awareness about 
vulnerabilities  
Stage-
2 
 
Intervention Session 
Input 
 
Group A-Formal 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
Group B-Informal Vulnerability 
Anti-Pattern 
 
Outpu
t 
Provide information of vulnerabilities  
 
Stage-
3 
 
Post-Assessment Survey Study 
Input Questionnaire comprised of vulnerable codes or UML diagram 
 
Outpu
t  
Evaluate participants’ ability to measure improvement/ 
deterioration after intervention provided by VAPs 
Stage-
4 
 
Semi-structured interview with Participants (Only with industry) 
After 1 Week (one week gap) 
Stage-
5 
Post-Post-Assessment Survey Study 
Input Questionnaire comprised of vulnerable codes or UML diagram 
Outpu
t  
Evaluate results to measure how much participants able to 
retain the information from the provided intervention based on 
VAPs after a gap of one week. 
Table 77 Description of experiment study structure, including all stages inputs and outputs description. 
8.2.3 Experiment Questions’ Structure 
Similar to Section 7.2.3, which was essentially constructed to test engineers’ 
understanding and awareness of vulnerabilities while specifying their root-causes 
during the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) phases from where the 
vulnerability originated. The aim is to categorise flaws based on SDLC: 
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requirement specification phase flaw, design phase flaw and implementation 
phase flaw. Subsequently, this directs developers’ attention towards the SDLC 
phase from where the vulnerability initiated.  
Each question was designed to ask software developers about the 
following necessary information: For example, part-1 of each question assessed 
participants’ actual knowledge about the vulnerability while providing vulnerable 
code or UML diagram, part-2 investigated participants’ understanding about 
misused or exploitation, and part-3 inspected participants' ability to recognise and 
classify the vulnerabilities using the terminology of the cybersecurity community. 
The question structure is as follows: 
1. Part-1: Vulnerable code or UML diagram 
2. Part-2: Misused or exploited explanation 
3. Part-3: Identify vulnerability formal name 
8.2.4 Vulnerability Sample Size 
For Java developers, the included vulnerabilities are: 
1) Missing Authentication, 
2) Missing Authorization, 
3) SQL injection 
4) Buffer Overflow 
5) Integer Overflow  
 
For C# developers, the included vulnerabilities are: 
1) Missing Authentication 
2) OS Command Injection 
3) Cross-Site Scripting 
4) SQL Injection 
5) Cross-site Request Forgery 
8.2.5 Participants Sample Size 
The study was conducted with five professional software engineers. Table 78 
shows the demographics of the participants. 
 
Participants Assign 
Names 
Degree Software 
Development 
Experience  
P1 Ethical Hacking  2 years 
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P2. P3, P4 Computing  2 years, 1 year, 2 
years 
P5 Computer and Electric 
Engineering  
5 years 
Table 78 Participants information  
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Research Question  
ü Does the Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) improve developers' understanding 
(awareness) to identify the root-cause of vulnerabilities in order to help 
developers to the creation of secure software systems? 
 
To investigate this question, the experimental study was performed with 
professional software engineers. During the experiment study, each participant 
was provided with an intervention based on Vulnerability Anti-Pattern and 
evaluated. The developers obtained scores before and after receiving the 
invention.  
The evaluation experiment study was developed with the purpose of fairly 
assessing the ability of VAP to provide a useful understanding of vulnerabilities. 
The experiment study is structured to determine the followings. 
1. Intervention helps participants’ ability to identify the root-cause of 
Vulnerabilities. 
2. Intervention helps participants’ ability to recognise and classify 
vulnerabilities using the terminology of the cybersecurity community. 
3. There is no difference between “Informal” and “Formal” interventions. 
 
8.3.2 Intervention helps participants’ ability to identify the root-cause of 
Vulnerabilities 
ü The intervention study, which is based on the Vulnerability Anti-pattern will 
improve participants’ ability to identify the root-cause of vulnerabilities during 
the software development process. 
 
In Pilot-Study-II Section 7.2, it was proved while using quantitative statistical 
analysis that intervention is useful in order to improve participants’ ability to 
identify the root-cause of vulnerability. However, this study is based on qualitative 
analysis. The  industrial study designed in two programming languages based on 
engineers’ awareness: 
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1) For Java Engineers  
• Stage-1: Pre-Assessment  
Out of 5 questions, Java based engineers only managed to answer 2 
questions correctly. 
• Stage-3: Post –Assessment  
After getting the intervention, out of 5 questions engineers managed to 
answer 4 questions correctly. 
• Stage-5: Post-Post-Assessment  
Similarly, to stage-3, after a gap of one week in intervention, engineers 
answered 4 questions correct out of 5. 
2) For C# Engineers  
• Stage-1: pre-Assessment  
Out of 5 questions, C# engineers answered the 3 questions correct. 
• Stage-3: Post –Assessment  
After getting the intervention, all engineers managed to answer 5 
questions correct. 
• Stage-5: Post-Post-Assessment  
Unlike stage-3, after a gap of one week in intervention, engineers 
managed to answer 4 questions correct out of 5. 
8.3.3 Results Discussion 
Identifying vulnerabilities within code samples or UML diagram is a complicated 
process. Those engineers who closely worked with the security of software 
systems such as P3, P5, easily target the vulnerabilities in the code samples. 
However, engineers with a computing background struggle to find the 
vulnerabilities in the code samples such as P1, P2. 
Stage-1 and Stage-3 scores comparison presented in Table 79, which 
clearly demonstrates the improvement in engineers’ scores after receiving the 
intervention. Furthermore, those engineers (i.e. P1, P2, and P4), who find 
difficulty in identifying the vulnerabilities during stage-1, after receiving the 
intervention, they also performed well and improved their scores during Stage-3. 
However, engineers’ background knowledge also has an impact on their 
ability to find the vulnerability in the code sample such as P2 engineer with 
computing background scored less than P3 engineer (P3) with cybersecurity 
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background.  After receiving the intervention, both participants scored well during 
Stage-3. Therefore, overall results suggest that intervention improves 
participants’ ability to identify the root-cause of vulnerabilities during the software 
development process. 
Participants  Java  C# Before 
Intervention 
After 
Intervention 
Stage-1 score Stage-3 score 
P1 Y  6 12 
P2  Y  6 14 
P3  Y 11 14 
P4  Y 10 13 
P5   Y 11 13 
Table 79 Participants’ scores before and after intervention  
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8.3.4 Intervention helps participants’ ability to recognise and classify 
vulnerabilities using the terminology of the cybersecurity 
community 
ü The intervention, which is based on Vulnerability Anti-pattern, will improve 
participants’ ability to recognise and classify vulnerabilities using the 
terminology of the cybersecurity community. 
 
The industrial study was designed in two programming languages based on 
engineers’ awareness: 
1) For Java Engineers  
• Stage-1: Pre-Assessment  
Out of 5 questions, Java engineers managed to answer 4 questions 
correctly. 
• Stage-3: Post –Assessment  
After getting the intervention, out of 5 questions engineers managed to 
answer 4 questions correctly. 
• Stage-5: Post-Post-Assessment  
After a gap of one week of receiving the intervention, engineers 
answered all questions correctly. 
2) For C# Engineers  
• Stage-1: Pre-Assessment  
Out of 5 questions, C# engineers answered all question correctly. 
• Stage-3: Post –Assessment  
After receiving the intervention, all engineers managed to answer all 
questions correctly. 
• Stage-5: Post-Post-Assessment  
Similarly, to stage-3, after a gap of one week in having the intervention, 
engineers managed to answer all question correctly. 
 
8.3.5 Results Discussion 
Awareness of cybersecurity terminology is an essential aspect in order to 
understand vulnerabilities. During this part of the experiment, the study results 
show that all engineers are aware of the vulnerabilities’ terminologies that are 
used by the cybersecurity community. 
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Table 80 compares the participants’ score in order to answer the part-3 of 
the questionnaire, which inquires the participants’ awareness of software flaws 
called by cybersecurity experts.  
Two engineers were unaware of Cross-Site Request Forgery and missing 
authorisation vulnerabilities (flaws) terminologies during Stage-1 such as P1 and 
P2. The reason underlying was caused by their expertise and knowledge being 
derived elsewhere.  For example, web-based developers have a different set of 
security priorities than the developers who worked on desktop applications. 
During Stage-1, engineers struggled to find the Cross-Site Request Forgery 
vulnerability, but with the support of intervention, they understood this 
vulnerability and managed to get it correct during Stage-3. However, some 
engineers lack the proper understanding of some vulnerabilities terminologies; 
for example, they got confused between information leakages with missing 
authorisation terminologies. As both vulnerabilities are interdependent/ 
interlinked to each other, thus we considered both answers correct in this case. 
Participants  Java  C# Before 
Intervention 
After intervention 
Stage-1 score Stage-3 
score 
Stage-5 
score 
P1 Y  4 5 5 
P2  Y  3 4 5 
P3  Y 5 5 5 
P4  Y 5 5 5 
P5   Y 5 5 5 
Table 80 Participants scores to identify vulnerabilities terminologies  
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8.3.6 There is no difference between “Informal” and “Formal 
intervention” 
ü There is no difference between “Informal” and “Formal” intervention in order 
to provide information about vulnerabilities. 
 
As mentioned previously in Chapter 4 Section 4.6. VAPs were designed in two 
types: Informal and Formal. Engineers were provided with two kinds of 
interventions. The experiment study aims to measure which kind of intervention 
is more effective. 
1) Informal Intervention  
• Stage-3: Post –Assessment  
Out of 5 participants, 3 were provided with informal intervention, who 
scored 12, 13, and 14 as shown in Table 81. 
• Stage-5: Post-Post-Assessment  
After a gap of one week of receiving an informal intervention, out of 3 
engineers, only 1 performed better while others were managed to retain 
their scores as compared to Stage-3.  
2) Formal Intervention  
• Stage-3: Post –Assessment  
After receiving a formal intervention, engineers scored 14 and 13 
respectively as shown in Table 81.  
• Stage-5: Post-Post-Assessment 
After a gap of one week, the formal intervention had a mixed response 
such as P2 performed better; however, P5 performance was declined as 
compared to Stage-3. 
8.3.7 Results Discussion 
Overall, the results suggest that both interventions help participants to improve 
their ability to identify and recognise vulnerabilities, although the small sample 
size is a limiting factor. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected due to the sample 
size, so there is no difference between “informal” and “formal” intervention. 
As shown in Table 81, it is noticeable that the Informal intervention 
appears easy for engineers’ understanding which is confirmed through participant 
P2 score of 14 during Stage-3 and scored 15 during Stage-5. Although after 
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receiving a formal intervention, participant P5 scored 13 during Stage-3 and 
declined score (12) during Stage-5. 
As discussed previously in Section 4.4, there is no current methodology to 
evaluate VAP types; thus, this study concluded that both “Informal” and “Formal” 
interventions are equally useful in order to provide information of vulnerabilities. 
Participants  Informal Intervention Formal Intervention 
Stage-3 score   Stage-5 score Stage-3 score   Stage-5 score 
P1 12 13   
P2    14 15 
P3 14 14   
P4 13 13   
P5    13 12 
Table 81  Participants scores and intervention type 
8.4 Discussion of Overall Results Including Semi-Structure 
Interview Data  
This section analyses the questionnaires score and semi-structured interview 
data of participants which concludes in two stages. 
8.4.1.1 Pre-Assessment Stage 
The first concern during the pre-assessment stage was whether engineers have 
an understating of vulnerabilities, do they know how vulnerable codes lead to a 
vulnerability. Interestingly, the results obtained from the pre-assessment stage 
shows that engineers had a partial understanding of vulnerabilities.  
Experiment study Q-1 (see appendices Table 67) relates to the create 
Bank Account sub-system, which was comprised of a figure and UML diagram. 
This was used to evaluate the understanding of the engineers about Missing 
Authentication vulnerability. 
This question is based on the UML diagram, which was appeared complex 
for engineers. Overall, during Stage-1, out of 5 engineers only 2 were managed 
to answer correctly. Following are the reasons to use the UML diagram to 
evaluate Missing Authentication vulnerability. 
1) Try to map vulnerability within Software Development Lifecycle. As  
targeted vulnerability commonly raised flaw during the design phase, so 
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we used UML diagram to assess engineers’ understanding about from 
where and when Missing Authentication vulnerability has occurred. 
2)  Evaluate and test engineers’ awareness of the root cause of vulnerability. 
 
Engineers faced difficulty in answering this question due to a lack of 
background knowledge and lack of UML diagram usage in their routine. As 
participants said during the informal semi-structured interview, 
 
P1 said: “Especially in the UML for the authentication authorised one I 
got a bit confused because may I am not used UML diagrams anymore”. 
 
P3 said:” I say that UML diagram in Q-1 is not effective just simply not 
explicitly and everything it is saying”. 
Only in this particular case, it can be concluded that engineers do not use 
UML diagrams; that’s why they could not answer the Q-1 related to Missing 
Authentication vulnerability during Stage-1 as shown in Table 82. 
Overall, during pre-assessment-stage, all engineers have managed to 
answer Buffer Overflow and SQL injection vulnerability related questions 
correctly. 
Consider the scenario in Figure below that is based on the design of a bank login 
system, which creates an account for the valid users only.  
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The UML class diagram below demonstrates the createBankAccount sub-system 
of the online banking system. As createBankAccount is a critical function, can 
you verify the authentication mechanism to ensure that the user has the 
permission to create a new bank account (a bank account is a critical object)? 
On a scale of 1 (not secure) to 3 (very secure), how secure is this authentication 
mechanism?  
 
Choose one of the following answers 
• Not secure 
• Average 
• Very secure 
• Other: 
Table 82 Missing authentication question  
8.4.1.2  Post-assessment & Post-Post-Assessment Stages 
After receiving an intervention during post-assessment stages, there is a 
significant improvement in all engineers’ scores. 
Engineers find the intervention an effective way to provide information of 
security flaws in the vulnerable code. As participants said during the informal 
semi-structured interview, 
 
 P3 said: “Yes, VAP was very clear, certainly with the code examples, 
definitely make it clear and make it standout”. 
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The main concern is related to the effectiveness of VAP in terms of 
whether it provides enough information about a vulnerability.  
 
 P2 said: “the document (VAP) we received just looked like descriptions 
of security vulnerabilities”.  
 
P1 said: ”In reading the anti-pattern, the sheet you gave us was more 
helpful, I thought”. 
 
P4 mentioned: “apart, looking at code reviewing code, for example, the 
ability to identify those is, yea is certainly useful is”. 
 
The second trend was the improvement of engineers understanding in 
the part-2 of each question that was related to the exploitation of vulnerable 
code. 
For example, 
P2 said: “VAPs did give me some insight into security vulnerabilities”. 
 
P5 said: “but I think it would probably be a good reference guide”. 
 
Furthermore, 
 
P3 said: “VAPs are a good way to explain the vulnerability in itself, so 
developers might understand the idea, especially inexperienced 
developers who might not understand why if they are putting their code 
would be a vulnerability rather than from the opposite direction 
understanding how something would be exploited immediately. I think it 
could be a very effective way of preventing vulnerabilities”. 
 
The third trend was how user-friendly VAPs are for engineers.  The 
vulnerable code example in the VAP support engineers to understand the 
vulnerability in a well-defined fashion such as  
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P5 said: “I was never got across to cross site forgery vulnerability 
whatever it called, so VAP of cross-site request forgery example was a 
very good example, because I thought, ah right that makes sense”. 
 
P4: “certainty in CRSFG one there, the example you gave in the sheet 
certainly very clear, you know, when you just picturing in your head 
exactly how it works, so the description and explanation are good for us”. 
 
P5 said:” one thing is a probably good idea in VAPs because your kind 
understands the general idea of it, but you see the code examples 
probably quite helpful particular for the cross-site request forgery.so I 
think having a code example that in particular, one is good”. 
 
In particular, engineers find VAPs more helpful against those 
vulnerabilities in which they do not have background knowledge. 
 
P5 said: “I think they are pretty understandable, I think is, well at least for  
programmers, you, I think you beat them understand, why you won’t do 
this, what wrong with it, and how to avoid it”. 
  
Some important comments raised by participants are: 
 
P4 said: “They (VAPs) would be useful only if readily available and 
referred to regularly. Would also be useful for code reviews, but again 
only if readily available/easily accessible”. 
 
P3 said: “be exploited immediately. I think it could be a very effective way 
of preventing mistakes made of being in the first place”. 
 
Overall these stages results suggest that engineers easily understand 
VAPs and their usage helps engineers to identify and recognise vulnerabilities 
effectively. 
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The third trend was how user-friendly VAPs are for engineers.  The 
vulnerable code example in the VAP supports engineers in understanding the 
vulnerability in a well-defined fashion such as Cross-Site Request Forgery 
vulnerability.   
8.4.1.3 Industrial Study Overall Results Summary  
The sample size of the industrial study was very small in comparison to PS-I and 
PS-II. Due to this reason, it is difficult to draw a significant conclusion. However, 
overall study results show essential outcomes such as intervention based on 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) is an effective way to provide developers with a 
necessary awareness of poor security practices that cause vulnerabilities. This 
knowledge transformation can bridge the security knowledge gap between 
software developers and cybersecurity experts in order to the creation of secure 
software systems.   
The study used a qualitative research method, including semi-structured 
interviews, which analysed experiment results to investigate developers’ 
understandings of recurrent vulnerabilities and to the measure effectiveness of 
VAPs in order to improve vulnerabilities awareness. Several interesting trends 
emerged from this evaluation study to show the potential of VAPs as a solution 
against recurrent vulnerabilities to prevent and mitigate them. Industrial study 
overall results summary is: 
• For all participants, intervention improves their ability to identify the root-
cause of Vulnerabilities. 
• In general, participants were aware of vulnerabilities using the terminology of 
the cybersecurity community; however, some of them were unaware due to 
their background knowledge. 
• Due to small sample size, there is no significant difference between 
“Informal” and “Formal intervention”.  
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9 Discussion 
This chapter will discuss the results, which were obtained and analysed in pilot-
study-I, pilot-study-II and the industrial study reported in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, 
respectively. 
Overall, the discussion will examine how the results relate to the research 
question “Can a pattern-based approach (Vulnerability Anti-Pattern) be effective 
in bridging the security knowledge gap between software developers and security 
experts in order to help developers in the creation of secure software systems?”  
9.1 Discussion of Results  
9.1.1 Reflection on Pilot-Study-I 
Pilot-study-I aimed to evaluate the students’ understanding of recurrent 
vulnerabilities. There was no intervention during this study. Overall, the Pilot-
study-I results suggest that computing degree related students (Developers) 
were lacking an effective awareness, which would enable them to identify 
recurring security flaws, coupled with an awareness of how malicious hackers 
can exploit these flaws 
However, background knowledge has a significant impact on developers’ 
abilities to prevent and mitigate vulnerabilities. For example, Ethical Hacking 
degree students performed well in identifying vulnerabilities in comparison to 
computing degree students. Furthermore, statistically significant results gained 
while evaluating the questionnaire results of participants shows that computing 
degree students lack the vulnerability awareness in comparison to ethical hacking 
degree students. However, computing students perform better than ethical 
hackers in coding phase related vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow and 
integer overflow. The primary goal of PS-I was to investigate the participants’ 
(students’) ability to identify software development errors that lead to 
vulnerabilities. Participants were given vulnerable code samples or UML class 
diagram and asked them to identify development errors. Furthermore, to explore 
the participants’ ability to know how malicious hacker exploit these vulnerabilities. 
The PS-I concluded that software developers are different from ethical hackers 
due to their background knowledge and type of tasks. Software developers 
worked to develop software, but ethical hackers worked as penetration testers to 
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find security flaws or vulnerabilities. The groups: penetration testers and software 
developers did not share common ground knowledge. The results of this case 
study, therefore, raise the concern that computing students lack the awareness 
of vulnerabilities and do not know how malicious hackers can exploit these. This 
case study also highlighted another fact that ethical hacking students lack the 
understating of coding level vulnerabilities.  
9.1.2 Reflection on Pilot-Study-II 
Based on the findings and limitations of the pilot-study-I, as discussed in Section 
6.3.6, which raised some concerns and justified further investigation in PS-II such 
as vulnerable code samples would need to understandable and accessible to 
explain the target vulnerability, as discussed in following chapter PS-II. The 
experiment design of PS-II considered the PS-I limitations and designed a more 
structured experiment. The participants were split up into two distinct groups:  
1) Experimental group (with the invention based on Anti-patterns) 
2) Control group (without intervention) 
During PS-II, the guideline and examples were chosen with great care. 
The experiment was designed to test the following hypothesis 
H1: There is a significant difference between the performances of those 
students who received the intervention and those who did not receive the 
intervention. 
The null hypothesis is stated as  
H0: there is no significant difference between the performance of the 
students with or without intervention. 
The results of the variance analysis indicate that performance of students 
provided with the intervention based on Anti-patterns was significantly better than 
those not provided with intervention. This provides quantitative support to our 
argument that Anti-patterns have a positive impact on transferring knowledge of 
poor development practices. The results from our quantitative analysis were 
confirmed by an observed difference in scores between the members of two 
groups during PS-II. The experimental group of students were demonstrated 
remarkable improvement in finding the vulnerabilities in code once they were 
provided with the VAP patterns support as an intervention. 
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It is evident from the statistical analysis of pilot-study-II results that 
developers improved their awareness of poor security practices, after receiving 
the intervention based on Vulnerability Anti-Pattern. Furthermore, statistically 
significant results showed, that intervention helped participants’ developers to 
understand vulnerabilities with the insight of how they can prevent them. 
Furthermore, just after receiving the intervention (without a week gap), there is 
no statistically significant difference between the “Informal” and “Formal” 
interventions. However, after a week, there was a significant trend of showing 
that “informal intervention is more effective in order to retain vulnerabilities 
awareness”. 
9.1.3 Reflection on Industrial Study 
In comparison to PS-I and PS-II, the industrial study was based on qualitative 
analysis due to the very small sample size. The results of the industrial study 
were unable to provide statistical significance trends, concluded that with the use 
of VAPs professional engineers (developers) improved their ability to identify the 
root-cause of vulnerabilities. In general, participants were aware of vulnerabilities’ 
terminologies used by the cybersecurity community such as cross-site request 
forgery and potential dangerous function calls. In addition, two engineers lacked 
information of integer overflow and cross-site request forgery vulnerabilities, 
which could be due to their background knowledge. These results are not 
significant as the sample size was too small, and engineers had different levels 
of experience with different background knowledge. Furthermore, the study was 
unable to show the difference between “Informal” and “Formal” interventions. 
Several interesting trends emerged from this evaluation study to show the 
potential of VAPs as a knowledge transfer mechanism. 
9.1.4 Conclusion  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the complicated structure of vulnerability databases 
(VDBs) and their inadequacies in capturing and transferring vulnerability 
knowledge via existing pattern-based approaches pose significant challenges to 
software developers. The contention between raising vulnerability awareness 
and the transfer of security knowledge is paramount to success in an effective 
way of capturing and transferring of vulnerability knowledge, in comparison to the 
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efficacy existing efforts such as security patterns, attack patterns and software 
fault patterns. As discussed in Section 2.11.1 due to a lack of shared 
understanding between cybersecurity and software engineering communities – 
there is a distinct communication gap when it comes to addressing recurring 
security problems, known as vulnerabilities. This research designed a new 
approach Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP), which includes two key components: 
(i) an anti-pattern which captures and transforms information on vulnerability and 
its common footprints to explain how a malicious hacker can exploit, and (ii) a 
pattern which provides solutions and mitigation techniques against the 
vulnerability. Moreover, as developers are familiar with pattern-based 
approaches, Vulnerability Anti-Patterns are designed to provide understandable 
vulnerability knowledge to developers. To evaluate the efficacy of VAP, empirical 
studies were conducted to determine whether VAPs are significantly effective to 
provide vulnerabilities awareness to developers as a knowledge transfer medium. 
The results of PS-I, PS-II and the industrial study confirmed the effectiveness of 
VAPs to raise awareness of vulnerabilities. These experiments quantitatively and 
qualitatively confirmed earlier assertions about the usefulness of VAPs of 
presenting poor security practices via Anti-patterns. The results of PS-II provided 
significant outcomes to improve participants vulnerability awareness via VAPs. 
These differences in participants’ performance can be attributed to the 
effectiveness of VAPs in presenting vulnerability knowledge as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Background knowledge of the participants was another impacting factor, 
which suggested that software developers are different from ethical hackers due 
to their background knowledge and nature of work. Software developers worked 
to develop software; however, ethical hackers worked as penetration testers in 
order to find security flaws or vulnerabilities. Both groups: penetration testers and 
software developers do not share common ground knowledge of software 
exploitation. An industrial study was performed with professional software 
developers and also confirmed the potential of the vulnerability anti-patterns in 
providing the awareness of vulnerabilities. We found that there is a great deal of 
hype, but very little hard evidence about the benefits and pitfalls of using anti-
patterns in software engineering education and none on capturing vulnerabilities 
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from cybersecurity community (see Section 2.14). It is apparent from the findings 
of our studies that anti-patterns have the potential to help to find vulnerabilities 
during the SDLC and to provide them with solutions. Therefore, the results 
suggest that giving anti-patterns as developers’ train have a significant effect on 
transferring vulnerability knowledge to software developers. Anti-patterns capture 
poor practices. Vulnerabilities are poor practices which can be exploited by 
hackers, so using anti-patterns to transfer poor security practice knowledge 
shows promise in reducing code related vulnerabilities. 
 
9.2  Experimental Studies Limitations  
9.2.1 Avoidance Bias 
Several steps were taken to avoid introducing any type of bias into the 
experiments. When partaking in the experiments, participants were initially told 
the purpose of the research was to assess and measure their core understanding 
and mitigation knowledge of software developers about the most commonly 
occurring software errors (vulnerabilities). Participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire and some simple tasks. All instructions were provided before each 
task began. No risks or discomforts were anticipated from taking part in this study. 
For data analysis and interpretation, participants were asked to answer all the 
questions and complete the tests. However, if a participant felt uncomfortable 
with any of our questions/tests, he/she was able to skip that question/test or 
withdraw from the study altogether. Participation was voluntary. All data and 
responses were kept entirely confidential. The data did not contain any personal 
information except participants age, gender and degree programme. Participants’ 
names were replaced with a participant number, and it is not possible to identify 
people from any of the gathered data.   
9.2.2 Very Small Sample Size 
Results obtained of studies such as PS-I, PS-II, and industrial studies were 
insignificant due to the very small sample size. In the PS-I, students were 
recruited regardless of their background knowledge, considering all of them to be 
software developers. The results of PS-I show that participants with a 
cybersecurity background are aware of vulnerable codes and not considered to 
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be software developers. Therefore, during PS-II we recruited only final year 
computing-related degree students, known as software developers. In PS-II, only 
those students were recruited who were well versed in specific programming 
languages. Only 38 students were recruited in PS-II. 
Professional programmers are hard to recruit and are expensive. During 
the Industrial study, only five professional software developers were recruited. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to come by an adequate pool of professional developers 
in locations that do not have a significant software developmental industrial base.  
In PS-I, participants with cybersecurity knowledge results were not reliable. To 
rectify these unreliable results, during PS-II, we only recruited computing related 
degree students known as software developers. However, during Industrial study, 
one of the participant’s possessed cybersecurity knowledge, which influenced our 
results. 
9.2.3 Students as Participants 
During our research, it was relatively easy to use students as subjects in PS-I 
and PS-II. Such experiments in software engineering are often criticized due to 
their artificial settings. To prove the practical implementation of experimental 
results in a realistic setting, the industrial study included sample subjects from the 
professional developer population that we aim to make claims about. Students 
are more accessible, easier to hire and are generally inexpensive. PS-I and PS-
II were easier to run and to reduce the risks, than experiments with professionals. 
PS-I and PS-II were carried out to test experimental design and initial hypotheses 
with students as participants, before conducting experiments with professionals’ 
developers. The potential goal of PS-I and PS-II was to gain an understanding of 
the basic issues without deliberately aiming for external validity. Conducting 
experiments with students was the first step to the measured effectiveness of 
VAPs in the knowledge transfer process, and the aim was to reduce risks and 
costs. However, students lack the experience or understanding of professionals, 
which is the main disadvantage of PS-I and PS-II. This affects the validity of 
results. In our research, the students were paid, and the experiment was not 
considered a part of the course. PS-I and PS-II were carried out to test 
experimental design and initial hypotheses with students as participants, before 
conducting experiments with professional developers. 
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9.2.4 Background Knowledge of Subjects 
Background knowledge of participants was another important factor that 
influenced the experimental results. On the basis of participants’ background 
knowledge, they were divided into two groups: ethical hackers, and software 
developers (PS-I). Ethical hackers possessed knowledge of cybersecurity that 
influenced experimental results. Hence during PS-II, ethical hacking students 
were not recruited as potential participants. Consequently, the initial number of 
potential participants was low. Moreover, the remaining participants were only 
software developers, who were assumed to lack the awareness of errors that led 
to vulnerabilities. In addition, the remaining participants had learnt different 
programming modules. For example, gaming students were aware of C\C++ 
programming languages, and computing students were aware of PHP 
programming languages. Thus, participants were further sub-divided that 
reduced the sample size and made it difficult to get statistically significant results.    
9.2.5 Lack of Realistic Environment 
Experiments were executed in an artificial environment, with a controlled group 
and in a short period of time. This makes it difficult to obtain meaningful results.    
9.2.6 Evaluating usability  
This research carried out three main studies to evaluate the effectiveness of 
VAPs in order to provide developers with an understanding of code 
vulnerabilities. In PS-II, control and treatment (experimental) groups’ comparison 
suggest that participants improved their ability to understand and mitigate 
vulnerabilities via VAPs. The scope of this study only considered the software 
engineering and cybersecurity domain aspects related to vulnerabilities. Due to 
limited research time, these studies were unable to verify usability, which requires 
a longitudinal field experiment while considering the other influential factors such 
as participant psychological and behavioural variables. To verify the efficacy of 
VAPs, we plan to carry out a longitudinal field quasi-experiment. This is a part of 
our future research (see Section 10.4.3).  
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10 Conclusion and Future Work  
This thesis discussed the transfer of desirable and feasible cybersecurity domain 
knowledge from security experts (“Ethical Hackers”) to software engineers. The 
mechanism of knowledge transfers between the work on vulnerability databases 
(VDBs), developers’ perceptions of security issues and the security development 
lifecycle (SDLC) is complex, which creates a distinct communication gap between 
ethical hackers and software engineers as mentioned in Section 2.11. This 
security knowledge gap prevents software developers from making use of 
security domain knowledge in its form of vulnerability databases (e.g. CWE, CVE, 
Exploit DB), which are therefore not appropriate for this purpose. The 
identification of these problems provided the motivation and requirement for a 
useful technique for transferring vulnerability knowledge. A solution is proposed 
in Section 3.4 Vulnerability Anti-Pattern that based upon the improved use of anti-
pattern, which encompasses security domain knowledge. A catalogue of 
Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (see Section 5.4) is developed to provide developers 
with an effective understanding of poor security practices that lead to 
vulnerabilities.  A series of experimental studies (see evaluation Section) has 
been performed to validate the proposed hypothesis (see Section 1.8). The 
results highlight that Vulnerability Anti-Pattern appears to be of value in providing 
an effective understanding of vulnerabilities. 
This chapter concludes the thesis by relating the results and contributions 
to the hypothesis in subsequent Section 10.1. Possible further work is 
summarised in Section 10.5.  
10.1 Conclusion 
A hybrid pattern-based technique to capture security knowledge during 
development has been defined.  The overall goal of this thesis is to contribute to 
the development of secure software systems by improving security vulnerabilities 
awareness among developers:  
• Increasing the Security Flaws Awareness among Developers.  A 
series of case studies performed for the following purposes: to raise 
awareness how vulnerabilities could be exploited by malicious hackers, to 
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measure the effectiveness of VAPs for developers in raising the 
awareness of poor security practices that lead to vulnerabilities. The 
significant results were concluded through the qualitative and quantitative 
research that VAPs are significantly useful in increasing vulnerabilities 
awareness among developers. 
• Awareness of Vulnerabilities via Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP). 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern technique can be used to provide developers 
awareness about how a malicious attacker can exploit a security flaw and 
misuse a system. Each VAP provides insight for developers to think about 
security systematically using an anti-pattern to signify poor security 
practices and a pattern to provide mitigation to solve the identifiable anti-
pattern. The contribution of this thesis is to help developers in identifying 
anti-patterns (vulnerabilities) and enable them to use patterns (solutions/ 
mitigations) against vulnerabilities.  
• Bridging the Security Knowledge Gap between Cybersecurity 
Experts and Software Developers.  VAP encapsulates vulnerability 
information from cybersecurity experts and presents a format that can be 
utilised by developers; anti-pattern (i.e. poor security practices) and 
pattern (i.e. mitigation and solutions mapping into SDLC) template. This 
enables tighter coupling between cybersecurity expertise and software 
development practice to bridge the knowledge gap. A series of 
experiments was performed to measure this; however, further evaluation 
of VAP effectiveness will be explored in our future work. 
Since new security attacks are being discovered and launched all the time, 
the security solutions to prevent the attacks will need to change, and so will need 
for the corresponding Vulnerability Anti-Pattern to stop security attacks. 
10.2 Primary Contribution: Vulnerability Anti-Pattern and its 
Catalogue: A Timeless Way to Capture Poor Software Practices 
(Vulnerabilities) 
To mitigate vulnerabilities, we anticipated a novel approach called Vulnerability 
Anti-Pattern that helps developers understand vulnerabilities, coupled with how 
to mitigate them during software development practices. We propose an 
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extended template of anti-patterns and using this template we produce a 
catalogue of VAPs against 12 vulnerabilities (Table 83 Catalogue of Vulnerability 
Anti-Patterns), chosen from the OWASP list of “Top 25 Most Dangerous Software 
Errors”. Our current catalogue covers SANS Top 10 most commonly occurring 
software errors in “Informal” and “Formal” format for today’s developers. We plan 
to continue maintaining and extending our catalogue in future. 
# Vulnerability Name 
(sourced from CWE (MITRE 
Corporation 2015e) ) 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern 
1 Improper Neutralization of Special 
Elements used in an SQL 
Command 
SQL Injection 
 
2 Missing Authentication Missing Authentication for Critical 
Functions  
3 Missing Authorization Missing Authorization  
4 Buffer Copy without Checking Size 
of Input 
Buffer Overflow  
5 Use of Obsolete Function Use of Deprecated Function  
6 Use of Potentially Dangerous 
Function 
Use of Potentially Dangerous 
Function Calls 
7 Integer Overflow or Wraparound Integer Overflow  
8 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size  
9 Improper Neutralization of Input 
During Web Page Generation 
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
10 Cross Site Reference Forgery  Cross-Site Request Forgery  
11 Use of Externally-Controlled Format 
String 
Format String Injection  
12 Shell injection OS Command Injection  
Table 83 VAPs catalogue  
Despite the relative success of the VAP addressing the fundamental 
problem of cybersecurity (vulnerabilities), it only provides a small contribution to 
solving the large research problem of aiming to provide developers awareness of 
eleven from thousands of discovered vulnerabilities. Future work will continue to 
extend this catalogue and will cover all possible sets of vulnerabilities. 
 253 
 
10.3 Research Outcomes 
The essential argument made in the thesis statement (Section 1.6) is that 
developing an awareness of poor software engineering practices through the use 
of a pattern-based approach can help software developers in the creation of more 
secure software by communicating recurrent exploitable software errors 
repeatedly made during the SDLC. However, existing pattern-based approaches 
are limited by their complicated structure and a lack of understanding of the 
genesis of development errors (Section 2.13) that lead to vulnerabilities.  
The research question driving this research was “Can a pattern-based 
approach (Vulnerability Anti-Pattern) be effective to fill the security knowledge 
gap between software developers and security experts in order to help 
developers in the creation of secure software systems?” We divided the research 
into the following questions: 
• RQ1: Do software developers have an effective understanding of errors 
that lead to the creation of vulnerabilities, coupled with an awareness of 
how malicious hackers can exploit these errors? 
o In response to RQ1, this research demonstrates that developers 
lack an effective understanding of recurrent vulnerabilities as 
investigated in the literature review (Chapters 2 and 3) and 
evaluated through experimental studies (Chapters 6,7 and 8). 
• RQ2: Why are current attempts, in the form of patterns and catalogues of 
vulnerabilities, not successful in communicating security knowledge to 
software developers? 
o In response to RQ2, Current attempts in the form of patterns and 
catalogues of vulnerabilities, are not successful in communicating 
security knowledge to developers as explored through literature of 
existing pattern-based approaches (Chapters 2 and 3) and 
proposed a solution: Vulnerability Anti-Pattern, which based on 
improved use of pattern-based approaches to capture poor 
software development practices (vulnerabilities) (Chapters 4 and 
5). 
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• RQ3: Do developers know how to mitigate these recurrent errors during 
the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)? 
o In response to RQ3, a series of experiments were performed with 
(students and professional software developers) participants to 
explore that do developers know how to mitigate these recurrent 
errors during the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). 
We address RQ1 and RQ2 in Chapter 2 and 3, by analysing existing 
pattern-based approaches and evaluating the issues why current attempts are 
not successful. This thesis addresses these issues by proposing “Vulnerability 
Anti-Pattern (VAP)” that assists software developers in developing an 
awareness of how malicious hackers can exploit errors in software (Chapter 
4). Furthermore, Anti-Patterns can provide sufficient awareness of 
vulnerabilities in order to enable developers to create more secure software 
(RQ1). This bridges the security knowledge gap between software engineers 
and cybersecurity communities by providing information about cybersecurity 
issues in formats that are usable and understandable for developers. 
• In response to the main research question, Vulnerability Anti-
Pattern can help developers to improve their awareness of recurrent 
vulnerabilities.  
We perform a series of experiments in the evaluation section of this 
dissertation (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), which was based on a series of experimental 
studies to measure VAPs effectiveness in raising professional software 
developers’ awareness of common software vulnerabilities. 
o Quantitative analysis of Pilot-study-I suggests that computing 
degree related students (Developers) were not able to identify 
recurring security flaws and were not able to demonstrate an 
understanding of how malicious hackers can exploit these flaws. In 
comparison, the ethical hacking students performed well in being 
able to identify recurring security flaws and demonstrating an 
understanding of how these can be exploited. 
o Quantitative analysis of Pilot-study-II shows that VAPs as an 
intervention, provide developers with the understanding and 
awareness of poor security practices (vulnerabilities) during SDLC, 
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however, there is no significant difference between “Informal” and 
“Formal” Vulnerability Anti-Pattern. The most interesting finding 
was that an “informal intervention was more effective in order to 
help participants to retain an awareness of vulnerabilities after one 
week gap” in comparison to formal intervention. 
o Qualitative analysis of the Industrial study shows that intervention 
through VAPs help participants to understand and identify the root-
cause of vulnerabilities. 
10.4 Significance of the Research 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern is a new pattern-based approach to identify and 
organise vulnerabilities that can provide support for developers to prevent and 
mitigate vulnerabilities. Results from a series of experimental studies recommend 
that Vulnerability Anti-Pattern is an appropriate way to provide vulnerability 
awareness training about poor security practices. The work of this thesis is 
concentrated on Vulnerability Anti-Pattern as a solution against recurring 
vulnerabilities in a reusable and understandable format for developers’ aspects, 
and there is much to do beyond these narrow boundaries. The following section 
will describe some future directions for our work and project our vision.  
10.5 Future Work 
There is a potential to build on this current work as well as expand it into newer 
terrains. Proposed here are some research areas that could be exploited in 
future: 
10.5.1 Catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns 
The Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) catalogue will grow in response to new 
classes of vulnerabilities and proactively, as more people use it and begin to look 
for missing security flaws. An automated tool will generate to keep the databased 
up-to-date. A developer can use multiple VAPs as a reference guide to prevent 
vulnerabilities during software development processes. Identify the connection 
among different sets of vulnerabilities and their mapping into SDLC. Furthermore, 
exploring the relationship between VAPs help us to understand how VAPs can 
be composed against interlinked vulnerabilities. 
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Furthermore, it is possible to study a particular programming language or 
platforms and identify appropriate Vulnerabilities Anti-Patterns. This research 
project is particularly interested in concentrating on vulnerabilities that mistakenly 
occurred due to a developer’s mistake. 
10.5.2 Design a Pattern Language  
Security threats evolve rapidly, requiring developers to be up to date with the 
latest information in order to prepare appropriately for software attacks. 
Education of security for developers is an on-going process. As new 
vulnerabilities will discover, more VAPs will generate against them. There is a 
need to design a pattern-language in order to classify the vulnerabilities with their 
vulnerable exploitation patterns, which will benefit developers to identify, prevent 
and predict potential interlinked or dependent vulnerabilities. My next step is to 
design a pattern-language based on to classify VAPs. 
10.5.3 VAPs Evaluation Considering Usability and Retainability   
In this research, VAPs was evaluated to provide an understanding of 
vulnerabilities. There are many aspects related to VAPs evaluation, which are 
essential to consider such as usability, efficiency and learnability. However, these 
are out of the scope of our research. Nevertheless, this is my future plan to 
examine these above factors and would run trials with a significant number of 
professional developers before developing a commercial product.  
10.5.4 Vulnerability Anti-Pattern Tool 
Vulnerability Anti-Pattern (VAP) has captured vulnerability information as 
depicted in a pattern and anti-pattern, which can be utilised to generate an 
automated security tool. I am aiming to build a tool based on VAP, which would 
warn developers of vulnerabilities during real-time development practices. 
10.5.5 Training Method to Educate Developers about Recurrent 
Vulnerabilities  
Software systems should be as secure as they are usable, but threats to, and 
vulnerabilities within, the augmented complex network of people and software 
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systems make this a challenging task for software developers. Education of 
security through an Anti-Pattern is a beneficial mechanism. 
I am aiming to design a security training package which will use the 
catalogue of Vulnerability Anti-Patterns. This awareness training can help 
developers to learn from others mistakes and gives insight on how to prevent 
them. This training will include in-house and online security training sessions to 
provide developers with awareness about the most-up-to-date security flaws that 
cause vulnerabilities. 
As a result, software developers can able to apply proactive and robust 
security measures, delivering secure software products that are not an easy 
target for cyber-attacks. 
10.5.6 VAP Catalogue Dissemination  
For academic purposes, the online directory will be created to publicise the VAPs. 
However, for commercialisation, VAPs will be used to develop a security training 
and automated tool. Therefore, VAPs will be publicised under copyright 
protection for academic researchers to use. The authors are collaborating with 
the Pattern Languages of Programs (PLoP) researchers to extend and 
disseminate the VAP catalogue for educational purposes. 
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